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Nederlandstalige Samenvatting
De macro-economische wetenschap en haar theoretische modellen zijn sterk geëvolueerd
in de laatste decennia. Het nooit aflatende streven naar almaar realistischere macro-
economische modellen zorgde ervoor dat meerdere assumpties die ooit de kern van deze
modellen vormde, versoepeld werden. Het gevolg is dat de modellen die heden ten dage
gebruikt worden niet meer vergelijkbaar zijn met de modellen die macro-economen des-
tijds gebruikten. Maar hoewel de theoretische funderingen van deze modellen fundamen-
teel gewijzigd zijn, blijft hun doel nog altijd hetzelfde. Hun doel is namelijk het verklaren
van werkelijke fenomenen. Bovendien zijn het belangrijke instrumenten om het effect
van beleid op het gedrag van de verschillende actoren in de economie en hun interactie te
bestuderen.
Deze verhandeling, bestaande uit vier papers, bouwt verder op deze evolutie langs
twee belangrijke dimensies. In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 ligt de focus van deze verhandeling op
een gedetailleerde modellering van de arbeidsmarkt van zowel hoog- als laaggeschoolden.
Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 focussen dan weer op de verwachtingen van gezinnen en de impact
van deze verwachtingen op de macro-economie. Het resultaat is dat elk model dat gecon-
strueerd wordt in deze verhandeling bijdraagt aan ons begrip van de macro-economie en
het effect van het begrotingsbeleid hierop.
Het vertrekpunt in hoofdstukken 2 en 3 is de observatie dat OESO-landen onderling sterk
verschillen inzake de arbeidsmarktprestatie van de laaggeschoolden, veel meer dan in
termen van arbeidsmarktprestatie van de hooggeschoolden. Bovendien is er een sterke
correlatie tussen de geaggregeerde werkgelegenheidsgraad in een bepaald land en de re-
latieve prestatie van laaggeschoolden op de arbeidsmarkt in dat land. Anders gezegd,
in landen waar de geaggregeerde werkgelegenheidsgraad hoog is, is de achterstand van
laaggeschoolden ten opzichte van hooggeschoolden op de arbeidsmarkt typisch klein.
Deze vaststellingen onderstrepen het belang van theoretische macro-economische mod-
ellen die niet alleen kunnen verklaren waarom meer of minder laaggeschoolden aan het
werk zijn, maar ook hoe het beleid de arbeidsmarktprestatie van deze individuen kan ver-
beteren. Dit is hetgeen hoofdstukken 2 en 3 ambiëren. In hoofdstuk 2 richten we ons op
17
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de determinanten van de arbeidsmarktprestatie van de laaggeschoolden. Waarom is het
percentage laaggeschoolden dat werkt hoger dan wel lager in een bepaald land? Welke
rol spelen het begrotingsbeleid en de arbeidsmarktinstituties? Of gaat het hier vooral
om individuele preferenties? Hoe belangrijk is elke component? Dit zijn de vragen die
we proberen te beantwoorden in het tweede hoofdstuk. Hoofdstuk 3 bouwt hierop ver-
der, maar de focus ligt nu veeleer op het simuleren van een reeks beleidsmaatregelen
die mogelijk de arbeidsmarktprestatie van laaggeschoolden bevorderen. Welke middelen
heeft de overheid om het percentage tewerkgestelde laaggeschoolden te verhogen? Zijn
deze middelen even effectief? Hoe kunnen vakbonden hiertoe bijdragen? Gaat hogere
werkgelegenheid ook gepaard met hogere welvaart of is dit afhankelijk van de genomen
maatregelen?
Om een antwoord op al deze vragen te kunnen geven, maken we gebruik van een
macro-economisch algemeen evenwichtsmodel met overlappende generaties. De grootste
innovatie in ons model ten opzichte van de bestaande literatuur is de zeer realistische mod-
ellering van de verschillende componenten van de arbeidsmarkt van de laaggeschoolden.
In het model wordt het loon voor de laaggeschoolden door de vakbonden bepaald. De
bedrijven kiezen daarna het aantal laaggeschoolden die zij willen tewerkstellen en tegelijk
bepalen de gezinnen de hoeveelheid uren die zij willen werken wanneer zij tewerkgesteld
zijn.
De resultaten in hoofdstuk 2 tonen aan dat het model een groot deel van de geob-
serveerde variatie in arbeidsmarktprestatie van de laaggeschoolden tussen landen kan
verklaren. Dit is een eerste indicatie van hoe waardevol het model en haar voorspellingen
zijn. Wanneer we kijken naar wat die variatie bepaalt, dan stellen we vast dat verschillen
inzake begrotingsbeleid en verschillen in arbeidsmarktinstituties elk ongeveer 50% van
de verklaarde variatie bepalen. Als we dus willen verklaren waarom een land beter dan
wel slechter scoort op het vlak van de arbeidsmarktprestatie van de laaggeschoolden,
moeten we zowel naar het gevoerde begrotingsbeleid als naar de arbeidsmarktinstitu-
ties kijken. Echter, niet elke beleidsparameter heeft dezelfde informatieve waarde. De
belangrijkste beleidsparameter is de hoogte van de werkloosheidsuitkering of de netto-
vervangingsratio, d.w.z. de werkloosheidsuitkering na belastingen als percentage van
het vroegere loon na belastingen. De rol van deze parameter is zeer sterk in zowel
de continentaal-Europese en de Scandinavische landen. Al het overige gelijk, hoe ho-
ger de netto-vervangingsratio in een land, hoe slechter de arbeidsmarktprestatie van de
laaggeschoolden.
Na het lezen van hoofdstuk 2 weten we waarom landen verschillen inzake werkgele-
genheid onder de laaggeschoolden. Maar wat kan de overheid nu concreet doen om de
werkloosheid onder laaggeschoolden te verlagen? Een aantrekkelijke optie is de com-
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binatie van lagere belastingen op arbeid en gematigde looneisen vanwege de vakbonden.
Een belangrijke bevinding in hoofdstuk 3 is dus dat het zowel voor de overheid en de
vakbonden aantrekkelijk is om de krachten te bundelen. De gematigde looneisen zor-
gen voor meer werkgelegenheid, terwijl de lagere belastingen op arbeid ervoor zorgen
dat het nettoloon van de laaggeschoolden op peil blijft of zelfs kan stijgen, ondanks het
lagere brutoloon. Een alternatieve optie om de arbeidsmarktpositie van laaggeschoolden
te verbeteren, is het verlagen van de netto-vervangingsratio. Ook deze zal leiden tot een
toename in de werkgelegenheid van laaggeschoolden, maar de impact op de welvaart van
de werklozen is naar alle waarschijnlijkheid sterk negatief. Daardoor is deze optie minder
interessant. Verder toont de analyse in hoofdstuk 3 aan dat de impact van werkgevers-
bijdragen en werknemersbijdragen niet equivalent zijn. De impact van de laatste op het
gedrag van individuen en dus de macro-economie is veel sterker waardoor het een in-
teressanter instrument is voor de overheid.
Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 dragen op hun beurt dan weer bij tot een groeiende literatuur die
alternatieven zoekt voor het paradigma van de rationele verwachtingen. Ondanks de
dominantie van dit paradigma groeit de kritiek erop. Immers, de veronderstelling van
rationele verwachtingen impliceert dat economische agenten extreme cognitieve capa-
citeiten hebben en dat ze een perfect inzicht hebben in de werking van de economie. In
hoofdstukken 4 en 5 veronderstellen we als alternatief dat het inzicht van de economis-
che agenten beperkt is. Zij observeren maar een klein deel van de economie en baseren
hun beslissingen hierop. Echter, hun inzicht mag dan wel beperkt zijn, toch zijn deze
economische agenten bereid tot en capabel om hun verwachtingen aan te passen wan-
neer nieuwe informatie beschikbaar is. Het loon kan bijvoorbeeld afwijken van het eerder
verwachte loon. In zo’n situatie zullen de economische agenten hun verwachtingen aan-
passen.
Dit beperkt inzicht en de leerprocessen vormen een belangrijk onderdeel van de eco-
nomische modellen in hoofdstuk 4 en 5. Hoe evolueren deze verwachtingen over tijd? Is
de dynamiek van het model met alternatieve verwachtingen anders dan in het model met
rationele verwachtingen? En in welke mate wordt de effectiviteit van het begrotingsbeleid
beïnvloed door de verwachtingen van de economische agenten?
In hoofdstuk 4 richten we onze focus op de korte termijn. In de literatuur is het
gebruikelijk om de conjuncturele schommelingen te analyseren in een lineare benadering
van het macro-economisch model rond het evenwicht. In tegenstelling tot het leeuwendeel
van de literatuur, echter, analyseren wij het leergedrag van de economische agenten in het
originele niet-lineaire model. Doorgaans is het lineaire model een goede benadering,
zeker als de afwijkingen van het evenwicht klein zijn. Maar bij grote afwijkingen – een
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diepe recessie bijvoorbeeld – wordt een lineaire benadering snel minder nauwkeurig. In
zo’n situaties vormt een niet-lineaire analyse een zeer waardevol alternatief.
Gebruikmakend van dit model tonen we aan dat de effectiviteit van extra overheidsuit-
gaven binnen het niet-lineaire Real Business Cycle (RBC) model varieert over de tijd, een
bevinding die in lijn is met heel wat empirische studies. Deze tijdsvariatie vindt zijn oor-
sprong in de wijzigende verwachtingen van de economische agenten. Dit resultaat staat in
schril contrast met de uitkomst van het standaard RBC model met rationele verwachtin-
gen, namelijk dat de effectiviteit van extra overheidsuitgaven constant is over tijd. Het
model in hoofdstuk 4 kan dus een instrument zijn voor de overheid om de effectiviteit van
extra overheidsuitgaven in te schatten wanneer de economie zich dicht én ver van haar
evenwicht bevindt.
De aanpak in hoofdstuk 5 verschilt van deze in hoofdstuk 4 op twee manieren. Ten
eerste verlaten we de korte termijn en bestuderen we de evolutie van de economie op
lange termijn. Ten tweede veronderstellen we nu dat de economische agenten gebruik-
maken van heuristieken oftewel vuistregels om verwachtingen te vormen. Wat we doen
in hoofdstuk 5 is de economische dynamiek simuleren die ontstaat na het permanent ver-
lagen van de belasting op arbeid, zowel onder rationele verwachtingen alsook onder de
veronderstelling dat individuen vuistregels gebruiken om verwachtingen te vormen. Dat
individuen dergelijke vuistregels gebruiken werd reeds aangetoond in empirische stud-
ies. De simulaties onthullen dat het traject van de economie met vuistregels vooral in
de eerste jaren na de beleidsingreep sterk kan verschillen van het traject onder rationele
verwachtingen. Rationele verwachtingen is dus niet altijd een goede benadering. Ver-
der stellen we vast dat dit traject sterk afhankelijk is van de (hoeveelheid) vuistregels die
beschikbaar zijn en hoe snel economische agenten overschakelen op beter presterende
vuistregels. Wanneer zij bijvoorbeeld maar één vuistregel kunnen gebruiken, zal het ex-
acte traject (en dus de impact van begrotingsbeleid) sterk afhankelijk zijn van de heuristiek
die op dat moment gehanteerd wordt alsook van de mate waarin zij hun verwachtingen
aanpassen wanneer nieuwe informatie beschikbaar is. Wanneer individuen bijvoorbeeld
hun verwachtingen altijd zeer sterk aanpassen aan de nieuwe economische realiteit, zal de
economie zelf ook onstabieler worden. Echter, wanneer zij de mogelijkheid hebben om
over te schakelen op beter presterende vuistregels, zal de economie niet alleen stabieler
worden, maar zal het traject van de economie ook veel minder afhankelijk zijn van de
verschillende vuistregels. Het gevolg is dat de variatie inzake mogelijke trajecten veel
kleiner wordt. Economische agenten maken dan ook kleinere voorspellingsfouten. Dit is
een belangrijke les voor economen en onderzoekers. Indien het model heuristieken bevat,
is het zeer sterk aan te raden om agenten de mogelijkheid te geven te wisselen tussen de
verschillende heuristieken.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The macroeconomic profession and its theoretical models have evolved strongly over the
last decades. In a never-ending attempt to build increasingly realistic macroeconomic
models, several assumptions that once formed the core of theoretical models have been
relaxed. As a consequence, the structural models used these days are not comparable to
the ones used a few decades ago. But while the theoretical foundations of these models
have changed significantly, their aim has not. They still serve to explain real-world phe-
nomena. Furthermore, they are important instruments to study the effects of public policy
on the behaviour of different economic actors and their interactions.
This dissertation, consisting of four papers, makes progress in this ongoing evolution
along two important dimensions. In Chapters 2 and 3, the focus of this dissertation lies
on a detailed modelling of the labour markets of respectively individuals who have and
individuals who have not enjoyed tertiary education1. Furthermore, special attention is
devoted to introducing frictions on the labour market of the latter. In Chapters 4 and 5, on
the other hand, this dissertation zooms in on the formation of expectations of economic
agents. As a result, the models constructed in these four chapters significantly enhance
our understanding of the macroeconomy and the effect of fiscal policy thereon.
The starting point in Chapters 2 and 3 is Figure 1.12. This figure shows first of all that
the labour market position of low-skilled individuals is highly indicative of the aggregate
employment rate within a country. Countries with lower aggregate employment rates
are typically countries with higher unemployment rates (panel a) and relatively lower
1In what follows, individuals who have enjoyed tertiary education are denoted as high-skilled, while
those who have not are denoted as low-skilled.
2The focus of the first two chapters of this dissertation is on 2001-2007 as this was the last period of
relative stability on the labour market before the financial crisis and the euro crisis. Considering that the
analysis in this dissertation aims at studying equilibrium unemployment, it is clearly more appropriate to
use data for a relatively stable period.
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employment rates (panel b) among the low-skilled. As a second important result, Figure
1.1. (panel c) reveals a much larger cross-country variance in the employment rate among
the low- than among the high-skilled3.
These observations indicate that a specific focus on understanding and improving the
labour market performance of low-skilled individuals should be an important (policy) ob-
jective. The lion’s share of the literature studying the effects of public policy on employ-
ment focuses on aggregate employment, however. Furthermore, they raise the question
whether restricting the focus on aggregate employment sufficiently captures the poten-
tial impact on the low-skilled, especially given the distinct and precarious labour market
status of the latter. They also highlight the importance of modelling the labour markets
of high- and low-skilled individuals separately, with a specific focus on the latter. Ulti-
mately, to address these concerns one needs theoretical models capable of capturing these
observations and use them to simulate a wide range of possible policy reforms and study
their impact on the labour market performance of the low-skilled. All these concerns and
observations lie at the core of Chapters 2 and 3.
In Chapter 2, co-authored with Freddy Heylen, we address these concerns by devel-
oping a five generations Overlapping Generations model for a small open economy with
two key assumptions. The first one – given the importance of skills and education – is
the assumption that individuals are heterogeneous by ability. They enter our model with
different human capital stocks and have different capacity to build more human capital.
Our second assumption and key novelty is the assumption of a unionised labour market
for the low-skilled4.
Having established its empirical reliability, the model is used to find out which policy
or preference parameters account for the cross-country differences in the aggregate un-
employment rate. We extend the literature by explicitly testing the potential explanatory
power of labour market imperfections, different union preferences in particular, and dif-
ferent tastes for leisure of the households. Performing a Shapley decomposition, we find
an almost equal role for differences in fiscal policy variables and in union preferences.
3For this sample of countries, the variance of the employment rate among the high-skilled 25- to 64-
year-olds is 4.75, whereas it is 20.35 among the low-skilled.
4A unionised labour market is not the only manner to introduce labour market frictions, though. Our
choice is motivated by the set-up of the model, the targeted skill group, and the observation that unions
are still an active actor in most OECD countries. Regarding the set-up of the model, given the length of
each generation, a search and matching framework might lead to difficulties when calibrating the model.
Indeed, within a span of several years, the probabilities that an individual finds a job, that a vacancy gets
filled, and that a job is terminated are very high. Introducing an efficiency wage framework is another way.
This framework is especially relevant when the effort of a worker is not easily measurable, when replacing
an employee is very costly and/or when firms want to attract high-potential workers. These characteristics
apply, however, more to high- than to low-skilled labour. Combined with the role unions still play in most
OECD countries, these arguments motivate our choice for a unionised labour market.
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Figure 1.1: Employment and unemployment in OECD countries, 2001-2007.
Note: The (un)employment rate among lower skilled individuals is computed as the average of the
(un)employment rates among individuals with less than upper secondary education and among individu-
als with upper secondary, but no tertiary degree. The (un)employment rate among individuals with higher
education relates to those with a tertiary degree. Unless defined differently, all reported employment and
unemployment rates concern the age group 25-64. The employment rate indicates the fraction of individu-
als who have a job. Data sources: Eurostat (LFS series: lfsa_ergaed, lfsa_urgaed) and OECD Labour Force
Statistics (Total Employment).
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Each account for about half of the explained variation in unemployment rates across
countries. By contrast, any differences in the households’ taste for leisure play virtu-
ally no role. We argue in the paper that the above market-clearing wage chosen by the
unions is the source of unemployment, while the fiscal policy variables explain a signific-
ant part of the magnitude of unemployment. Going into greater detail on the fiscal side,
we find that the key variable driving cross-country differences in unemployment of lower
ability individuals is the unemployment benefit replacement rate. In the Nordic countries
and (even more) the continental European countries, this has a significant impact on the
reference wage of the union. We find no contribution, however, from differences in labour
taxes to account for cross-country unemployment variation on an interregional level.
The aim in Chapter 3 is to extend and generalise the model used in Chapter 2 and use
it to quantitatively investigate the impact of fiscal and union policies on the labour market
outcome for low-skilled individuals. The key innovation in this chapter is that the union-
ised labour market now leads to endogenously generated idiosyncratic employment risk.
The simulations reveal that modelling the different components of aggregate employment
is important to explore the effectiveness of fiscal and union policies. While most fiscal
policy and union instruments have a highly similar impact on aggregate output, capital,
and labour, these instruments all have a different impact on unemployment, labour force
participation, hours worked, and workers’ welfare. The simulations thus highlight that
the choice for a given policy instrument is dependent on the target variable.
That being said, several policies lead to desirable results in terms of unemployment.
Overall, however, the simulations show that fiscal governments and unions have a mutual
interest in joining forces to improve the labour market performance of the low-skilled.
For example, our most preferred policy is a decrease in labour taxes levied on low-skilled
employees combined with wage moderation accepted by the unions. Not only does this
lead to a decrease in the unemployment rate of the low-skilled, it also has a positive
impact on the number of hours worked per employed individual and it is very likely to
increase welfare of employed low-skilled individuals. Furthermore, it does not directly
harm unemployed individuals.
The last conclusion one can draw from the simulations is that, unlike in perfectly
competitive labour markets, labour taxes levied on respectively employers and employees
are not equivalent within the model. Even more, the behavioural effects of a decrease in
the labour tax rate paid by employers are very small. Within the current set-up, the fiscal
government can thus achieve more by lowering the tax rates paid by employees.
In Chapters 4 and 5, this dissertation focuses on the formation of household expectations
in the short and the long run. Indeed, by now it is well understood that the macroeconomic
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impact of (fiscal) policy crucially depends on the behavioural response of households to
these policies. An important determinant of this behavioural response is the approach
households apply to form expectations regarding the evolution of different endogenous
macroeconomic variables. The dominant paradigm used to model expectations in mac-
roeconomics is the rational expectations (RE) hypothesis. According to this hypothesis,
households have perfect knowledge about the structure of the model and understand the
full complexities of the macroeconomy. Notwithstanding its dominance, the rational ex-
pectations paradigm has been under attack as it endows economic agents with unrealistic
cognitive capabilities. An alternative to the rational expectations hypothesis is provided
by the learning literature. In this literature, agents form expectations using a perceived
law of motion. Over time, as new information becomes available, agents update the coef-
ficients of their perceived law of motion.
Chapter 4, co-authored with Ewoud Quaghebeur, studies learning behaviour and the
effects of government spending in the original non-linear model, unlike the vast majority
of the learning literature in which the model is often first linearised around the steady
state. We show that our set-up leads to time variation in the transmission of government
spending shocks in the model economy. Furthermore, the time variation in the govern-
ment spending multiplier is endogenously determined within our set-up. As the economic
agents update their beliefs, their response to a change in government spending changes as
well, leading to a different impact of government spending shocks on the economy. This
result stands in sharp contrast with the rational expectations solution of the model.
While Chapter 4 focuses on the role of expectations in the short run, Chapter 5 shifts
the focus to the long run. Agents now use simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the future
course of the interest rate and the real wage within an Overlapping Generations setting
with idiosyncratic risk. Compared to the literature focusing on least-squares learning,
these agents using heuristics do not act as econometricians, though. Instead, they have a
certain number of different heuristics at their disposal and on a regular basis, they assess
the predictive power of the heuristic they are currently applying. If it performs well, the
probability that agents will use the same heuristic in the next period will be higher. If it
does not perform well, there is a higher probability that they switch to another rule.
This chapter shows that in a context in which agents only have one heuristic at their
disposal to form expectations, the transitional dynamics can be substantially different
from the rational expectations solution. This finding indicates that rational expectations
is not always a good approximation. Furthermore, there is a lot of variation in the dy-
namics over different values for the preference parameters and heuristics. Moreover, for
some parameter configurations, the model becomes unstable and the resulting dynamics
oscillate or even diverge.
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Second, after activating the heuristic switching regime, the variation in the transitional
dynamics decreases significantly, meaning that the transitional effects of a decrease in
labour taxes become more predictable and monotonic over all different configurations of
the parameters. Thus, allowing for alternative expectations does no longer lead to a wide
range of possible transitional paths.
Third and last, the heuristic switching mechanism has a stabilising effect on the trans-
itional dynamics. For certain configurations of the parameter values for which the dynam-
ics were very unstable in the absence of heuristic switching, the dynamics now converge
to the steady state in most cases.
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Chapter 2
Cross-country Differences in
Unemployment: Fiscal Policy, Unions,
and Household Preferences in General
Equilibrium1
Abstract
We develop a five period overlapping generations model with individuals who
differ by ability and an imperfect labour market (union wage setting) for the indi-
viduals of lower ability. The model explains human capital formation, hours worked
and unemployment within one coherent framework. Its predictions match the dif-
ferences in the unemployment rate across 12 OECD countries remarkably well. A
Shapley decomposition of these differences reveals an almost equal contribution of
fiscal policy variables and union preferences. As to fiscal policy, differences in unem-
ployment benefits play a much more important role than tax differences. Differences
in households’ taste for leisure are unimportant.
Keywords: Low-skilled unemployment, Heterogeneous agents, Union wage setting,
Fiscal policy, Shapley decomposition
JEL classification codes: E24, E62, J51, J64
1This Chapter is co-authored with Freddy Heylen and has been revised and resubmitted to the Scandinavian
Journal of Economics. We thank Dirk Van de gaer, Tim Buyse, Glenn Rayp, Frédéric Docquier, Stéphane Vigeant
and Rigas Oikonomu, and an anonymous referee and the editor for valuable suggestions and comments. We have also
benefited from comments received at the 2014 Ghent-Lille Workshop in Economics, the 41th Conference of the Eastern
Economic Association (New York, February - March 2015), the 20th Spring Meeting for Young Economists (Ghent,
May 2015) and the Annual Conference of the European Economic Association (August 2015, Mannheim).
2. CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN UNEMPLOYMENT
2.1 Introduction
Labour market performance differs widely across OECD countries. Since about a decade
many researchers have built gradually richer general equilibrium models to account for
these differences. Initial contributions by Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2007), Dhont and
Heylen (2008) and Ohanian et al. (2008) tried to explain differences in aggregate per
capita hours worked. Later work introduced a life-cycle dimension in labour supply and
employment in order to explain also the huge cross-country differences in employment
among persons older than 50 (see Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), Erosa et al. (2012),
and Alonso-Ortiz (2014)). Another advantage of introducing a life-cycle dimension is
that it became possible to model the time allocation of young people between labour and
education, and to explain human capital formation as an endogenous variable (see e.g.
Ludwig et al. (2012); Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013); Wallenius (2013)).
Despite the enormous progress that has been made in this literature, one clear weak-
ness has not been dealt with. A striking observation in all the aforementioned models
is their assumption of a perfectly competitive labour market. They cannot explain equi-
librium unemployment, let alone the huge and persistent differences in unemployment
between for example high and lower educated individuals. Yet, as demonstrated in Figure
2.1 for 12 OECD countries in 2001-2007, cross-country differences in aggregate employ-
ment are strongly related to differences in unemployment, in particular unemployment
among lower educated individuals. In panel (a), we observe the highest aggregate em-
ployment rates in countries (e.g. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) that are relatively
successful in avoiding unemployment among lower educated individuals. By contrast,
countries that fail in fighting unemployment among the lower educated, like Belgium and
Germany, also show relatively bad aggregate employment performance. The other panels
in Figure 2.1 reveal a number of interesting other regularities, which will guide us later
in this paper. Panel (b) establishes the fact that almost all cross-country variation in the
gap between the unemployment rates of lower and high educated individuals is due to
variation in the unemployment rate among the lower educated. Correlation in this panel
is almost 0.95. Countries vary much less when it comes to the labour market situation of
the high educated. (Correlation between the unemployment rate among individuals with
a tertiary degree and the unemployment gap between the lower and the high educated is
only 0.14). Panel (c) shows a strong inverse relationship between the unemployment gap
and the employment gap between lower and high educated individuals. Finally, panel (d)
reveals that the aggregate employment rate is strongly related to this employment gap.
We conclude that if it is the objective of countries to raise aggregate employment, an im-
portant challenge will be to fight unemployment among lower educated individuals. The
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Figure 2.1: Employment and unemployment in OECD countries, 2001-07.
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
Notes: We compute the (un)employment rate among lower educated individuals as the average of the 
(un)employment rates among individuals with less than upper secondary education and among 
individuals with upper secondary, but no tertiary degree. The (un)employment rate among 
individuals with higher education relates to those with a tertiary degree. Unless defined 
differently, all reported employment and unemployment rates concern the age group 25-64. 
Data sources: Eurostat (LFS series: lfsa_ergaed, lfsa_urgaed) and OECD Labour Force Statistics 
(Total Employment).  
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existing (dynamic) general equilibrium models for labour market analysis in the tradition
of Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2007) have no clear answer to deal with this challenge.
Next to excluding a potential role for labour market imperfections, the above men-
tioned general equilibrium literature also leaves little room for differences in individual
preferences across countries to show up. Blanchard (2004) and Alesina et al. (2005)
have argued that a key factor behind the lower employment in many European countries
compared to the US is a higher taste for leisure. Yet, the general equilibrium literature
generally imposes the same preferences upon individuals.
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Our contribution in this paper is to extend the dynamic general equilibrium literature
studying employment with a labour market imperfection and to use our extended model
to quantitatively explore which variables drive cross-country differences in unemploy-
ment, in particular unemployment among lower educated individuals. More precisely, we
develop a five generations OLG model for a small open economy with two key assump-
tions. The first one - given the importance of skills and education - is the assumption that
individuals are heterogeneous by ability. They enter our model with different human cap-
ital stocks and have different capacity to build more human capital. This approach may
offer the best match to findings by Huggett et al. (2006), Huggett et al. (2011) and Keane
and Wolpin (1997) that heterogeneity in human capital endowment at young age and in
learning abilities, rather than shocks to human capital, account for most of the variation
in lifetime utility. Our second assumption and key novelty compared to previous work
in this tradition is the assumption of a unionised labour market for lower ability (lower
educated) individuals2. Like Faia and Rossi (2013), we introduce a monopolistic firm-
specific trade union that determines the real pre-tax wage for these workers while taking
aggregate variables and fiscal policy parameters (e.g. tax rates, unemployment benefits)
as given. We specify a Stone-Geary utility function for the union with both wages and
employment as arguments, albeit with a different weight. As to wages, the firm-specific
union only derives utility from the difference between the after-tax wage and a reference
wage. The monopoly union chooses the wage in a first stage. In the next stage, the firm
will choose employment (number of workers), while the households of lower ability in-
dividuals decide on the supply of hours per employed. Both the firm and the households
take the wage set by the union as given.
The union wage setting framework in our model is motivated by the observation that
in Europe union wage bargaining is still the most common way of wage determination.
While union membership rates have decreased over time, the coverage of collective bar-
gaining is still at least 80% in most continental European countries and Nordic countries.
Also, despite the fact that unions are not that powerful in the US, there exists a form of
minimum wage in the US. As such, a union pushing the wage above its perfectly compet-
itive counterpart might be a valid assumption for all countries to introduce unemployment.
Firms in our model act competitively on the goods market. Furthermore, we introduce
a government with a rich set of fiscal policy instruments. Government spending on goods
and unemployment benefits are financed by taxes on labour, capital and consumption. As
2For higher ability workers we assume that wages and employment are determined in a perfectly com-
petitive way. Several authors have provided empirical evidence that the effects of the presence of unions are
much stronger for low skilled individuals than for the high skilled, e.g. through a higher union-non union
wage premium among the low skilled workers. See e.g. Card et al. (2004), and Checci and García-Peñalosa
(2008).
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to labour taxes, we distinguish between taxes paid by the employer and the employees3.
Another novelty is the modelling of progressive income taxes paid by the households. We
follow the approach used by Guo and Lansing (1998) and Koyuncu (2011). Lump sum
transfers balance the budget.
We then use our model to investigate the main drivers of the differences in unemploy-
ment across OECD countries. A large range of variables play a role in the model. To
find out which of these matter most, our procedure is as follows. First, we calibrate our
model and show its empirical relevance for twelve countries belonging to three groups
(five continental European countries, four Nordic countries and three Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries). More precisely, we simulate our calibrated model for each country imposing com-
mon technology on all countries, but country-specific fiscal policy parameters and coun-
try group-specific household and union preferences. We find that the predictions of our
model match the main facts in most countries. These facts concern hours worked per
employed person and the unemployment rate. Having established its empirical reliability,
we then use the model to find out what policy or preference parameters account for the
cross-country differences in the aggregate unemployment rate. Our objective is similar to
the one of Dhont and Heylen (2008), Wallenius (2013) and Alonso-Ortiz (2014) in earlier
work. We make progress by also explicitly testing the potential explanatory power of la-
bour market imperfections, different union preferences in particular, and different tastes
for leisure of the households. Performing a Shapley decomposition, we find an almost
equal role for differences in fiscal policy variables and in union preferences. Each ac-
count for about half of the explained variation in unemployment rates across countries.
By contrast, any differences in the households’ taste for leisure play virtually no role. Our
story will then be that the above market-clearing wage chosen by the unions is the source
of unemployment, while the fiscal policy variables explain a significant part of the mag-
nitude of unemployment. Going into greater detail on the fiscal side, we find that the key
variable driving cross-country differences in unemployment of lower ability individuals
is the unemployment benefit replacement rate. In the Nordic countries and (even more)
the continental European countries, this has a significant impact on the reference wage of
the union. We find no contribution, however, from differences in labour taxes to account
for cross-country unemployment variation on an interregional level.
Our finding that both policies and institutions should be taken into account for a good
3In a perfect labour market situation, whether labour taxes are levied on workers or firms does not
matter for the cost of labour, nor for after-tax wages and employment. However, as Heijdra and Ligthart
(2009) argue, it is not immediately clear whether the same result holds in imperfectly competitive labour
markets. We therefore choose to distinguish explicitly between the two.
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explanation of differences in unemployment across OECD countries matches well with
the results of many econometric studies, like those of Nickell et al. (2005), Bassanini and
Duval (2009), and Nymoen and Sparrman (2015). The generosity of the unemployment
benefit system and the characteristics of wage setting are often found among the main
drivers of unemployment in these studies. Our focus on unemployment among low edu-
cated workers, however, is missing in most econometric studies (despite its importance
for the aggregate employment situation that we highlighted in Figure 2.1). As we have
emphasised before, introducing a labour market imperfection and explaining unemploy-
ment is also our main contribution to the dynamic general equilibrium analysis of labour
market performance in the tradition of Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2007), Rogerson and
Wallenius (2009), and Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013), among others.
Several earlier contributions have made an attempt to introduce unemployment in dy-
namic macro models. Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Corneo and Marquardt (2000), and
Ono (2010) among others developed OLG models with a unionised labour market, while
Ravn and Sørensen (1999), Cahuc and Michel (1996) and Sommacal (2006) introduced
minimum wages. Gali et al. (2011) extended the Smets and Wouters New Keynesian
DSGE model to allow for involuntary unemployment. In their model, unemployment also
results from market power in labor markets, reflected in positive wage markups. Other
authors embed a search and matching setup in a life-cycle model, e.g. de la Croix et al.
(2013). We also make progress compared to this literature. First, to the best of our know-
ledge, all the existing OLG models where unions are present are populated by only two
generations, which means that they lack a life-cycle dimension of labour supply. The fact
that we model the labour market outcome of different generations is clearly different from
the DSGE literature on unemployment as well. Second, most of the models incorporating
unions in a life-cycle model leave the intensive margin of employment (i.e. hours worked)
unexplored. However, hours of work per employed person are substantially lower in most
European countries than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Third, most of these models do
not allow for individuals with different ability. The consequence being that these are not
suited to explore the labour market situation of lower educated individuals separately.
And last, given the rich specification of the model, both in terms of fiscal and institutional
variables, we are able to explore the drivers of unemployment in much more detail.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe the basic setup of
our model. Section 2.3 discusses optimal behaviour of unions and firms, and how this
drives hours worked, unemployment and real output. Section 2.4 presents our calibration
procedure. In Section 2.5 we test and show the empirical validity of our model for 12
OECD countries as described above. Finally, in Section 2.6 we investigate the relative
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importance of institutional and (household and union) preference related variables versus
several fiscal policy variables to explain differences across countries in the unemployment
rate. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The model: setup, preferences and constraints
Time is discrete and runs from 0 to infinity. We assume a small open economy populated
by five overlapping generations of households, firms, unions and a fiscal government.
Individual members of the household enter the model at the age of 18 and live for five
periods j of 12 years. Individuals have either high or low innate ability. Households have
only higher or lower ability members, but not both. Both the goods market and the labour
market for higher ability individuals are competitive, whereas the labour market for lower
ability individuals is unionised. In every period t, wages for lower ability workers are
set by a monopoly union at the firm level. The government in our model disposes of a
rich set of fiscal policy instruments. Government spending on goods and unemployment
benefits are financed by taxes on capital, labour and consumption. As to labour taxes,
we distinguish between taxes paid by the employer (linear) and by the employees (non-
linear). There is no uncertainty.
2.2.1 Households
In the spirit of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), we assume a number of households
each consisting of a continuum of members of the same age and the same ability. Each
household has unitary mass. We normalise the number of households of a given age
and ability type to one. Therefore, the economy consists of 10 households in total4. All
members at working age participate on the labour market and pool their income, meaning
that consumption across household members is the same. As such there is perfect insur-
ance within the household against the risk of unemployment. A household that enters the
model in period t (a household of generation t) is denoted with a superscript t. Subscripts
are reserved for the age j 2 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and the ability type a 2 {H,L}. Hence, nt+12H
denotes the fraction of time devoted to labour services by a member of a higher ability
family who is in the second period of life and who started active life in period t+1. Tables
2.1 and 2.2 present a brief overview of the model structure with respect to the households:
4With our assumption of five periods, we are able to isolate the young (18-29) and the elderly (54-65)
and look at whether the model correctly predicts the labour market outcome for these generations. Including
more generations would not lead to additional insights with respect to the aggregate unemployment rate.
Having fewer generations might lead to generations that are too big (especially the young and the older
workers).
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Table 2.1: Life-cycle of a member of a higher ability household of generation t
Time t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
Hours worked nt1H nt2H nt3H nt4H 0
Education et1H 0 0 0 0
Participation rate 1 1 1 1 0
Unemployment rate 0 0 0 0 0
Employment rate 1 1 1 1 0
Leisure time 1  nt1H   et1H 1  nt2H 1  nt3H 1  nt4H 1
Table 2.2: Life-cycle of a member of a lower ability household of generation t
Time t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
Hours worked when employed nt1L nt2L nt3L nt4L 0
Education 0 0 0 0 0
Participation rate 1 1 1 1 0
Unemployment rate u1,t u2,t+1 u3,t+2 u4,t+3 0
Employment rate 1  u1,t 1  u2,t+1 1  u3,t+2 1  u4,t+3 0
Leisure time when employed 1  nt1L 1  nt2L 1  nt3L 1  nt4L 1
– Members of the higher ability household enter the model with a human capital stock
ht1H . They have a time endowment of one in each period which they can devote to work,
education when young, or leisure. During four active periods (age j = 1, 2, 3, 4), all
these individuals are employed on a perfectly competitive labour market. During the fifth
period (j = 5), they are retired. The household chooses an optimal consumption path,
the optimal amount of non-human wealth, the time each individual devotes to education
when young and the amount of hours each member supplies labour.
–Members of the lower ability household enter with a human capital stock ht1L < ht1H .
Just like their higher ability counterparts, they have a time endowment of one. Lower
ability individuals do not pursue tertiary education. A fraction 1   uj,t+j 1 of all lower
ability individuals of generation t at age j will be employed in period t+ j  1, the others
are (involuntarily) unemployed. Employed members devote time to either work or leisure,
unemployed members only have leisure. The household chooses an optimal consumption
path, the optimal amount of non-human wealth and the amount of time the employed
members supply labour.
2.2.1.1 Higher ability households
Lifetime utility of the higher ability household of generation t is given by
utH =
5X
j=1
 j 1
 
ln ctjH +  j
(1  etjH   ntjH)
1  ✓
1 ✓!
(2.1)
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with 0 <   < 1,  j > 0, ✓ > 0 (✓ 6= 1), and where et2H = et3H = et4H = et5H = nt5H = 0.
In this equation,   represents the discount factor,  j is an age-specific parameter determ-
ining the value of leisure relative to consumption and 1✓ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in leisure5. The household’s budget constraints are given by (2.2). Income is
derived from labour, non-human wealth and lump sum transfers from the government. It
is allocated to either consumption or savings.
(1+⌧c)c
t
jH+⌦
t
jH = wH,t+j 1"jh
t
jHg(n
t
jH)(1 ⌧jH)+(1+rt+j 1)⌦tj 1,H+zt+j 1 (2.2)
for j 2 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and with ⌦t0H = ⌦t5H = nt5H = 0. As in Rogerson and Wallenius
(2009), g(ntjH) = max{ntjH   n¯H , 0}, with ntjH the chosen fraction of their time endow-
ment that individuals allocate to labour services and ntjH   n¯H the effective labour time
that individuals supply. We assume that if an individual with human capital stock htjH
devotes a fraction ntjH of his/her time to the labour market, this will yield (ntjH   n¯H)htjH
units of effective labour market services if ntjH   n¯H , and 0 otherwise. A fraction n¯H
is not productive due to e.g. commuting and getting setup in a job. Individuals earn an
after-tax wage of wH,t+j 1"j htjHg(ntjH)(1  ⌧jH) during their four active periods, where
wH,t+j 1 is the pre-tax real wage per unit of effective labour, "j is an age-specific pro-
ductivity parameter, and ⌧jH is the average tax rate on labour. Due to our modelling of
a progressive labour income tax system, tax rates depend on individuals’ ability and age.
We specify the tax system in greater detail below. As to other variables, we denote the
lump sum transfer from the government at time t by zt. The consumption tax rate is ⌧c.
The households’ accumulated non-human wealth at the end of their j-th period of life is
⌦tjH . Households enter the model without wealth and leave no bequests.
2.2.1.2 Lower ability households
In the spirit of the previous subsection, we again consider a large household, consisting
of a continuum of lower ability members. Again, the decision unit is the household. The
key difference is that in this household only a fraction 1   uj,t+j 1 of the individuals is
employed. A fraction uj,t+j 1 is unemployed. Hence, uj,t+j 1 represents the aggregate
unemployment rate among the lower ability individuals of generation t at age j and time
t + j   1. The household derives utility from consumption, while it only enjoys utility
from the leisure of each employed member6. Thus, lifetime utility of the household of
5In the empirical part of our paper (i.e. Sections 4 and 5), we allow  j to differ between regions
(continental European countries, Nordic countries, and Anglo-Saxon countries). The region-specific values
will be calibrated.
6A similar utility function is also used in both business cycle and overlapping generations models
with search and matching frictions, e.g. Tomas (2008) and de la Croix et al. (2013). Similar to these
contributions, we assume that the leisure of the unemployed members is neutral in terms of utility.
35
2. CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN UNEMPLOYMENT
lower ability individuals of generation t is given by
utL =
5X
j=1
 j 1
 
ln ctjL +  j(1  uj,t+j 1)
"
(1  ntjL)
1  ✓
1 ✓#!
(2.3)
where nt5L = 0. The household’s budget constraints are given by (2.4). Again, we assume
that all members of the household pool their income:
(1 + ⌧c)c
t
jL + ⌦
t
jL = wL,t+j 1"jh
t
jL(1  uj,t+j 1)g(ntjL)(1  ⌧jL) + eBj+
(1 + rt+j 1)⌦tj 1,L + zt+j 1 (2.4)
for j 2 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and with ⌦t0L = ⌦t5L = nt5L = 0. For the fraction uj,t+j 1 of its
members who are unemployed, the household receives an unemployment benefit, equal
to a fraction ebj of the after-tax labour income that these individuals would receive if they
were employed. Formally, eBj = ebjwL,t+j 1"jhtjLg(ntjL)(1   ⌧jL)uj,t+j 1, where j 2
{1, 2, 3, 4}. The household takes both the unemployment benefit and the unemployment
rate as given, when choosing consumption, savings and the supply of working hours. Note
that, due to the progressivity of labour income taxes, lower ability households will face a
different tax rate than higher ability households (⌧jL < ⌧jH).
2.2.1.3 Human capital
Individuals enter our model at the age of 18 with a predetermined level of human capital.
This level is generation-invariant, but higher for individuals with high innate ability. The
latter reflects for example higher intelligence and greater capacity to learn and accumulate
knowledge at primary and secondary school. We normalise the human capital of a young
individual with high ability to h0. A young individual with low ability enters the model
with only a fraction ✏Lh0, where ✏L < 1. The parameter ✏L will be calibrated.
During youth, individuals with high ability will invest a fraction of their time in ter-
tiary education. They accumulate more human capital, making them more productive in
later periods. Formally,
ht2H = h
t
1H(1 +  (e
t
1H)
 ) with 0 <    1,  > 0 (2.5)
We adopt in Equation (2.5) a human capital production function similar to Lucas (1990)
and Bouzahzah et al. (2002). The production of new human capital by these individuals
rises in the amount of time they allocate to education (et1H) and in their initial human
capital (ht1H). The parameter   indicates the elasticity of time input,   is an efficiency
parameter. Individuals with low innate ability do not study. Their human capital remains
constant: ht2L = ht1L. Finally, we assume that the human capital of all individuals remains
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unchanged after the second period. A rationale for this assumption is that learning-by-
doing in work may counteract depreciation. This means that ht4a = ht3a = ht2a, for
a 2 {H,L}.
2.2.2 Firms
Both the goods market and the labour market for higher ability individuals are perfectly
competitive, whereas the labour market for lower ability individuals is unionised. All
firms are identical. They maximise profits, pay taxes on capital income and social secur-
ity contributions when hiring labour. Total domestic output is given by the production
function (2.6). Production exhibits constant returns to scale in aggregate physical capital
(Kt) and labor in efficiency units (AtHt). Given our assumption of perfect competition
on the goods market, profits are zero in equilibrium.
Yt = K
↵
t (AtHt)
1 ↵ (2.6)
Technology At is growing at an exogenous and constant rate x: At+1 = (1 + x)At. As to
total effective labour Ht, we assume that higher and lower ability individuals are imper-
fectly substitutable in production. This framework was pioneered by Katz and Murphy
(1992). So,
Ht =
h
⌘HH
◆ 1
◆
H,t + ⌘LH
◆ 1
◆
L,t
i ◆
◆ 1
, with ⌘H + ⌘L = 1 (2.7)
with ⌘a being a share parameter and ◆ the elasticity of substitution between higher and
lower ability labour. Furthermore, workers of the same ability type but different age are
assumed to be perfect substitutes. Formally, this gives respectively for higher and lower
ability labour
HH,t =
4X
j=1
(nt j+1jH   n¯H)"jht j+1jH , HL,t =
4X
j=1
(1  uj,t)(nt j+1jL   n¯L)"jht j+1jL (2.8)
2.2.3 Unions
The economy is populated by decentralised trade unions, operating at the firm level. Every
single union represents all the lower ability workers in a firm. As such, unions are large
compared to the workers. The union will determine the lower ability workers’ wage while
taking aggregate variables and fiscal policy parameters as given. Just like in e.g. Pencavel
(1984) and de la Croix et al. (1996), the objective function of the union follows the Stone-
Geary specification,
Vt =
4X
j=1

1
 j
(wL,t(1  ⌧jL)  w¯j,t) j (1  uj,t)
 
(2.9)
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with  j > 0. The union derives utility from both wages and employment, albeit to a
different degree7. As to wages, what matters is the difference between the after-tax wage
wL,t(1   ⌧jL) and a reference wage, w¯j,t. The age-specific parameter  j measures the
concavity with respect to the excess wage gap. The higher  j , the higher the preference
of the union for wages versus employment for the age group j. Every union has the same
reference wage. We define this as a weighted average or combination of the after-tax
wage that would prevail if the lower ability labour market were competitive, the after-tax
wage of higher ability workers and the unemployment benefit. The respective weights
are ⇢1, ⇢2 and ⇢3. They sum up to 1. Formally, the reference wage is given by w¯j,t =
⇢1w
c
L,t(1  ⌧ cjL) + ⇢2wH,t(1  ⌧jH) + ⇢3ebjwL,t(1  ⌧jL)8.
2.2.4 Government
Unemployment benefits and government spending on goods are financed by taxes on
capital, labour (both on employers and employees) and consumption. Lump sum transfers
ensure a balanced budget. Formally,
Gt +BL,t + Zt = TnH,t + TnL,t + Tk,t + Tc,t (2.10)
and
Gt = gYt, Zt = 10zt (2.11)
Tk,t = ⌧k↵Yt (2.12)
Tc,t = ⌧c
5X
j=1
(ct+1 jjH + c
t+1 j
jL ) (2.13)
BL,t =
4X
j=1
ebjwL,t"jht+1 jjL g(nt+1 jjL )(1  ⌧jL)uj,t (2.14)
TnH,t =
4X
j=1
wH,tg(n
t+1 j
jH )"jh
t+1 j
j,H (⌧jH + ⌧
p) (2.15)
TnL,t =
4X
j=1
wL,t(1  uj,t)g(nt+1 jjL )"jht+1 jjL (⌧jL + ⌧ p) (2.16)
The government spends a fraction g of output on goods. In Equations (2.15) and (2.16),
⌧ja is the average tax rate that applies to the labour income of an individual of age j and
7In our companion paper (Boone and Heylen, 2015), we elaborate more in detail on the Stone-Geary
functional form.
8Like for the household taste for leisure parameters ( j), we also assume for  j and ⇢k (j 2 {1, 2, 3, 4}
and k 2 {1, 2, 3}) that their empirical values may differ across country groups (continental European
countries, Nordic countries, and Anglo-Saxon countries).
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ability a and ⌧ p is the tax rate paid by the employer. What remains is the specification
of progressive income taxes. The tax rates appearing in the budget constraints of the
households are average tax rates and given by ⌧ja =  
⇣
ylabja,t
y¯labt
⌘⇠
, where ⇠   0 and 0 <
   1. Here, ylabja,t is total pre-tax labour income of the household at time t and y¯labt
is the average labour income in the economy. Just like in Guo and Lansing (1998) and
Koyuncu (2011), the parameters ⇠ and   govern the slope and level of the tax schedule.
The average tax rate ⌧ja increases with the total taxable labour income of the household
when ⇠ > 0. Households are aware of the progressive structure of the tax system when
making decisions, but take this as given. The marginal tax rate ⌧mja is then simply the rate
applied to the last euro earned: ⌧mja = (1+ ⇠) 
⇣
ylabja,t
y¯labt
⌘⇠
. Rewriting this yields ⌧
m
ja
⌧ja
= 1+ ⇠.
The marginal tax rate is higher than the average tax rate when ⇠ > 0, i.e. the tax schedule
is said to be progressive. When ⇠ = 0, the average and marginal tax rates coincide.
2.3 Optimisation and Equilibrium
All households will optimally choose consumption in each period of life and hours worked
when employed. Households of higher ability will also choose the fraction of time alloc-
ated to education when young. The first order conditions are standard. We report them
in Appendix 2.A. Our focus in this section is on the maximisation problem of the firms
and the unions. Moreover, we also present a detailed description of how we solve for
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game played between a triplet of a union, a firm
and a household. For a description of the general equilibrium of our model, we refer to
Appendix 2.B.
2.3.1 Firms
The representative firm in our model operates in a small open economy with perfect mo-
bility of physical capital. It chooses the optimal capital stock and the amount of effective
labour. In terms of production, the firm prefers a combination of few people working more
hours over a combination of many people working few hours, as each individual causes
a time cost for commuting and getting setup in a job. More precisely, firms maximise
profits with respect to the vector [Kt, H1H,t, H2H,t, H3H,t, H4H,t, (1 u1,t), (1 u2,t), (1 
u3,t), (1  u4,t)], leading to the following first order conditions,
↵

AtHt
Kt
 (1 ↵)
(1  ⌧k) = rt (2.17)
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(1  ↵)A1 ↵t

Kt
Ht
 ↵
⌘a

Ht
Ha,t
  1
◆
= wa,t(1 + ⌧
p), a 2 {H,L} (2.18)
where HH,t and HL,t are defined in Equation (2.8) and ⌘H = 1   ⌘L. Due to the perfect
mobility of capital, the firm in Equation (2.17) will hire capital until its after-tax marginal
product equals the exogenous world interest rate, rt. There is no depreciation of capital.
Whenever the net return to investment exceeds the world interest rate, capital will flow
into the country until optimality is restored. According to Equation (2.18), firms hire
higher and lower ability labour up to the point where their marginal product equals their
real wage cost. On the labour market for higher ability workers, wages are determined
competitively. Wage flexibility on this market implies that they will all work. The wage
will be such that the total supply of higher ability labour, HH,t, in Equation (2.8) equals
the firms’ demand in (2.18). For lower ability workers, however, the wage is controlled
by the union. Since hours of work are chosen by the households, in order to satisfy
Equation (2.18) the firm can only choose the fraction of persons it wants to employ, or the
unemployment rate.
Our assumptions of constant population and of individuals entering the model with a
predetermined and generation-invariant level of human capital imply that in steady state
effective labor will be constant. Physical capital, output and real wages by contrast will
all grow at the exogenous technology growth rate x.
2.3.2 Union
The union chooses the wage wL,t to maximise Equation (2.9) subject to the firm’s and the
lower ability households’ optimal choice of (un)employment and hours of work, i.e.
s.t.
8><>:F (n
t j+1
jL , 1  uj,t, wL,t) = (1  ↵)A1 ↵t
h
Kt
Ht
i↵
⌘L
h
Ht
HL,t
i 1
◆   wL,t(1 + ⌧ p) = 0
G(nt j+1jL , 1  uj,t, wL,t) =  j(1 nt j+1jL )✓  
wL,t"jh
t j+1
jL (1 ⌧mjL)
(1+⌧c)c
t j+1
jL
= 0
with j 2 {1, 2, 3, 4}. To derive the first order condition, one has to know how the optimal
unemployment rate resulting from the second stage of the game changes when the chosen
wage changes. From the second stage, we derive a system of two implicit equations in
the supply of hours worked, the unemployment rate, and the wage rate.
Using matrix notation, evaluating at the equilibrium values of the supply of hours
worked, the unemployment rate, and the wage rate, and taking the total differential yields:24 @F@nt j+1jL @F@(1 uj,t)
@G
@nt j+1jL
@G
@(1 uj,t)
35" dnt j+1jL
d(1  uj,t)
#
=
"
  @F@wL,tdwL,t
  @G@wL,tdwL,t
#
(2.19)
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Under normal parameter values the (2x2)-matrix is non-singular. We can then take the
inverse to calculate d(1 uj,t)dwL,t , the change in the equilibrium unemployment rate resulting
from the second stage of the game, following an increase in the chosen wage rate by the
union. Using the assumption that the union treats every generation equally when it comes
to generating union utility, the first order condition for the union is given by9:
wL,t(1  ⌧jL)  w¯j,t =   j(1  uj,t)@(1 uj,t)
@wL,t
(1  ⌧mjL) (2.20)
As the right-hand side of this equation is positive, the left-hand side has to be positive as
well. This implies that the after-tax wage determined by the union will exceed the refer-
ence wage. The higher  j (i.e. the relative weight on wages as opposed to employment
for age group j), the higher the ex-ante union wage premium. Ex-post, a rise in  j will
also be reflected in higher unemployment uj , though. The reason is that if the union has
a higher preference for wages for a particular age group, the firm will in the end replace
the workers of this age group by low ability workers of other age. Unemployment among
these other age groups might fall. Due to more expensive low ability labour, however,
aggregate unemployment among low ability workers will rise.
2.3.3 Solving for the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Within every period t, a dynamic two-stage game is played between a triplet of a firm,
a union and a lower ability household. In the first stage, the unions choose the wage for
the lower ability workers, whereas in the second stage firms choose the fraction of people
they want to employ, and lower ability households choose their labour supply in hours.
As such, the second stage is a static game, played between the firm and the lower ability
household. We use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of
our game. In the second stage, the firm and the households play simultaneously, taking
the union’s wage, the fiscal policy variables, and the action of the other player as given. In
the previous sections, we already solved for the best responses of the household and the
firm. In Graph 1, we show the second stage of the game. The flatter curves are the ‘best
response’-functions of the households given the real wage rate, the unemployment rate
chosen by the firm, tax rates and the unemployment benefit. If the unemployment rate
increases, the income and consumption of the household will decrease, implying that the
marginal benefit of working increases. Household members will then supply more hours.
This argument explains the negative slope of the households’ best-response curves. If the
wage chosen by the union increases, the best-response curves shift upwards, leading to a
9For details on the derivation of this equation, we refer the reader to Appendix 2.D.
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higher supply of hours for a given unemployment rate. Intuitively, the substitution effect
of a higher wage dominates the income effect. The best-response curves of the firm are
calculated using the first-order conditions of the firm. If the households decide to supply
more hours for a given wage rate, the firm will employ fewer people. If the wage chosen
by the union increases and households maintain their supply of hours, the firm will also
employ fewer people, implying that the best-response curves will shift to the left. The
intersection of the ‘best response’-functions for different wage rates represent the Nash
equilibria of the second stage of our game. In Graph 2, an indifference curve of the union
has been drawn. The other curve is the collection of Nash equilibria for different wage
rates resulting from the second stage of the game. This curve indicates the employment
rates which are Nash Equilibria in the second stage given different levels of the real wage
rate.
The optimal combination of the wage and the employment rate is found where the
indifference curve of the union is tangent to the Nash-function of the second stage. In
Graph 2, one optimal point is drawn. From this value for the wage, we can calculate the
exact Nash equilibrium in the second stage. The firm chooses the different employment
rates such that Equation (2.18) holds for every age group. The exact composition of
employment follows from the second stage of the game. First, notice that Graph 1 only
represents one age group. To solve the full game, one needs a similar graph for all age
groups (four in total). Then, for a given wage rate chosen by the union, the best-response
curves of the firm and the household will be different over the age groups. The workers
of an old household react differently to an increase in the wage compared to the members
of the youngest household, for example. The same goes for the firm. Given the same
wage increase, as there are differences in productivity and the amount of hours worked,
the decrease in the employment rate for the oldest workers which is required to restore
optimality (Equation 2.18) will differ from the required decrease for the youngest workers.
Thus, the shift in the best-response curves of the household and the firm will be different
over all the ages and therefore, for the same wage, one will obtain different employment
rates. Finally, as every game is symmetric, the wage will be the same at every firm in the
economy.
2.4 Calibration and empirical relevance of the model
In a first step, we calibrate our model and compare its predictions regarding the main
labour market variables to the data for three groups of countries: Anglo-Saxon countries
(the US, the UK and Canada), continental European countries (Belgium, France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and Austria) and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway
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and Sweden). To make our predictions, we impose common technology and productivity
parameters on all countries. Most household and all union preference parameters are as-
sumed to be common for the countries within the same group, but they may differ across
groups. The parameters involved are the relative utility of leisure versus consumption
for the households ( j), the relative weight that the unions assign to wages as opposed to
employment ( j), and the relative weight of each of the three determinants of the unions’
reference wage (⇢k). To highlight their country group or region-specific character we add
a superscript R to these parameters from now on, which gives  Rj , Rj and ⇢R1 , ⇢R2 and ⇢R3
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respectively, with j 2 {1, 2, 3, 4} and R 2 {Eur,Ang,Nor}. Last but not least, fiscal
policy parameters are all country-specific.
All common and all country group-specific parameters are reported in Table 2.3 below.
So are the country-group averages of the unemployment rate by age, the country-group
averages of hours worked per employed person by age, and the overall average education
rate and per capita growth rate. These performance indicators play an important role in
our calibration, as we will describe in Section 2.4.2. First, however, we say more about the
construction of our main data in Section 2.4.1. For country-specific data on labour market
performance and for the country-specific fiscal policy parameters we refer to Appendix
2.C.
2.4.1 Data
In our model we have assumed that all individuals (except the retired) of both higher
and lower ability participate in the labour market. Those of higher ability will all work.
Among those of lower ability, only a fraction 1  uj,t will work. The difference between
both employment rates corresponds to the rate of unemployment uj,t. The data for unem-
ployment that we report in Table 2.3 reflect this setup. They are the difference in percent-
age points between the actual employment rate (in persons) among those within a particu-
lar age group who enjoyed tertiary education and those who did not. Although consistent
with the setup of our model, this proxy for unemployment among the lower educated dif-
fers from official unemployment series. Our unemployment rate also captures differences
in the labour market participation rate between high and low educated individuals in the
data. Lower participation among low educated individuals implies higher unemployment
in our data. When we account for cross-country differences in unemployment in Section
2.5, our results will then also capture any impact of household preferences, union pref-
erences, and fiscal policy on participation. This should not affect our main conclusions,
though10. The (negative) correlation in actual data between the difference in employment
rates and the difference in unemployment rates between higher and lower educated indi-
viduals is strong (see also Figure 2.1.c). Depending on the age group considered, it varies
between -0.60 and -0.85. Our data for hours worked per employed n indicate the fraction
of time that employed individuals devote to work relative to their total time endowment
10Balleer et al. (2009) have investigated the determinants of labour force participation in the euro area.
They find that labour taxes, union density and unemployment benefits have an impact, but this impact is
not robust in sign nor statistical significance across age and gender groups, and countries. Moreover, since
the deeper objective of this paper is to contribute to an explanation of labour market performance, and
employment in particular (see the introduction to this paper), our approach to compute unemployment rates
is even to be considered an advantage.
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on an annual basis. We followWallenius (2013) in our computation11. The education rate
e is the fraction of time that higher ability individuals devote to tertiary education. The
data reflect the number of students in tertiary education in full-time equivalents divided
by (the assumed higher ability) half of the population of age 18-29.
2.4.2 Calibrated parameters
How well does our model match reality in individual countries? When we impose each
country’s fiscal policy parameters, how close are the model’s predictions to the data? To
find out, we first parameterise the model. We discuss our procedure in this section. Table
2.3 contains an overview of all parameters. Many have been set in line with, or taken
from, the existing literature. Others have been calibrated to match key data.
We set the rate of time preference at 2% per year and the (exogenous and constant)
world real interest rate at 4.5% per year. Considering that periods in our model last 12
years, this choice implies a discount factor   = 0.788 and interest rate r = 0.696. In
the production function for goods, we assume a capital share coefficient ↵ equal to 1/3.
Following Caselli and Coleman (2006), who state that the empirical labour literature con-
sistently estimates values between 1 and 2, we set the elasticity of substitution ◆ between
the two ability types in effective labour equal to 1.5. We set ✓ = 4. Rogerson (2007)
considers a value for the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure
✓ between 1 and 3 as reasonable. We do not have an endogenous participation decision,
however. Therefore, we adopt a value for ✓ that is somewhat higher. Two other sets of
parameters that we took directly from the literature are the age-specific productivity para-
meters "j and the time cost of commuting and being set-up in a job n¯. For the former
we follow the hump-shaped pattern imposed by Miles (1999). For the latter we impose a
value of 0.05, in line with Wallenius (2013). We impose the same ✏j and n¯ for both ability
types.
Three parameters relate to the production of human capital and to the level of human
capital with which individuals enter the model. For the elasticity with respect to education
time ( ) we choose a conservative value of 0.3. This value is within the range considered
by Bouzahzah et al. (2002), but much lower than the value imposed by Lucas (1990).
To determine the relative initial human capital of lower ability individuals (relative to the
initial human capital of high ability individuals, ✏L) we follow Buyse et al. (2017) who rely
on PISA science scores. We use the average of the test scores of students at the 17th and
the 50th percentile as representative for lower ability individuals in our model, and the test
11We assume that the total time endowment of each individual is 14 hours a day, 7 days a week and
52 weeks per year. This time can be allocated to work, leisure or (for young higher ability individuals)
education.
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Table 2.3: Basic parameterisation of the model
Parameters imposed on all countries - Values
Discount factor in utility   0.788
World real interest rate r 0.696
Capital share parameter in goods production ↵ 0.33
Elasticity of substitution between different ability types of labour ◆ 1.5
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure ✓ 4
Age-specific productivity parameters "1,"2,"3,"4 2.325, 2.770, 2.776, 2.341
Time cost for e.g. commuting n¯ 0.05
Relative initial human capital of lower ability individuals (to h0) ✏L 0.755
Elasticity of human capital with respect to education time   0.3
Efficiency parameter in human capital production   3.53
Share parameter of higher ability individuals in effective labour ⌘H 0.594
Exogenous technology growth x 0.255
Calibrated region-specific parameters
cont. European Nordic Anglo-Saxon
 R1 0.195 0.216 0.106
 R2 0.481 0.391 0.355
 R3 0.356 0.289 0.262
 R4 0.239 0.204 0.187
 R1 2.513 1.740 1.792
 R2 4.013 2.355 2.913
 R3 4.017 2.366 2.888
 R4 4.280 2.598 2.960
⇢R1 0.8 0.9 0.9
⇢R2 0.05 0 0.1
⇢R3 0.15 0.1 0
Target values for the calibrated parameters  , x, and ⌘H (2001-07)
Education rate (e) (average over 12 countries) 23.4%
Per capita annual growth (average over 12 countries) 1.91%
Relative gross wage of young low versus high educated workers US 0.53
Region-specific targets: unemployment and hours worked by age (2001-07)
cont. European Nordic Anglo-Saxon
u1 14.0% 8.7% 16.9%
u2 14.9% 11.8% 14.8%
u3 15.5% 12.7% 14.7%
u4 20.3% 18.7% 17.2%
n1 0.295 0.293 0.331
n2 0.313 0.343 0.371
n3 0.313 0.343 0.371
n4 0.306 0.331 0.355
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score of students at the 83th percentile as representative for high ability individuals. The
data are remarkably robust across countries. The science test scores of students at the 17th
percentile and students at the 50th percentile are always very close to 67% and 85% of
the test score of students at the 83th percentile12. The differences across countries being
so small, we take these relative scores as objective indicators of the relative cognitive
capacity of lower and high ability individuals, and will correspondingly set ✏L equal to
0.755 (= the average of 0.67 and 0.85). Last but not least, the efficiency parameter  
in the human capital production function of the individuals with high ability has been
determined by a calibration procedure that we discuss now.
We determined 36 parameters by calibration. Next to the efficiency parameter in hu-
man capital production ( ), these are the exogenous technology growth rate (x), the share
parameter in aggregate effective labor (⌘H), the four household taste for leisure parameters
( R1 ,  R2 ,  R3 ,  R4 ), the four union ’preference for wage’ parameters ( R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 ), and
the three weights in the unions’ reference wage (⇢R1 , ⇢R2 , ⇢R3 ). The former three paramet-
ers ( , ⌘H , x) are assumed to be the same for all countries. The 11 household and union
preference parameters may differ by country group. The efficiency parameter in human
capital production ( ) is determined to correctly predict the average fraction of time al-
located to tertiary education (e) by individuals of age 18-29 in all twelve countries in our
sample. The parameter turns out to be 3.53. The exogenous growth rate of technology
(x) is calibrated to match actual per capita growth. The underlying target for the annual
growth rate is 1.91%, being the average annual per capita growth in our sample of twelve
countries in 2001-2007. Following Buyse et al. (2017), we calibrate the share parameter
in aggregate effective labor (⌘H) to match the relative wage of young workers without a
tertiary degree versus young workers with tertiary degree in the US. This relative wage is
0.5313. As shown by Equation (2.18), the share parameter ⌘H is an important determinant
of the relative productivity of labour and relative wages. Actual wages are informative
if a close link can be assumed between wages and productivity. This condition is much
more likely fulfilled in the US than in Europe, which explains the introduction here of US
relative wages. The value for ⌘H that emerges is 0.59.
Finally, we calibrated the four taste for leisure parameters of the households ( Rj ), the
four union preference for wage parameters ( Rj ), and the weights in the reference wage of
the union for the hypothetical competitive wage of lower ability workers (⇢R1 ), the wage
of higher ability workers (⇢R2 ), and the unemployment benefit (⇢R3 = 1   ⇢R1   ⇢R2 ) for
12 The data that we report are averages of the PISA results for the years 2000, 2003 and 2006. The
available data concern students aged 15.
13OECD data (Education at a Glance, 2009, table A7.1a) show a relative wage of 0.43 for workers of
age 25-34 without upper secondary education versus workers of this age with a tertiary degree. The relative
wage of workers of age 25-34 with upper secondary degree is 0.63. On average this is 0.53.
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each of the three country groups. That is a total of 33 parameters. To do this, we used
a procedure in line with Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013). Basically, this procedure
comes down to (i) exactly matching the 24 country-group averages of the unemployment
rates and hours worked by age reported in Table 2.3, and (ii) to minimise the deviation
of our model’s predictions for the aggregate unemployment rate (over all age and both
ability groups) from the data in the twelve individual countries in our sample. More pre-
cisely, in a first step we imposed 9 values for ⇢R1 , ⇢R2 and ⇢R3 (R 2 {Eur,Nor, Ang}).
With these imposed values we calibrated the 12 parameters  Rj and the 12 parameters
 Rj with j = {1, 2, 3, 4} and R 2 {Eur,Nor, Ang} to exactly match the country-group
averages of actual unemployment rates u in four generations and the country-group av-
erages of actual hours worked n per generation (over both ability types). The obtained
set of household taste for leisure and union preference parameters for each of the three
country groups - together with all other calibrated parameters - would then allow us to
compute the predictions of our model for all unemployment rates and all hours worked in
all generations in each of the twelve countries in our sample separately. We repeated this
procedures many times, each time starting from different values for ⇢R1 , ⇢R2 and ⇢R3 . Our
guideline to pin down our final values for these parameters and the corresponding values
for  Rj and  Rj was to minimise the deviation of our model’s predictions from the actual
data for the aggregate unemployment rate (over all age and ability groups)14.
The results in Table 2.3 reveal by far the highest values for  EURj in continental
Europe, which implies that in these countries union indifference curves are flatter, wages
are more rigid and the union wage mark-up is higher. Given the dominance of sectoral
wage bargaining in these countries, this result matches well with the famous Calmfors and
Driffill (1988) hypothesis. Furthermore, we observe that in each country group  Rj rises in
the age of the workers involved. Wages are therefore the most (least) rigid and the highest
(lowest) for the oldest (youngest) workers. Seniority pay systems and the insider-outsider
theory may provide an explanation for this result. As to the specific weights in the unions’
reference wage, we notice in each country group a major role for the competitive wage
of lower ability individuals (⇢R1   0.8). In the Anglo-Saxon countries the only other
variable that matters in the unions’ reference wage is the wage of the high skilled. In the
Nordic countries, it is the unemployment benefit. In continental Europe, both these other
variables have an impact on union wage setting, with unemployment benefits being more
important. For the household taste for leisure parameters  Rj , we observe the lowest val-
ues in the Anglo-Saxon countries, which would confirm Blanchard (2004). Except among
14From the predictions of our model and the data for 12 countries we computed each time for the
aggregate unemployment rate the root mean squared error normalised to the mean. We minimised the
average normalised RMSE.
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the youngest households, however, cross-country differences in  Rj are fairly small.
2.4.3 Evaluation and empirical relevance of the model
In Figures 2.2-2.4, we evaluate the empirical relevance of the model regarding the cross-
country variation in unemployment and hours worked. The interrupted line in each figure
is the 45º-line. In each figure, we also report the slope of the regression line (not shown).
Plugging each country’s policy parameters into our calibrated model, it matches the facts
for the aggregate unemployment rate very well. Correlation between the predictions of
the model and the facts in Figure 2.2.a is over 80%, with a slope of the regression line very
close to 1. Our model also captures the cross-country differences in the unemployment
rates of different age groups quite well. Figure 2.3 shows this for the youngest and the
oldest age groups. Last but not least, in Figures 2.2.b and 2.4 our model explains an im-
portant fraction of cross-country differences in hours worked per employed. The reported
slope of the regression line in these figures remains below one, though, suggesting that
our model somewhat exaggerates the effect of policy differences on hours worked.
2.5 Accounting for cross-country variation in
unemployment
Figure 2.2.a showed large differences across OECD countries in the unemployment rate.
From Figure 2.1 we know that these differences explain an important fraction of cross-
country differences in aggregate employment and labour market performance. The final
step in this research is to account for these unemployment differences. What exactly
causes higher unemployment in some countries compared to other countries?
2.5.1 Description of the experiment
We find a correlation of 0.804 between the predictions of our model for the aggregate
unemployment rate and the unemployment data. From this, we derive a R2 of 0.646. Fol-
lowing Israeli (2006), we perform a Shapley decomposition of the R2-coefficient in order
to evaluate the relative importance of the different fiscal policy variables, union wage set-
ting and household preferences in generating cross-country unemployment differences.
More specifically, according to a Shapley decomposition, the contribution of each of
our variables equals its marginal effect measured by the change in the R2-coefficient
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate labour market performance in individual countries (2001-07)
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after eliminating the cross-country differences in this variable. This change in R2 is
computed for every subset S of other explanatory variables. For example, if we had
four explanatory variables, x1, x2, x3, and x4, the marginal effect of x1 on R2 would be
M1 = R2[x1, S ✓ {x2, x3, x4}]   R2[S ✓ {x2, x3, x4}] for every subset S. Next, we
take a weighted average over all these marginal effects where the weight is respectively
s!(n s 1)!
n! , with s the number of elements in the subset and n the total number of ex-
planatory variables. Hence, for each of our variables in the Shapley decomposition, we
successively replace their country-specific values by the average value over all countries
in our sample, implying that we shut down the influence of these specific variables in
generating cross-country differences in the unemployment rate. These variables are (i)
the labour tax imposed on employers; (ii) the labour tax imposed on employees; (iii) the
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Figure 2.3: Unemployment rate (%) among lower ability individuals
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replacement rate in the unemployment benefit formula; (iv) the tax rate on capital; (v) the
tax rate on consumption; (vi) government spending on goods; (vii) the union preference
parameters, and (viii) the taste for leisure of the households.
Our model generates cross-country variation in aggregate unemployment due to these
country-specific and region-specific variables. The Shapley decomposition makes it pos-
sible to formally explore the contribution of the variation in each of those variables to the
predicted variation in the aggregate unemployment rate. While the decomposition can be
applied to any model independent of the underlying theory, we believe that there are a
few features of our model and our results that make the Shapley decomposition highly
relevant. First, the richer the model, the more explanatory variables contribute to the R2-
coefficient and the more relevant is a decomposition of R2 into its contributing variables.
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Figure 2.4: Hours worked by age over both ability types
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Second, the R2-coefficient between the model’s predictions and the actual data for the ag-
gregate unemployment rate is quite high. Thus, the variation in the exogenous variables
and parameters is highly informative about the cross-country variation in the aggregate
unemployment rate.
2.5.2 Fiscal policy, union preferences, or households’ taste for
leisure?
Is the cross-country variation in unemployment rates due to differences in union beha-
viour, household preferences or fiscal policy variables. Blanchard (2004) and Alesina
et al. (2005) emphasise the role of union behaviour and differences in the taste for leis-
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Table 2.4: Shapley decomposition of ut
Variables Contribution to R2
Preferences/Institutions Absolute Relative
Wage preference of union  R 0.217 33.6%
Weights in union reference wage ⇢R1 , ⇢R2 , ⇢R3 0.121 18.7%
Household taste for leisure  Rj -0.009 -1.4%
Total preferences/institutions 0.329 50.9%
Fiscal policy Absolute Relative
Tax on employers, employees, consumption ⌧p, ⇠, , ⌧c -0.057 -8.8%
Net unemployment benefit replacement rate b˜j 0.198 30.6%
Tax on capital income ⌧k 0.049 7.6%
Fraction of output spent on goods g 0.128 19.7%
Total fiscal policy 0.318 49.1%
Total 0.647 100%
ure of households. Other authors such as Prescott (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008) and
Dhont and Heylen (2008) conclude that differences in fiscal policy are superior. Look-
ing at Table 2.4, the conclusion is that both fiscal policy variables and union preferences
and wage setting matter. They account each for about half of the unemployment vari-
ation across countries. A correct diagnosis of the unemployment problem and analysis of
cross-country differences clearly seems to require both components. On the other hand,
any differences in households’ taste for leisure can safely be ignored. Integrating these
findings, our interpretation is that while the above market-clearing wage chosen by the
unions is the source of unemployment, the fiscal policy variables explain a large part of
the magnitude of the unemployment rate.
If we explore the impact of the union parameters into more detail, we notice that
the contribution of the variation in  Rj (i.e. the relative weight on wages as opposed to
employment for age group j) is superior to that of the variation in ⇢R1 and ⇢R2 (i.e. the
weights in the specification for the reference wage of the unions).
Looking at the different components of fiscal policy, a surprising result is that - despite
huge cross-country variation in ⇠,  , ⌧ p, and ⌧c - these tax rates and parameters have
no role to play when it comes to explaining unemployment differences across countries.
Countries with higher average tax rates and a higher degree of progressivity in labour
taxes are not necessarily the countries with the highest aggregate unemployment rate.
Ambiguous effects from higher taxes may explain this. A rise in ⌧ p for example will
imply higher unemployment because it raises the cost of low skilled labour for the firms.
On the other hand, it also generates effects that may lead to lower unemployment. One
is the negative effect of a rise in ⌧ p on competitive gross wages, which will imply more
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moderate wage claims from the unions. Another is that higher taxes may feed through
into higher lump sum transfers in our model. The negative effect of higher transfers on
the supply of hours per worker will induce firms to hire more people. Similar ambiguity
follows after a rise in  . On the one hand, this negatively affects labour supply, pushing
wages up and making low skilled workers more expensive. Firms will then hire fewer
workers, and unemployment rises. On the other hand, the fact that individuals supply
fewer hours because of higher taxes (and an expected increase of lump sum transfers),
will induce firms to hire more people.
The major role of the replacement rateebj is not a surprising result, however. From the
results of the calibration in Table 2.3, it is clear that unions in both continental Europe and
Nordic countries attach a positive weight ⇢R3 to the level of these benefits. This weight
is the largest in continental Europe. Benefit changes will therefore affect the cost of
low educated labour most in these countries, and therefore firms’ willingness to hire.
Important differences in benefits as exist for example between France and Germany can
then be expected to explain a significant fraction of unemployment differences in the
period studied. The contribution of ebj might even be an underestimation, as it is the
combined impact of the net replacement rate and the region-specific union preferences
that drive the Shapley results for the union preferences.
The variation in the capital tax rate has a small positive contribution to the R2. Its
influence runs via the first order condition of the firm with respect to capital, and has
an impact on the variation in labour demand over countries. This effect dominates the
indirect effect on the lump sum transfers. Thus, a decrease in ⌧k leads to a decrease in
u due to the higher labour demand. Government spending affects u via the lump sum
transfers. An increase of g leads to a decrease in lump sum transfers. Households will
consume less and supply more hours. Therefore, the firm will hire fewer individuals (u
increases).
2.6 Conclusion
Huge differences in labour market performance across OECD countries have attracted
the attention of many researchers during the last decade. One strand of the literature has
emphasised the major role of the composition of fiscal policy, i.e. the level and structure
of taxes and government expenditures (e.g. Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2007), Dhont
and Heylen (2008), Wallenius (2013), Alonso-Ortiz (2014)). The focus of these studies is
mainly on explaining employment (hours worked). All assume perfect competition and as
such disregard any role for labour market imperfections. Unemployment is not an issue
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in these studies. A second tradition in the literature also recognises the role of labour
taxes and unemployment benefits, but this tradition has put much more emphasis on the
role of unions (e.g. union power and wage bargaining) and labour and product market
institutions (e.g. Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Nickell et al. (2005), Alesina et al. (2005)).
Last but not least, some other authors (e.g. Blanchard (2004)) have pointed to the key role
of household preferences. In their view, a major element behind the weaker employment
performance in many European countries compared to the US is a higher taste for leisure
in Europe. Alesina et al. (2005) explain that stronger unions may have contributed to this
higher taste for leisure in Europe.
This paper is complementary to the first strand of the literature. We also develop a gen-
eral equilibrium model (OLG model) to study cross-country differences in labour market
performance. While we somewhat simplify the approach by assuming exogenous parti-
cipation, our main contribution is to extend this literature so that it can also explain equi-
librium unemployment among lower educated individuals. This extension is important
given that differences in employment rates among OECD countries are strongly related to
countries’ success or failure in avoiding unemployment among the lower educated. Two
assumptions are key in our model. The first one is the assumption that individuals are
heterogeneous by ability. They enter the model with different human capital stocks and
have different capacity to build more human capital. A second assumption and key nov-
elty compared to previous work in this tradition is the assumption of a unionised labour
market and union wage setting for lower ability (lower educated) individuals. For higher
ability individuals we assume that wages and employment are determined in a perfectly
competitive way.
Calibrating and simulating this richer model for twelve OECD countries, we are able
to assess the relative importance of a whole range of explanatory variables for cross-
country differences in unemployment. What is the contribution of (progressive) tax rates
on labour, tax rates on consumption, unemployment benefits, etc.? What is the contri-
bution of union preferences and wage setting? What is the contribution of differences
in households’ taste for leisure? Performing a Shapley decomposition we find an almost
equal role for differences in fiscal policy variables and in union preferences. Each ac-
count for about half of the cross-country variation in unemployment rates explained by
our model. By contrast, any differences in the households’ taste for leisure play no role.
Integrating our findings, our interpretation will then be that the above market-clearing
wage chosen by the unions is the source of unemployment, while the fiscal policy vari-
ables explain the major share of its magnitude. Going into greater detail on the fiscal
side, we find that differences in unemployment benefit generosity play a much more im-
portant role than tax differences. In the Nordic countries and (even more) the continental
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European countries, the unemployment benefit replacement rate has a significant impact
on union wage setting.
Our results highlight the relevance of integrating heterogeneity in individuals’ abil-
ity and labour market imperfections into dynamic general equilibrium analyses of labour
market performance. Imposing perfect competition seems to imply that an important frac-
tion of reality is unfortunately ignored. By contrast, cross-country differences in house-
holds’ taste for leisure seem insignificant for unemployment, and can safely be disreg-
arded.
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Appendix 2.A First-order conditions of the household
2.A.1 Higher ability households
The maximisation problem of the higher ability households boils down to:
max
⌥H
utH =
5X
j=1
 j 1
"
ln ctjH +  j
(1  etjH   ntjH)
1  ✓
1 ✓#
s.t. the household budget constraints and the human capital accumulation process, while
taking fiscal policy variables, the wage and the interest rate as given. The vector ⌥H of
decision variables is [⌦t1H ,⌦t2H ,⌦t3H ,⌦t4H , nt1H , nt2H , nt3H , nt4H , et1H ]. Optimisation yields
the following first order conditions guiding the optimal consumption path (2.21), the
labour-leisure choice (2.22, 2.23) and the optimal time allocation to education (2.24):
ctj+1,H
ctjH
=  (1 + rt+j), j 2 {1, 2, 3, 4} (2.21)
 1
(1  nt1H   et1H)✓
=
wH,t"1ht1H(1  ⌧m1H)
(1 + ⌧c)ct1H
(2.22)
 j
(1  ntjH)✓
=
wH,t+j 1"j(1 +  (et1H)
 )ht1H(1  ⌧mjH)
(1 + ⌧c)ctjH
, j 2 {2, 3, 4} (2.23)
 1
(1  nt1H   et1H)✓
=  
1
ct2H
@ct2H
@et1H
+  2
1
ct3H
@ct3H
@et1H
+  3
1
ct4H
@ct4H
@et1H
(2.24)
with:
@ctjH
@et1H
=   (et1H)
  1wH,t+j 1"jh
t
1H(1  ⌧mjH)
 
ntjH   n¯H
 
(1 + ⌧c)
, j 2 {2, 3, 4} (2.25)
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2.A.2 Lower ability households
For the lower ability individuals, the objective is to
max
⌥L
utL =
5X
j=1
 j 1
"
ln ctjL + (1  uj,t+j 1) j
(1  ntjH)
1  ✓
1 ✓#
s.t. the household budget constraints and the human capital accumulation process, while
taking the unemployment rate, wages, the interest rate, taxes and the unemployment bene-
fit as given. The vector⌥L of decision variables is [⌦t1L,⌦t2L,⌦t3L,⌦t4L, nt1L, nt2L, nt3L, nt4L].
Optimisation yields the following first order conditions:
ctj+1,L
ctjL
=  (1 + rt+j), j 2 {1, 2, 3, 4} (2.26)
 j
(1  ntjL)✓
=
wL,t+j 1"jhtjL(1  ⌧mjL)
(1 + ⌧c)ctjL
, j 2 {1, 2, 3, 4} (2.27)
Appendix 2.B Description of the equilibrium of the
model
Definition 1 Given an initial value for the technology stock A0 and a value for the pre-
determined human capital stock of young higher ability individuals h0, a vector of exo-
genous fiscal policy variables {⌧c, ⌧k, ⌧ p, , ⇠, g,ebj}4j=1 and the exogenous world interest
rate, an intertemporal equilibrium consists of sequences of household decision rules
{ct1a, ct2a, ct3a, ct4a, ct5a,⌦t1a,⌦t2a,⌦t3a,⌦t4a, et1H , nt1a, nt2a, nt3a, nt4a}1t=0, sequences of prices
{wa,t}1t=0, human capital stocks {ht1a, ht2a, ht3a, ht4a}1t=1, lump sum transfers {Zt}1t=0, tax
rates {{⌧ja, ⌧mja}4j=0}1t=0, unemployment rates {u1,t, u2,t, u3,t, u4,t}1t=0 and aggregate vari-
ables {Yt, Kt, Ht, At}1t=0 for a 2 {H,L} such that
1. Decision rules of the higher ability households maximise the intertemporal utility
function (2.1) subject to the budget constraints (2.2) and the human capital ac-
cumulation process (2.5), whereas decision rules of the lower ability households
maximise the intertemporal utility function (2.3) subject to the budget constraints
(2.4) and the human capital accumulation process described in Section 2.2.1.3..
2. Firms’ choices {Kt, H1H,t, H2H,t, H3H,t, H4H,t, (1 u1,t), (1 u2,t), (1 u3,t), (1 
u4,t)} maximise profits. These choices are determined via the optimality conditions
of the firm in (2.17) and (2.18).
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3. The wage {wH,t} is determined via (2.18) and is such that the labour market for
higher ability individuals clears.
4. Given the wages chosen by the union using (2.20), each couple {ntjL, 1   uj,t}
forms a Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the dynamic game played between
the household, the firm and the union. The union chooses {wL,t} to maximise its
utility (2.9) subject to the optimal responses of the household and the firm (2.19).
These actions form a subgame perfect equilibrium.
5. Human capital of the individuals evolves according to the human capital accumu-
lation process described in Section 2.2.1.3..
6. Lump sum transfers ensure that the government budget (2.10) is balanced.
7. Government aggregates are determined via the equations described in (2.11-2.16).
Average tax rates follow ⌧ja =  
⇣
ylabja,t
y¯labt
⌘⇠
, whereas marginal tax rates are determ-
ined via ⌧mja = (1 + ⇠) 
⇣
ylabja,t
y¯labt
⌘⇠
.
8. Yt follows from the production function (2.6) and the values for Kt and AtHt (2.7-
2.8).
Appendix 2.C Details on data construction and sources
In this Appendix, we provide details on the construction and sources of our data.
2.C.1 Individuals of high and low ability
Individuals of high ability pursue tertiary education when they enter our model at the
age of 18. Individuals of lower ability do not: they achieve at most an upper secondary
degree, but no tertiary degree. These assumptions explain why we use existing data for
individuals with a tertiary degree as proxy for variables (e.g. wages, employment) relating
to higher ability individuals in our model, and the average of existing data for individuals
with a lower secondary degree and individuals with an upper secondary degree (but no
tertiary degree) as proxy for variables relating to lower ability individuals. According to
ISCED classification, data for high ability individuals therefore relate to education levels
5-6. Data for lower ability individuals are constructed as the average for education levels
0-2 and 3-4.
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Table 2.5: Unemployment rates among four generations of lower
educated individuals (2001-2007), in %
Unemployment rates 18-29 30  41 42  53 54  65
Belgium 23.7 17.1 18.9 17.6
France 5.9 12.5 10.2 17.4
Germany 20.0 18.5 18.5 23.5
Austria 9.8 14.1 16.4 25.0
Netherlands 10.5 12.4 13.5 17.7
Denmark 4.9 10.2 11.4 19.1
Finland 20.7 12.5 13.8 17.0
Norway 7.9 13.5 14.2 23.1
Sweden 1.2 11.1 10.9 15.7
United States 17.3 15.7 15.8 21.0
United Kingdom 17.7 14.5 13.9 8.5
Canada 15.7 14.3 14.5 12.9
Average 13.5 14.0 14.3 18.2
2.C.2 Unemployment
In our model, all individuals participate in the labour market during four periods of work-
ing age (18-29, 30-41, 42-53, 54-65). A fraction of lower ability individuals becomes
unemployed. High ability individuals are always employed. Since we do not model parti-
cipation as an endogenous variable, our setup implies that the unemployment rate among
lower ability individuals in a particular age group is the same as the gap in percentage
points between the employment rate among higher ability individuals and the employ-
ment rate among lower ability individuals in that age group. In line with our explanation
in C.1, as a proxy for the former we use data for individuals with a tertiary degree. As a
proxy for the latter, we compute the average of data for individuals with a below upper
secondary degree and individuals with an upper secondary degree, but no tertiary degree.
Data sources: Eurostat (Employment rates by sex, age and highest level of education
attained (%) [lfsa_ergaed]) provides employment rates in persons by level of educational
attainment and by age for all EU15 countries and Norway since 1995 at the latest. Data
are available for the age groups 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59
and 60-64, among others. We compute the data for our four larger age groups as weighted
averages of the Eurostat data. The data that we report and employ are for 2001-2007. For
the United States and Canada we use data provided by OECD Education at a Glance. Data
by educational attainment are available for the age groups 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64.
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2.C.3 Hours worked
For hours worked, we proceed as follows. First, we gather available OECD (Labour Force
Statistics) data on the usual weekly number of hours that individuals work. These data
are available for the age groups 15-24, 25-54 and 55-64. We compute the data for our
four age groups as weighted averages of the OECD data. Second, we compute how many
weeks individuals work per year. We divide OECD data on total annual hours worked per
employee by the average number of hours worked per week. Data on total annual hours
are only available at the level of the aggregate labour force. As such, we obtain a proxy for
the number of weeks individuals work per year, also at the level of the aggregate labour
force. Multiplying the first variable (usual hours per week) by the second (weeks per
year), we obtain our proxy for total annual hours worked per employee in each generation.
We express this number as a fraction of the total time endowment. Like Wallenius (2013),
we assume that the total time endowment of each individual is 14 hours a day, 7 days a
week and 52 weeks per year. This time can be allocated to work, leisure or (for young
higher ability individuals) education.
2.C.4 Education rate of the young higher ability individuals
The education rate indicates the fraction of their total time endowment that high ability
individuals allocate to schooling. Considering that in countries like Canada and Norway
almost (or even more than) 50% of the 25-34 year-olds succeed in obtaining a tertiary
degree, it will be our assumption that 50% of the population in each country has high
ability, and therefore the potential to succeed at high level. The extent to which this
potential is fully exploited may however differ across countries. Differences may show up
in the fraction of individuals that effectively succeed in tertiary education and in the level
of the tertiary degree that these individuals eventually achieve. We expect that the latter
will be reflected in the number of years that is studied. Building on this assumption and
these considerations, our empirical proxy for the education rate is the number of students
in tertiary education in full-time equivalents divided by 50% of size of the population of
age 18-29. Data on the number of students is obtained from Eurostat (Students by ISCED
level, study intensity (full-time, part-time) and sex [educ_enrl1ad]). Population data are
from the OECD database (Total Population by sex and age). The education rates that we
report are averages for 2001-2007.
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Table 2.6: Hours worked per person employed (fraction of time) - average
for tertiary and non-tertiary educated individuals (2001-2007)
Hours worked 18-29 30  41 42  53 54  65
Belgium 0.309 0.311 0.311 0.311
France 0.292 0.301 0.301 0.291
Germany 0.285 0.283 0.283 0.277
Austria 0.339 0.349 0.349 0.351
Netherlands 0.252 0.319 0.319 0.299
Denmark 0.283 0.354 0.354 0.344
Finland 0.327 0.366 0.366 0.349
Norway 0.263 0.309 0.309 0.297
Sweden 0.300 0.341 0.341 0.332
United States 0.338 0.383 0.383 0.374
United Kingdom 0.325 0.359 0.359 0.332
Canada 0.331 0.371 0.371 0.358
Average 0.305 0.338 0.338 0.323
Table 2.7: Fraction of time allocated to education by
young high ability individuals (2001-2007)
Education
Belgium 0.450
France 0.450
Germany 0.386
Austria 0.434
Netherlands 0.442
Denmark 0.522
Finland 0.564
Norway 0.512
Sweden 0.444
United States 0.574
United Kingdom 0.366
Canada 0.474
Average 0.468
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2.C.5 Growth rate of real per capita output
To compute the growth rate of real per capita output, which we need for the calibration
of the exogenous rate of technical progress (x), we use data on real potential GDP and
on population at working age (15-64). The former are available from OECD Economic
Outlook (supply block), the latter from OECD Labour Force Statistics. In line with all
other data we compute average growth rates over 2001-2007.
2.C.6 Fiscal policy variables
The government in our model finances spending on goods and unemployment benefits
from taxes on labour (on both employers and employees), consumption, and capital.
Lump sum transfers ensure a balanced budget. For the tax rates ⌧k and ⌧c, we use the
same data as Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013). Regarding labour tax rates, we dis-
tinguish between social security contributions paid by employers and taxes and social
security contributions on labour income paid by employees. Our data source is OECD
(Taxation, Tax Database, Tables I.4, I.5, I.6). More specifically, we use the OECD’s av-
erage rate of employer social security contributions for ⌧ p (Table I.5). We calibrate the
level parameter   in the workers’ income tax rate using the OECD data for all-in aver-
age personal income tax rates at average wage. The all-in tax rate is calculated as the
combined central and sub-central government income tax plus employee social security
contribution, as a percentage of gross wage earnings. The OECD provides these tax rates
for four family types (Table I.6). We computed the average over these types. A nov-
elty compared to previous work is the inclusion of progressive income taxation. Just like
Koyuncu (2011), we calibrate the country-specific degree of progressivity ⇠ according to
our description in Section 2.2.4. as the ratio (minus 1) of the marginal tax rate on work-
ers’ gross wage to the average tax rate, both including social security contributions. The
OECD provides these marginal and average tax rates for a single person without depend-
ent at four different income levels (Tables I.4 and I.5). Our proxy for ⇠ reflects the average
of the results over these four income levels. All computed and reported tax data in our
Table 8 are averages over the period 2000-2007. For government spending on goods in
percent of GDP (g) we compute the sum of their data for government consumption and
productive government spending. For details on the construction of these fiscal policy
variables, we refer to Heylen & Van de Kerckhove (2013, their Appendix 1).
For the unemployment benefit replacement rate (eb) we make use of data provided by
the OECD (Tax-Benefit Models). Since in our model unemployment is a structural or
equilibrium phenomenon, the data that we use concern net transfers received by structur-
ally or long-term unemployed people. They include social assistance, family benefits and
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Table 2.8: Labour tax rates on employees and em-
ployers (2000-2007) and unemployment benefit re-
placement rates (2001-2004), in %
⇠   ⌧ p ebj
Belgium 0.343 33.4 29.1 59.6
France 0.296 21.7 38.7 46.0
Germany 0.245 30.2 19.9 64.7
Austria 0.311 27.3 28.6 56.3
Netherlands 0.391 25.2 11.2 55.0
Denmark 0.233 35.3 0 61.9
Finland 0.424 28.9 24.1 61.3
Norway 0.392 25.1 12.7 56.9
Sweden 0.376 28.9 32.2 55.4
United States 0.330 17.1 7.7 30.5
United Kingdom 0.383 24.0 9.8 51.1
Canada 0.331 17.9 11.1 44.4
Average 0.337 26.3 18.8 53.4
Table 2.9: Tax rates on consumption and
capital (in %), and government spending on
goods (in % of GDP), (1995-2001)
⌧c ⌧k g
Belgium 13.4 27.1 24.8
France 17.1 21.7 28.5
Germany 11.1 34.4 23.2
Austria 13.2 17.3 23.4
Netherlands 12.2 24.3 27.3
Denmark 18.9 22.5 29.8
Finland 15.2 17.2 26.8
Norway 16.4 22.1 26.3
Sweden 17.9 16.1 32.6
United States 7.2 23.6 19.5
United Kingdom 14.5 21.2 21.4
Canada 14.5 24.8 23.6
Average 14.3 22.1 25.7
housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also include unemployment in-
surance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are still paid, i.e. if workers
can be structurally unemployed for more than five years without losing benefit eligibility.
The OECD provides net replacement rates for six family situations and three earnings
levels. Our data in Table 8 are the averages of these 18 cases. Data are for 2001-2004.
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Appendix 2.D Derivation of the first-order condition of
the union
The union maximises Equation (2.9) with respect to wL,t. In this derivation, we use the
structure of average and marginal tax rates as discussed in Section 2.2.4. So,
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We impose an extra assumption, namely that the union treats every generation equally
when it comes to generating union utility. Due to this assumption, each part of this sum is
put equal to zero. The result is the first-order condition that appears in the text (Equation
2.20), which applies for each generation. For each generation, the excess wage gap is
now related to the corresponding response of the household within that generation and
the firm.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Policy, Union Preferences, and
the Labour Market Position of
Low-skilled Individuals1
Abstract
I explore the potential of fiscal and union policies to improve the labour market posi-
tion of the low-skilled in an OLG model with heterogeneous abilities. The key innovation is
that the probabilities in the Markov transition matrix governing the stochastic employment
process for the low-skilled are endogenous. The results indicate that alternative fiscal policy
and union instruments may have a very different impact on respectively hours worked, un-
employment, labour market participation, and workers’ welfare. Most preferable to improve
the labour market position of the low-skilled is a decrease in labour taxes on employees com-
bined with wage moderation accepted by the unions. Finally, unlike in perfectly competitive
labour markets, labour taxes levied on respectively employers and employees are no longer
equivalent.
Keywords: Low-skilled unemployment, EndogenousMarkovmatrix, Heterogeneous agents,
Union wage setting, Fiscal policy
JEL classification codes: E24, E62, J51, J64
1I am grateful to Freddy Heylen, Selien de Schryder, Ewoud Quaghebeur, and the members of the
Macro Research Group of Ghent University for valuable suggestions and comments. The computational re-
sources (Stevin Supercomputer Infrastructure) and services used in this work were provided by the Flemish
Supercomputer Center, funded by Ghent University, the Hercules Foundation, and the Economy, Science,
and Innovation Department of the Flemish Government. The author is Ph.D. fellow of the Research Found-
ation - Flanders and acknowledges support from the foundation. Any remaining errors are mine.
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3.1 Introduction
This paper explores the potential of fiscal and union policies to improve the labour mar-
ket performance of low-skilled individuals2. While there is considerable evidence on the
impact of public policy on aggregate employment3, there is much less evidence on the im-
pact thereof on employment across different skill groups, notably among the low-skilled
individuals. Figure 3.1 indicates, however, that focusing on the latter is of particular
interest4. This figure shows first of all that the labour market position of low-skilled indi-
viduals is highly indicative of the aggregate employment rate within a country. Countries
with lower aggregate employment rates are typically countries with higher unemployment
rates (panel a) and relatively lower employment rates (panel b) among the low-skilled. As
a second important result, Figure 3.1. (panel c) reveals a much larger cross-country vari-
ance in the employment rate among the low- than among the high-skilled5.
These observations indicate that a specific focus on improving the labour market per-
formance of low-skilled individuals should be an important policy objective. Furthermore,
they raise the question whether restricting the focus on aggregate employment sufficiently
captures the potential impact on the low-skilled, especially given the distinct and precari-
ous labour market status of the latter. They also highlight the importance of modelling
the labour markets of high- and low-skilled individuals separately, with a specific focus
on the latter. Ultimately, to address all these concerns one needs a theoretical model (i)
with labour market frictions on the low-skilled labour market, (ii) that is capable of cap-
turing the cross-country variation in low-skilled employment, and (iii) that can be applied
to simulate a wide range of possible policy reforms to explore their impact on the differ-
ent components that determine the labour market performance of the low-skilled. These
concerns and findings lie at the core of this paper.
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first objective is to develop a large-scale com-
putable OLG model that contains all the different components of aggregate employment.
The key innovation compared to most of the literature is that low-skilled individuals face
idiosyncratic unemployment risk. As the source of unemployment, I introduce a union-
2In this paper, the term low-skilled is given to individuals who have not enjoyed tertiary education,
whereas the term high-skilled refers to individuals who have enjoyed tertiary education.
3Examples using a deterministic life-cycle model include Prescott et al. (2009); Erosa et al. (2012);
Wallenius (2013); Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013), and Alonso-Ortiz (2014) while Heathcote (2005);
Nishiyama and Smetters (2005, 2007), and Conesa et al. (2009) use heterogeneous agent life-cycle models
with idiosyncratic productivity risk.
4The focus of this paper is on 2001-2007 as this was the last period of relative stability on the labour
market before the financial crisis and the euro crisis. Considering that the analysis in this paper aims at
studying equilibrium unemployment, it is clearly more appropriate to use data for a relatively stable period.
5For this sample of countries, the variance of the employment rate among the high-skilled 25- to 64-
year-olds is 4.75, whereas it is 20.35 among the high-skilled.
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Figure 3.1: Employment and unemployment in OECD countries, 2001-2007.
Note: The (un)employment rate among lower skilled individuals is computed as the average of the
(un)employment rates among individuals with less than upper secondary education and among individu-
als with upper secondary, but no tertiary degree. The (un)employment rate among individuals with higher
education relates to those with a tertiary degree. Unless defined differently, all reported employment and
unemployment rates concern the age group 25-64. The employment rate indicates the fraction of individu-
als who have a job. Data sources: Eurostat (LFS series: lfsa_ergaed, lfsa_urgaed) and OECD Labour Force
Statistics (Total Employment).
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ised labour market for the low-skilled with a rich specification of union preferences. Due
to this set-up, the probabilities in the age-specific Markov matrix governing the stochastic
employment process are endogenously determined. By attending college or not, house-
holds choose the employment risk they will face. The model contains two additional
ingredients that will determine the choices that different individuals make when it comes
to attending college or not. These ingredients are heterogeneity in individuals’ innate abil-
ity and a college wage premium. Furthermore, both skilled and unskilled individuals face
idiosyncratic productivity risk. Last but not least, given that early retirement determines
the employment rate for the elderly to a large extent, the participation decision of 54- to
65-year-old individuals will also be endogenous in the model.
The second objective is to simulate a number of different public policies that are ex-
pected to improve the labour market outcome for low-skilled individuals. Due to the rich
set-up of the model, I can study the effects of both fiscal and union policies on aggregate
and skill-specific employment in great detail. For example, a change in fiscal policy might
have several effects: (i) the union might adopt a different wage rate, leading to a pos-
sible change in employment rates and different Markov matrices, (ii) 54- to 65-year-olds
might change their decision to participate or not on the labour market, (iii) the number of
18-year-olds choosing to attend college might change, leading to fewer low-skilled indi-
viduals in the economy, and (iv) employed individuals might choose to supply a different
number of hours. Furthermore, the model allows to investigate the impact on the wel-
fare of both employed and unemployed low-skilled individuals. The life-cycle structure,
finally, allows the government to target specific groups of individuals: e.g. low-skilled
individuals, 54- to 65-year-olds and 54- to 65-year-old low-skilled individuals. Most of
the aforementioned papers are not able to identify all these effects.
The simulations reveal that modelling the different components of aggregate employ-
ment is important to explore the effectiveness of fiscal and union policies. While most
fiscal policy and union instruments have a highly similar impact on aggregate output, cap-
ital, and labour, these instruments all have a different impact on unemployment, labour
force participation, and hours worked. The simulations thus highlight that the choice for a
given policy instrument is dependent on the target variable. Decreasing only labour taxes,
for example, has no use when the fiscal government aims to decrease low-skilled unem-
ployment. Decreasing the net unemployment benefit replacement rate and less aggressive
wage policies by the union, on the other hand, have a strong impact on low-skilled unem-
ployment. But they have no use if the target variable is the amount of hours worked per
employed individual.
That being said, several policies lead to desirable results in terms of unemployment.
Overall, however, the simulations show that fiscal governments and unions have a mutual
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interest in joining forces to improve the labour market performance of the low-skilled.
For example, a particularly interesting policy is a decrease in labour taxes levied on low-
skilled employees combined with wage moderation accepted by the unions. Not only
does this lead to a decrease in the unemployment rate of the low-skilled, it also has a
positive impact on the number of hours worked per employed individual and it is very
likely to increase welfare of employed low-skilled individuals. Furthermore, it does not
harm unemployed individuals directly.
The last conclusion one can draw from the simulations is that, unlike in perfectly
competitive labour markets, the effects of labour taxes levied on respectively employers
and employees are not equivalent within the model. Even more, the behavioural effects
of a decrease in the labour tax rate paid by employers are very small. Within the current
set-up, the fiscal government can thus achieve more by lowering the tax rates paid by
employees.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model equations and the
recursive formulation of the household, while Section 3.3 describes the definition of the
equilibrium. The data and the calibration are outlined in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 reports
the simulation results. Section 3.6, finally, concludes.
3.2 The model
The model is an OLG model for a closed economy. Time is discrete and runs from 0 to
1. The economy is populated by heterogeneous individuals, firms, unions, and a fiscal
government. Individuals enter the model at the age of 18 and live at most J periods.
Both the goods market and the labour market for high-skilled individuals are competitive,
whereas the labour market for low-skilled individuals is unionised. In every period t, the
pre-tax real wage for low-skilled workers is set by a monopoly union operating at the firm
level. The government in the model disposes of a rich set of fiscal policy instruments.
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3.2.1 Demographics
At each moment in time, the economy is populated by J overlapping generations. At the
beginning of each period, a continuum of new agents with measure 1 enters the model.
Individuals have an uncertain lifespan, since all individuals face an age-specific survival
probability 'j between the age of j and j + 1. The demographics of the model are
exogenous and given by:
Nj+1,t+1 = 'jNj,t (3.1)
where Nj,t represents the number of individuals of age j at time t. Every individual
who survives J periods will die with certainty after the J-th period. For the purpose of
clarification, I immediately introduce a few additional notations which are frequently used
below: Njs,t, Pj,t, Pjs,t, Lj,t and Ljs,t. These variables denote respectively the number
of individuals of age j and skill s at time t, the number of individuals of age j who
participate on the labour market at period t, the number of individuals of age j and skill s
who participate at time t, the number of individuals of age j employed at period t and the
number of individuals of age j and skill s employed at period t.
3.2.2 Individuals
Individuals enter the model without wealth and have no intentions to leave bequests. Any
remaining resources at the time of death are collected by the government and are equally
distributed among the living population in the next period. Before any decision is made,
individuals draw their innate ability ⇡ 2 {⇡1, ⇡2, ..., ⇡N}. This value remains unchanged
for the remainder of their life. Each agent decides on whether to attend college or not.
Going to college requires an ability-specific fraction of time 0 < ⇧(⇡) < 1, which in-
dividuals spend during their first period of life (Krueger and Ludwig, 2013). More able
people require less time to learn, meaning that the time cost decreases when the innate
ability is higher. Individuals who choose to attend and complete college are referred to
as high-skilled, individuals who have not enjoyed tertiary education are denoted as low-
skilled. In line with the literature, both high- and low-skilled individuals face labour
productivity shocks during their active life6.
6Several authors argue that the introduction of idiosyncratic productivity risk has a few advantages -
see e.g. Heathcote et al. (2009) and Fehr (2009). For example, they add an additional precautionary motive
for savings. This in turn will influence the levels of the aggregate equilibrium quantities and prices. These
authors also argue that the welfare implications can differ substantially over heterogeneous households.
As such, they can be much larger than the cost for a representative agent. Heckman (2001) argues that in
order to properly evaluate large-scale government programs, researchers need models that take into account
both general equilibrium effects and the impact of these policies on heterogeneous agents. Nishiyama
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Going to college has two different benefits. First, wages for high-skilled individuals
are higher. Second, low-skilled individuals face extra idiosyncratic uncertainty as only a
fraction lt of the participating low-skilled individuals is employed. The probability that a
participating low-skilled agent of any age is employed (l = e) or is unemployed (l = u)
is endogenously determined within the model due to the monopoly union framework (cf.
infra).
An individual will decide to attend college if his/her maximised expected lifetime
utility of being high-skilled (s = s¯) is bigger than the maximised expected lifetime utility
of staying low-skilled (s = s) :
I⇡ =
8<:1 if V (0, ⇡, s = s¯)   V (0, ⇡, s = s)0 otherwise (3.2)
where V (0, ⇡, s) gives the maximised expected lifetime utility at age j = 0 (i.e. before in-
dividuals enter the model and start making decisions), given the ability level ⇡ and where
the expectations are taken over the stochastic processes governing the labor productivity
and employment shocks.
All agents are endowed with one unit of time, which they devote to labour supply,
leisure, and education if they decide to attend college. Individuals reaching the age of JR
retire. However, from the age of JR 3 onwards, they do have the opportunity to withdraw
from the labour market and enjoy early retirement7.
At any given point in time, individuals are characterised by a state vector (a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s),
where a denotes the accumulated non-human wealth at the beginning of the period, l is
the employment status, ⇡ is the ability level, s is the skill level, and ⌘ is the productivity
shock. Let  j,t(a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s) denote the share of agents aged j of type (a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s) at date
t. For each t and j we have
R
 t,j(da⇥ dl ⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘ ⇥ ds) = 1.
The expected lifetime utility of an individual entering the model at period t and age
j = 1 is given by:
U t = E
(
JX
j=1
 j 1
" 
cj(1 µ)(1  I⇡⇧(⇡)  nj   (1  IP )⇢n⇤j)µ
 1 ✓
1  ✓   IP⇥s
#)
(3.3)
with 1   µ   0, ✓ > 0, 1   ⇢   0 and where the expectations are taken over the
stochastic processes governing the mortality risk, and the labor productivity and employ-
and Smetters (2007) simulate the privatisation of social security in a setup respectively with and without
idiosyncratic wage shocks. They find that the effects on both aggregate equilibrium quantities and prices
on the one hand and welfare on the other hand are indeed different in both setups.
7In the empirical part, the length of one period is four years. The generation of age JR 3 represents
the age group 54-57. So from the age of 54 onwards, individuals have the opportunity to withdraw from the
labour market. Furthermore, JR coincides with the age group 66-69. Thus, the official retirement age is 66.
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ment risk. Note that the individuals endogenously choose the fraction of time endowment
nj they allocate to labour services. Agents derive utility from consumption (cj) and leis-
ure
 
1  I⇡⇧(⇡)  nj   (1  IP )⇢n⇤j
 
. Two indicator functions are present: I⇡ takes the
value 1 in the first period of active life when an individual decides to attend college and
IP takes the value 1 when the individual has reached age JR 3 (and is entitled to early
retirement) but continues to participate on the labour market. ⇥s is a fixed utility cost
of participating8. Furthermore, it is my assumption that the early retired individuals do
not fully enjoy their leisure time yet. The leisure they enjoy as an early retiree is equal
to 1   ⇢n⇤j where n⇤j is the fraction of time an individual would work if he or she still
participated, while the actual fraction of time he or she devotes to labour market services
nj is equal to 09.
An employed individual with state (j, a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s) faces the following recursive prob-
lem:
V (j, a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s) = max
n2[0,1 I⇡⇧(⇡)],c,a0 0(
u(c, 1  I⇡⇧(⇡)  n) +  'j
X
⌘0
X
l0
 (⌘0|⌘) s(l0|l)V (j + 1, a0, l0, ⇡, ⌘0, s)
)
(3.4)
subject to the budget constraint
(1 + ⌧c)cj + a
0
j = ws,t+j 1"j⌘$s(⇡)nj(1  ⌧js) + (1 + rt+j 1)(aj + Trt+j 1). (3.5)
Individuals aged j who participate on the labour market earn an after-tax wage of ws,t+j 1
"j⌘$s(⇡)nj(1   ⌧js), where ws,t+j 1 is the real wage per unit of effective labour for an
individual with skill s at time t + j   1, "j is an age-specific productivity parameter, ⌘
is the labour productivity shock, $s(⇡) denotes the component making wages depend on
ability, and ⌧js is the average tax rate on labour, which is specified more completely below.
The interest rate is given by rt+j 1. The consumption tax rate is ⌧c. The accumulated
8This assumption is based on Kitao and Imrohoroglu (2012) and Kitao (2014). These authors include a
fixed utility cost of participating as well. In the latter paper, the author includes a fixed cost of participation
for each generation, where the cost itself is a function of the age of the individuals. The calibrated utility
cost only slightly increases between the ages of 20 and 50. Between the ages of 50 and 85, the cost of
participating increases strongly. Based on this profile, I choose to include a utility cost only for the age
group 54-65. I do not, however, assume that the cost of participation changes as the individual ages.
9A study conducted by Age Wave and Merrill Lynch (2016) found that retirees may have difficulties to
adapt to their new life, especially early retirees. They do not yet organise their leisure activities efficiently.
Age Wave and Merrill Lynch also conclude that it matters more who retirees engage with in their leisure
activities than the actual leisure activity itself. Furthermore, Chang et al. (2014) conclude that relationships
and the social network are an important determinant of the leisure enjoyed as a retiree. As an early retiree,
however, friends and relatives might still be in the labour force.
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non-human wealth at the end of the period is denoted by a0j . Furthermore, I impose that
individuals are not able to borrow: a0j   0. Due to accidental bequests, individuals receive
a transfer Trt+j 1 from the government. Finally, (⌘0|⌘) and s(l0|l) denote respectively
the productivity process and the skill-specific employment process. Note that for high-
skilled individuals, the probability that they will be employed in the next period is always
equal to 1 if they participate.
A low-skilled unemployed individual with current state (j, a, u, ⇡, ⌘, s) faces the fol-
lowing recursive problem:
V (j, a, u, ⇡, ⌘, s) = max
c,a0 0
(
u(c) +  'j
X
⌘0
X
l0
 (⌘0|⌘) s(l0|l)V (j + 1, a0, l0, ⇡, ⌘0, s)
)
(3.6)
subject to the budget constraint
(1 + ⌧c)cj + a
0
j = Bt+j 1 + (1 + rt+j 1)(aj + Trt+j 1). (3.7)
The only difference between Equation (3.5) and (3.7) is the presence of an unemployment
benefit instead of labour income. I assume that the unemployment benefit is given by
Bt+j 1 = bws,t+j 1"j⌘$s(⇡)nj(1   ⌧js), i.e. a fraction b of the income of an individual
with the same state, except for the employment status.
From the age of JR 3 onwards, individuals have the opportunity to withdraw from the
labour market. If they do so, they receive an early retirement benefit epj,t+j 1 which is
a fraction bp of the income they would have earned if they had participated on the labour
market. Formally, the budget constraint is then
(1 + ⌧c)cj + a
0
j = (1 + rt+j 1)(aj + Trt+j 1) + epj,t+j 1 (3.8)
At the age of JR, individuals have to retire and receive a public pay-as-you-go pension.
The budget constraint for the ages j   JR is given by
(1 + ⌧c)cj + a
0
j = (1 + rt+j 1)(aj + Trt+j 1) + pps,t+j 1 (3.9)
For simplicity, it is assumed that all individuals of the same skill group receive the same
pension. This pension is a fraction bp of the skill-specific average wage in the economy.
Algebraically,
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pps,t = bp
0BBBBB@
JR 1X
j=1
Ljs,t
R
ws,tnj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s)⌘"j$s(⇡)(1  ⌧js) j,t(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘)
JR 1X
j=1
Ljs,t
1CCCCCA
(3.10)
3.2.3 Firms
Both the goods market and the labour market for high-skilled individuals are perfectly
competitive, whereas the labour market for low-skilled individuals is unionised. Firms
maximise profits and pay social security contributions when hiring labour. The production
function of the representative firm is given by
Yt = AK
↵
t H
1 ↵
t , ↵ 2 [0, 1] (3.11)
The level of technology is represented by A and is assumed to stay constant over time.
Kt is the amount of capital used by the firm. Inspired by Katz and Murphy (1992) and
Borjas (2003), it is my assumption that high- and low-skilled individuals are imperfectly
substitutable in production:
Ht =
h
⌫1H
◆ 1
◆
s¯,t + (1  ⌫1)H
◆ 1
◆
s,t
i ◆
◆ 1
(3.12)
where ⌫1 is a share parameter and ◆ the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled
labour Hs¯,t and low-skilled labour Hs,t. Furthermore,
Hs¯,t =
JR 1X
j=1
Ljs¯,t
Z
nj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s¯)$s¯(⇡)⌘"j t,j(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘) (3.13)
Hs,t =
JR 1X
j=1
Pjs,t(1  ut)
Z
nj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s)$s(⇡)⌘"j t,j(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘) (3.14)
Note that for the low-skilled a fraction 1   ut = lt of the number of participating indi-
viduals of each generation Pjs,t is employed at period t.
3.2.4 Unions
The economy is populated by decentralised trade unions, operating at the firm level. Every
firm negotiates with a single union, representing all the low-skilled individuals employed
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at the firm. As such, unions are large compared to the workers, while taking aggregate
variables and fiscal policy parameters as given. Just like in e.g. Pencavel (1984), de la
Croix et al. (1996), Corneo and Marquardt (2000) and Ono (2007), the objective function
of the unions follows the Stone-Geary specification:
Wt =
h
 (ws,t(1  ⌧¯s)  w¯s,t)1  1 + (1   )l1 
1

t
i 
 1
(3.15)
The union takes both wages and employment into account, albeit to a different degree.
As Equation (3.15) indicates, the firm-specific trade union only derives utility from the
difference between the negotiated net wage ws,t(1  ⌧¯s) and a reservation wage, w¯s,t. The
elasticity of substitution  > 0 between the wage gap and the employment rate takes
different values than 1. The share parameter   measures the relative utility value of a
higher wage versus higher employment for the union. I assume that the union derives
utility from the fraction of participating low-skilled individuals employed at the firm.
Every union has the same reservation wage, i.e. a weighted average or combination of
the hypothetical net wage that would prevail if the labour market for the low-skilled were
perfectly competitive, the net wage of the high-skilled and the net unemployment benefit,
respectively with weights %1, %2 and %3. These sum up to 1. The different tax rates ⌧¯ cs , ⌧¯s
and ⌧¯s¯ are the average of all average tax rates faced by respectively the low- and the
high-skilled.
The specification for the reservation wage is the following:
w¯s,t = %1w
c
s,t(1  ⌧¯ cs ) + %2ws¯,t(1  ⌧¯s¯) + %3bws,t(1  ⌧¯s)
At the beginning of each period t, in the first stage the monopoly union decides on the
pre-tax wage, knowing that in the next stage the firm and the members decide on the
extensive and intensive margin of employment. Both individuals and the firms take the
wage set by the monopoly union as given. Moreover, as they move simultaneously, they
take the action of the other player as given. Once the wage has been determined, the firm
decides on the extensive margin (fraction of available low-skilled individuals to employ)
and the individuals who participate on the intensive margin (hours worked per employed).
3.2.5 Government
Government expenditures on unemployment benefits, government consumption, early re-
tirement pensions and public PAYG pensions are financed by taxes on labour (both on
employers and employees) and consumption. The fraction of output that is devoted to
government consumption is given by gc. Formally, the government budget constraint is
given by
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Gc,t +Bt + EPt + PPt = Tn,t + Tc,t (3.16)
with:
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Gc,t = gcYt
PPt =
PJ
j=jR
Nj,t
R
pps,t j,t(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ ds)
EPt =
PJR 1
j=jR 3(Nj,t   Pj,t)
R
epj,t(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s) j,t(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘ ⇥ ds)
Bt = Bs,t
Tn,t = Tns¯,t + Tns,t
Tc,t = ⌧c
PJ
j=1Nj,t
R
cj(a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s) j,t(da⇥ dl ⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘ ⇥ ds)
And
Bs,t =
JR 1X
j=1
Pjs,tut
Z
bws,t⌘"j$s(⇡)nj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s)(1  ⌧js) j,t(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘) (3.17)
Tns¯,t =
JR 1X
j=1
Ljs¯,t
Z
ws¯,tnj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s¯)⌘"j$s¯(⇡)(⌧js¯ + ⌧
p) j,t(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘) (3.18)
Tns,t =
JR 1X
j=1
Ljs,t
Z
ws,tnj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s)⌘"j$s(⇡)(⌧js + ⌧
p) j,t(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘) (3.19)
What remains is the specification of the progressive income taxes. The tax rates appearing
in the budget constraints of the households are average tax rates and are given by
⌧js =  
 
ylabj,t (a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s)
y¯t
!⇠
(3.20)
where ylabj,t is the total pre-tax labour income of an individual of age j and state (a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s)
at time t and y¯ is the average labour income in the economy. Just like in Guo and Lansing
(1998) and Koyuncu (2011), the parameters ⇠ and   govern the level and slope of the
tax schedule. The average tax rate ⌧js increases with the total taxable labour income of
the household when ⇠ > 0. Households are aware of the progressive structure of the tax
system when making decisions. The marginal tax rate ⌧mjs is then simply the rate applied
to the last euro earned:
⌧mjs = (1 + ⇠) 
 
ylabjs,t(a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s)
y¯t
!⇠
(3.21)
78
3.3. Definition of Equilibrium
Rewriting this yields
⌧mjs
⌧js
= 1 + ⇠ (3.22)
This means that the marginal tax rate is higher than the average tax rate when ⇠ > 0, i.e.
the tax schedule is said to be progressive. When ⇠ = 0, the average and marginal tax rates
coincide.
3.3 Definition of Equilibrium
Let  j,t(a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s) denote the share of agents aged j at time t with state (a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s).
For each j and t we have
R
 j,t(da⇥ dl ⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘ ⇥ ds) = 1.
Definition 1 Given an initial capital stockK0, initial measures { j,0}Jj=1, and a given
vector of exogenous fiscal policy variables {⌧c,t, ⌧ pt , bt, bp,t, ⇠t, t}1t=0, an intertemporal
equilibrium consists of sequences of household value and policy functions {Vj,t, a0j,t, cj,t,
nj,t, I⇡, Ip}1t=0, sequences of transfers {Trt}1t=0, sequences of prices {ws¯,t, ws,t, rt}1t=0, se-
quences of taxes, social security policies and government spending {Gc, ⌧js,t, ⌧mjs,t, pps,t,
epj,t}1t=0, unemployment rates {ut}1t=0 and aggregate variables {Yt, Kt, Ht, Hs¯,t, Hs,t}1t=0
and sequences of measures { j,t}1t=0 such that:
1. Given prices and government policies, Vj,t satisfy the Bellman equations as given in
subsection 3.2.2 for all ages j and all states (a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s), where {a0j,t, cj,t, nj,t, I⇡, Ip}
are the related policy functions.
2. Interest rates and wages for high-skilled individuals are given by:
rt = ↵A
✓
Ht
Kt
◆(1 ↵)
    (3.23)
and
ws¯,t(1 + ⌧
p) = (1  ↵)A
✓
Kt
Ht
◆↵
⌫1
✓
Ht
Hs¯,t
◆( 1◆ )
(3.24)
3. The pension ppt is determined by:
pps,t = bp
0BBBBB@
JR 1X
j=1
Ljs,t
R
ws,tnj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s)⌘"j$s(⇡)(1  ⌧js) j,t(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘)
JR 1X
j=1
Ljs,t
1CCCCCA
(3.25)
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for s 2 {s¯, s} and where bp,t is the net replacement rate for the individuals. The
early retirement benefit is formally given by epj,t = bpws,tn⇤j⌘"j$s(⇡)(1  ⌧js).
4. The transfer Trt+1 is determined by:
Trt+1 =
0BBBBB@
JX
j=1
(1  'j)Nj,t
R
a0j(a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s) j,t(da⇥ dl ⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘ ⇥ ds)
JX
j=1
Nj,t+1
1CCCCCA
(3.26)
5. Given the wage ws,t chosen by the union, the optimal response of the low-skilled
individuals nj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s) and the optimal response of the firm uj,t form a Nash
equilibrium in the second stage of the dynamic game played between the individu-
als, the firm and the union. These actions form a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
6. The capital market, the labour market for high-skilled individuals and the goods
market clear every period t:
Kt+1 =
JX
j=1
Nj,t
Z
a0j(a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s) j,t(da⇥ dl ⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘ ⇥ ds) (3.27)
Hs¯,t =
JR 1X
j=1
Ljs¯,t
Z
nj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s¯)"j⌘$s¯(⇡) j,t(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘) (3.28)
Yt =
JX
j=1
Nj,t
Z
cj(a, l, ⇡, ⌘, s) j,t(da⇥dl⇥d⇡⇥d⌘⇥ds)+Gc,t+(Kt+1 (1  )Kt)
(3.29)
7. Hs,t is given by:
Hs,t =
JR 1X
j=1
Pjs,t(1  ut)
Z
nj(a, e, ⇡, ⌘, s)"j⌘$s(⇡) j,t(da⇥ d⇡ ⇥ d⌘) (3.30)
8. Government consumption as fraction of Yt (gc) is endogenously determined such
that the government budget is balanced each period:
gc =
Tn,t + Tc,t   EPt   PPt   Bt
Yt
(3.31)
9. Average and marginal tax rates are determined via Equations (3.20) and (3.21).
10. Yt is determined by Equation (3.11).
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11.  j+1,t+1 = Zj,t( j,t)whereZj,t is the law of motion induced by the exogenous mor-
tality rates, the exogenous Markov process for labour productivity, the endogenous
Markov process for employment shocks and the endogenous asset accumulation
and education choice.
3.4 Data and calibration
In this section, the parameterisation and calibration of the model is outlined in detail. The
lion’s share of the calibration is in line with the literature on quantitative OLG models
with idiosyncratic risk. I make a distinction between shared and country-specific vari-
ables. Shared parameters are those that I consider to hold for all OECD countries. In line
with most of the literature these include many household preference and technology para-
meters. Country-specific parameters include the survival probabilities, the probability of
being employed in the next period given unemployment in this period, the union pref-
erence parameters and the fiscal policy parameters10. The shared parameters are either
taken from the literature or calibrated on Belgium. Afterwards, I explore the performance
of the model in its capacity to replicate the data for Denmark and the United Kingdom11.
The values for the shared parameters and the corresponding moments can be found in
Table 3.1. The values for the country-specific variables can be found in Table 3.2.
3.4.1 Demographics
Individuals enter the model at the age of 18 and live at most 19 periods of 4 years until the
age of 94. The conditional survival probabilities {'j} are country-specific and are taken
from the Human Mortality Database and are for 2000.
3.4.2 Participation and employment rates
In the model, all high- and low-skilled individuals aged 18-53 participate, those aged
54-65 choose whether they participate or not, and all individuals aged 66 and over have
no choice but to retire. Furthermore, all the participating high-skilled individuals are
employed, whereas only a fraction lt = (1   ut) among the participating low-skilled
10Note that in the spirit of Boone and Heylen (2017), the union parameters  R, %R1 and %R2 are in
fact region-specific. Hence, the superscript R is added from now on. Boone and Heylen (2017) distin-
guish three regions: continental European countries (including Belgium, Germany, France, Austria, and the
Netherlands), the Nordic countries (including Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway), and the Anglo-
Saxon countries (including the US, the UK and Canada). However, as I pick one country from each region,
region-specific coincides with country-specific in this set-up.
11The choice for these two countries is arbitrary. The conclusions do not depend on this choice.
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individuals works. To construct the different variables of interest I use data from Euro-
stat on both the participation and employment rate by age and by educational attainment
(respectively lfsa_argaed and lfsa_ergaed). Table 3.3 contains the main labour market per-
formance data for Belgium, Denmark, and the UK. A comparison later with the model’s
predictions will provide a first and simple test of the quality of the model. A detailed
description of these data is given in Appendix 3.B.
3.4.3 Employment shocks
The set-up of the model leads to idiosyncratic employment risk among the low-skilled
workers. The Markov matrix governing the stochastic process is given by:
⌦s =
"
⇢ll 1  ⇢ll
⇢ul 1  ⇢ul
#
(3.32)
where ⇢ll and ⇢ul denote the probability of being employed in the next period for respect-
ively an employed and an unemployed individual today. To calibrate the age-specific
Markov matrix governing the stochastic employment process, I use job-finding rate es-
timates provided by Hobijn and Sahin (2009). Using their estimated hazard function, I
computed 48 consecutive monthly job-finding rates for Belgium, Denmark and the UK.
I use the average of these job finding rates for ⇢ul. The data at the bottom of Table 3.2
reveal much lower job finding rates in Belgium compared to Denmark and the UK. Fi-
nally, ⇢ll is adjusted endogenously such that the stochastic process leads to the correct
macroeconomic employment rates.
3.4.4 Technology and employment
The parameters regarding technology are {↵, A,  , ◆, ⌫1}. The capital share in production
↵ equals 0.36. The level of technologyA is normalised such that the equilibrium real wage
rate for high-skilled individuals ws¯,t is equal to 1. The depreciation rate   is calibrated
using a target for the equilibrium annual real interest rate of r = 4.5%. Following Caselli
and Coleman (2006), who state that the empirical labour literature consistently estimates
values between 1 and 2 for the elasticity of substitution between the two skill groups, ◆
is set to 1.4, the value reported by Katz and Murphy (1992). The share parameter for
high-skilled labour in composite labourHt, ⌫1, is calibrated such that the equilibrium real
wage rate of the low-skilled individuals delivers an unemployment rate as observed in the
data (cf. Section 3.4.2).
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3.4.5 Labour productivity shocks and parameters
In the model, an employed individual of age j with innate ability ⇡, skill s and idiosyn-
cratic shock ⌘ who works n hours will earn a pre-tax wage of
ws,tn⌘"j$s(⇡) (3.33)
I use the specification reported by Cournède and Gonand (2006) to calibrate the age-
specific productivity profile "j . Like Krueger and Ludwig (2013) and Kindermann and
Krueger (2014), I assume that the ability-dependent component of wages takes the fol-
lowing log-linear form:
ln$s(⇡) = #1s⇡ (3.34)
Following this specification, two parameters {#1s¯,#1s} have to be calibrated. A priori, #1s
is normalised to 1, so only one parameter is left to be calibrated. #1s¯ is chosen such that
in equilibrium the benchmark model generates an average college wage premium equal
to 1.8. Heathcote et al. (2010) report this value for US wages.
The stochastic process governing the labour productivity shocks is the same for both
skill groups. The productivity shock ⌘ can take three values ⌘j with j 2 {1, 2, 3}. The
Markov transition matrix is a (3x3)-matrix:
⌥ =
264⇢11 ⇢12 ⇢13⇢21 ⇢22 ⇢23
⇢31 ⇢32 ⇢33
375 (3.35)
where ⇢ij is the probability Pr(j|i) to end up in state j in the next period given state
i in the current period. Taking all this information together, the states of the Markov
chain {⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3} and the Markov transition matrix ⌥ still have to be determined. For
the labor productivity states {⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3} in the labor earnings process, I use a discretised
Markov chain for a continuous AR(1)-process with persistence ⇣s and variance  2⌘ . These
parameters are the same for both skill groups. The persistence is chosen to be 0.969 and
the variance 0.01 (Krueger and Ludwig, 2013). The latter authors estimate these values
using an econometric model for log wages on PSID data for the United States.
The markov transition matrix for the idiosyncratic productivity risk is then given by
⌦ =
2640.8851 0.1113 0.00350.0557 0.8887 0.0557
0.0035 0.1113 0.8851
375
while the values for ⌘1, ⌘2 and ⌘3 are respectively 0.6029, 1, and 1.6587.
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3.4.6 Preferences
The instantaneous utility function of the individuals is given by12:
u(cj, nj) =
 
cj(1 µ)(1  I⇡⇧(⇡)  nj   (1  Ip)⇢n⇤j)µ
 1 ✓
1  ✓   IP⇥s. (3.36)
The parameters to be calibrated are { , µ, ✓,⇥s¯,⇥s, ⇢}13. As in Krueger and Ludwig
(2013), ✓ is chosen to be 4, in line with the literature using this functional form for the
utility function. The relative weight on leisure µ is determined such that hours worked per
Belgian employed individual is close to the value found in the data (see Table 3.3) and  
is chosen such that a capital-output ratio of approximately 2.8 is obtained for Belgium14.
⇥s¯ and ⇥s are calibrated on the aggregate participation rate of respectively the high- and
the low-skilled individuals aged 54-65. Finally, ⇢ is calibrated such that given the values
for⇥s¯ and⇥s, the deviation between the model’s predictions and the data for the different
participation rates of the individuals aged 54-57, 58-61 and 62-65 over both skill groups
is minimised for Belgium.
3.4.7 Innate ability and time spent in college
Before any decisions are made, individuals draw their innate ability from a time-invariant
distribution F (⇡). As IQ is often mentioned as an adequate measure for innate ability, it is
assumed that the distribution F (⇡) follows a normal distribution N (µ⇡,  2⇡) with µ⇡ = 1
and  ⇡ = 0.15, which are standard values for the distribution of IQ. The chosen normal
distribution N is then discretised to 10 equidistant values: ⇡ 2 {⇡1, ⇡2..., ⇡10}. The
probabilities follow from the probability density function. In the model these probabilities
coincide with the actual fraction of individuals with ability ⇡i in the economy.
After having observed their innate ability, individuals decide whether to attend college
or not. The actual fraction of time required for completing tertiary education conditional
on the innate ability is exogenous and given by the following function which is linear in
ability:
⇧(⇡) =  0 +  1⇡,  0 > 0,  1 < 0 (3.37)
12This functional form is often used in the quantitative OLG literature with idiosyncratic risk: see e.g.
Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Krueger and Ludwig (2013).
13Remember that I(⇡) takes the value 1 in the first period of active life when an individual decides to
attend college, IP takes the value 1 when the individual is aged 54-65 and participates on the labour market,
⇥s is a fixed utility cost of participating, and IER takes the value 1 when an 54-65 year-old individual
decides to withdraw from the labour market. The leisure these early retired individuals enjoy is equal to
1  %n⇤j where n⇤j is the fraction of time this individuals would work if they would participate.
14For more details on the construction of hours worked per employed individual, I refer the reader to
Boone and Heylen (2017).
84
3.4. Data and calibration
In line with Krueger and Ludwig (2013), for individuals with the lowest innate ability ⇡1,
the fraction of time they have to devote to college education in order to graduate is 1. For
individuals with the highest innate ability ⇡10, the required time cost is calibrated such
that the number of college graduates in the economy is as close as possible to the number
of college graduates in the data. In OECD (2014), values for the percentage of people
who obtained tertiary degree in 2000 and 2005 can be found. Using these two points, the
parameters  0 and  1 are easily determined.
3.4.8 Union preferences
The parametrisation of the union framework is in line with Boone and Heylen (2017).
Remember that in order to highlight their region-specific character, the notation of the
union preference parameters has been augmented with a superscript R. In Boone and
Heylen (2017), the authors calibrate the union’s preference for wage parameter ( R) and
the weights in the reference wage of the union (%R1 , %R2 and %R3 = 1   %R1   %R2 ) for a
sample of Anglo-Saxon, continental European and Nordic countries using a sensitivity
analysis à la Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013)15. In this paper, I use these calibrated
values for  Rj , %R1 and %R2 . The values for the two latter parameters are directly applicable
to the model in this paper. However, the specification of the utility function of the union
is slightly different from the functional form used in Boone and Heylen (2017). I thus
have to transform the calibrated values for  Rj from Boone and Heylen (2017) such that
the relative weight on wages as opposed to employment is the same in this model. The
new value is obtained as follows:
 N,R =
P4
j=1  
O,R
j
4
1 +
P4
j=1  
O,R
j
4
where  N,R is the new  , used in the remainder of this paper.  O,Rj are the ones obtained
in Boone and Heylen (2017). Finally,  is determined such that given all these parameters,
the resulting unemployment rates among the low-skilled are consistent with the data for
respectively Belgium, the UK, and Denmark16.
15In a first step - executed separately for each country group - the authors imposed values for %R1 , %R2 and
%R3 (R 2 {Eur,Nor,Ang}). With these imposed values the parameters  Rj with R 2 {Eur,Nor,Ang}
were calibrated to match the average of actual unemployment rates in four generations over all countries in
the country group. The obtained set of union preference parameters for each of the three country groups -
together with all other calibrated parameters - allowed them to compute predictions for all unemployment
rates in all generations in each of the twelve countries in their sample. This procedure was repeated many
times, each time starting from different values for %R1 , %R2 and %R3 . The ultimate aim was to minimise the
average normalised RMSE for the aggregate unemployment rate over all ability and age groups.
16Although the size of the effects of the different scenarios reported in Section 3.5.2 might differ some-
what if different values for  are used, the main findings of this paper do not change.
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3.4.9 Fiscal policy variables
The government in the model finances government spending on goods, PAYG pension
and benefits to the unemployed with taxes on consumption and labour. Data on b, ⇠,  , ⌧ p
and ⌧c are the same as Boone and Heylen (2017).
For the tax rate ⌧c, I use the same data as Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013). For
details on the construction of this fiscal policy variable, I refer to Heylen & Van de Ker-
ckhove (2013, their Appendix 1). For the unemployment benefit replacement rate b data
provided by the OECD (Tax-Benefit Models) is used. Since in the model unemployment
is a structural or equilibrium phenomenon, the data that are used concern net transfers
received by structurally or long-term unemployed people. They include social assistance,
family benefits and housing benefits in the 60th month of benefit receipt. They also in-
clude unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits if these benefits are
still paid, i.e. if workers can be structurally unemployed for more than five years without
losing benefit eligibility. The OECD provides net replacement rates for six family situ-
ations and three earnings levels. The data in Table 3.2 are the averages of these 18 cases.
Data are for 2001-2004.
Regarding labour tax rates, I distinguish between social security contributions paid by
employers and taxes and social security contributions on labour income paid by employ-
ees. The data source is the OECD (Taxation, Tax Database, Tables I.4, I.5, I.6). More
specifically, I use the OECD’s average rate of employer social security contributions for
⌧ p (Table I.5). The level parameter   in the workers’ income tax rate is calibrated using
the OECD data for all-in average personal income tax rates at average wage. The all-
in tax rate is calculated as the combined central and sub-central government income tax
plus employee social security contribution, as a percentage of gross wage earnings. The
OECD provides these tax rates for four family types (Table I.6). The average over these
types is computed. A novelty compared to previous work is the inclusion of progressive
income taxation. Just like Koyuncu (2011), I calibrate the country-specific degree of pro-
gressivity ⇠ according to Equation (3.21) as the ratio (minus 1) of the marginal tax rate on
workers’ gross wage to the average tax rate, both including social security contributions.
The OECD provides these marginal and average tax rates for a single person without de-
pendent at four different income levels (Tables I.4 and I.5). Our proxy for ⇠ reflects the
average of the results over these four income levels. All computed and reported tax data
in Table 3.2 are averages over the period 2000-2007.
For the basic PAYG-pension received by the (early) retired households in the model,
I use data on the net replacement rate for the average level of earnings obtained from the
OECD (Pensions at a Glance, 2005, Table 4.2.).
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Table 3.1: Calibration summary: parameter values imposed on all countries
Parameters taken from the literature: definition, parameter, value, and source
Elasticity of substitution between different types of labour ◆ 1.4 Katz and Murphy (1992)
Coefficient of risk aversion of the individuals ✓ 4 Conesa and Krueger (2006); Krueger and Ludwig
(2013)
Age-specific component of wages "j Cournède and Gonand (2006)
Stochastic component of wages ⇣, 2⌘ see Section 3.4.5 Krueger and Ludwig (2013)
Capital share in production ↵ 0.36
Parameters calibrated to Belgium: definition, parameter, value, and target
Weight on leisure in the individuals’ utility function µ 0.6164 Average fraction of time spent working = 0.31
(Boone and Heylen, 2017)
Discount factor in the individuals’ utility function   0.97 Capital-output ratio of 2.8 (Penn World Table)
Utility cost of participation for high-skilled individuals ⇥s¯ 0.01 Employment rate for high-skilled individuals (54-65)
equal to 53%
Utility cost of participation for low-skilled individuals ⇥s 0.029 Participation rate for low-skilled individuals (54-65)
equal to 34.5%
Increase in leisure time as early retiree* ⇢ 0.65 Age profile of participation rates 54- to 65-year-olds
in Belgium (see Table 3.3)
Fraction of time required to complete tertiary education  0,  1 1.827, 1.272 % of high-skilled individuals equal to 31% ((OECD,
2014)
Level of technology A 2.836 ws¯ = 1
Depreciation rate   0.378 r = 4.5%
Share parameter of high-skilled labour ⌫1 0.528 Wage rate for low-skilled individuals
Parameters calibrated to other targets: definition, parameter, value, and target
Parameter determining the ability dependent component of wages #1s¯ 1.322 College wage premium of 80% in the US (Heathcote
et al., 2010)
Elasticity of substitution utility function union  1.4 Unemployment rates for Belgium, UK, and Denmark
(see Table 3.3)
* This increase in leisure is expressed as a percentage of the fraction of time this individual would work if he/she still participated.
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Table 3.2: Calibration summary: country-specific parameters
Country-specific parameters
Belgium UK Denmark
Weight of union on wages relative to employment  R 0.787 0.725 0.694
Weight in union reference wage for competitive wage %R1 0.8 0.90 0.9
Weight in union reference wage for high-skilled wage %R2 0.05 0.1 0
Weight in union reference wage for unemployment benefit %R3 0.15 0 0.1
Degree of progressivity of tax code ⇠ 0.34 0.383 0.233
Labour tax rate for the average wage   33.4 24.0 35.3
Labour tax rate levied on employers ⌧p 29.1 9.8 0.0
Consumption tax rate ⌧c 13.4 14.5 18.9
Net replacement rate for unemployment benefit b 59.6 51.1 61.9
Net replacement rate PAYG pension for (early) retired bp 63.1 47.6 54.1
Probability to move from unemployment to employment ⇢ul 0.035 0.092 0.082
3.4.10 Model performance
Table 3.3 gives an overview of the performance of the model. Given that the model
is calibrated to Belgium, it is no surprise that the model’s predictions are very close to
the actual numbers in the data. However, using the calibrated parameters together with
the country-specific parameter values for both the UK and Denmark and exploring the
model’s predictions provides an additional test of the performance of the model. Looking
at Table 3.3, one can conclude that the model goes a long way in explaining the differences
in labour market outcome between Belgium, the UK and Denmark. For both Denmark
and the UK, the model correctly predicts that high- and low-skilled individuals aged 54-
65 participate far more on the labour market. Within age groups, the model’s predictions
do deviate somewhat from the actual data. The lower aggregate unemployment rates and
Table 3.3: Labour market data and model performance for Belgium, the UK and Denmark
Belgium UK Denmark
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Average participation rate high-skilled (54-65) 53.0% 54.0% 82.3% 87.1% 81.4% 76.0%
Participation rate low-skilled (54-57) 55.5% 53.7% 78.3% 86.5% 89.0% 78.0%
Participation rate low-skilled (58-61) 32.1% 33.9% 73.8% 71.5% 62.3% 59.6%
Participation rate low-skilled (62-65) 15.9% 17.4% 72.0% 47.1% 37.5% 34.0%
Aggregate unemployment rate(a) 11.0% 13.3% 8.4% 8.9% 5.2% 5.6%
Fraction of time devoted to work per employed(a) 0.310 0.312 0.343 0.345 0.334 0.342
Government spending as % of GDP 27.0 19.7 23.4
% of skilled individuals 31.1 31.1 31.1
(a) averaged over both skill groups and all generations.
Note: For details on the construction of the data, I refer the reader to Appendix 3.B.
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Table 3.4: Simulation outline - Different scenarios
Ages 18-53 Ages 54-65 Ages 18-65
Labour tax
level ( )
Labour tax
level ( )
Employer tax
(⌧ p)
Unemployment
benefit (b)
Union wage
intensity ( R)
(1) 30.45 30.45 29.1 59.6  EUR
(2) 33.4 33.4 24.92 59.6  EUR
(3) 33.4 33.4 29.1 35.2  EUR
(4) 30.45 30.45 29.1 35.2  EUR
(5) 33.4 33.4 24.92 35.2  EUR
(6) 33.4 12.2 29.1 59.6  EUR
(7) 33.4 12.2 29.1 35.2  EUR
(8) 33.4 33.4 29.1 59.6  ANG
(9) 30.45 30.45 29.1 59.6  ANG
(10) 33.4 33.4 24.92 59.6  ANG
(11) 33.4 12.2 29.1 59.6  ANG
(12) 30.45 30.45 29.1 35.2  ANG
(13) 33.4 33.4 24.92 35.2  ANG
Note: The ex-ante effect of all changes in fiscal policy parameters is equal to 1% of output. Policy
changes only apply to low-skilled individuals. Benchmark values (in %) are:   = 33.4, ⌧p = 29.1,
b = 59.6.
the higher fraction of time devoted to work per employed individual are captured as well.
3.5 Simulations: outline and results
3.5.1 Outline
Table 3.4 contains a detailed outline of the different simulated scenarios. The ex-ante
effect of all these policy changes is equal to 1% of output, i.e. if no one changed beha-
viour, they would all cost or save 1% of output. Every scenario described in Table 3.4
specifically targets low-skilled individuals and is designed such that an improvement in
the labour market position of these individuals can be expected. The fiscal variable used
to balance the budget ex-post is ⌧c.
In (1) the level parameter   determining the labour taxes levied on low-skilled em-
ployees is decreased for all generations from 33.4% in the benchmark model to 30.45%,
while (2) applies the same logic to ⌧ p, the tax rate levied on employers for employing low-
skilled individuals. In (3), the net unemployment benefit replacement rate b is reduced.
Scenarios (4) and (5) combine the respective scenarios (1) and (2) with the decrease in b of
scenario (3). Scenarios (6) and (7) focus on the 54- to 65-year-old low-skilled agents. In
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(6) and (7)   is reduced for these individuals. In (7) this is complemented by a reduction
of the net unemployment benefit replacement rate b for all generations.
In scenarios (8-13), the fiscal policy component is augmented with a change in the
union preference for wage parameter  . More specifically, its value is reduced from 0.787
( EUR) to 0.725 ( ANG) (see Table 3.2).
3.5.2 Results
The results are split into three main categories of variables and are displayed in Table 3.5.
The first category groups the % change compared to the old steady state in respectively
(a) aggregate output YN , (b) capital KN and (c) total effective labour HN . The subscript
N denotes the new steady-state. The second category looks into the different components
of aggregate labour: (d) % change in the average fraction of time spent working by a
low-skilled, employed individual relative to the same indicator in the old steady state, (e)
the %-point change in the aggregate unemployment rate, (f) and the %-point change in
the average participation rate of the low-skilled individuals aged 54-65.
The third category looks at the welfare effects (i) for a newborn who will stay low-
skilled and (ii) for a newborn who will become high-skilled. To calculate the welfare
effects of the different tax reforms, I use the ex-ante expected utility of a newborn to
compute the Consumption Equivalence Variation. This indicator measures the uniform
percentage change in consumption that would make the expected lifetime utility of a
newborn before the reform equivalent to the expected lifetime of a newborn after the
reform. Formally, this metric is given by:
CEV =
"✓
V ta (0, ⇡, a = 0)
V tb (0, ⇡, a = 0)
◆ 1
(1 µ)(1 ✓)
  1
#
⇤ 100 (3.38)
where V ta (0, ⇡, j = 0) and V tb (0, ⇡, j = 0) are the expected lifetime utility of a newborn
respectively after the reform and before the reform. I compute this metric for newborns
who remain low-skilled and newborns who attend college and become high-skilled.
3.5.2.1 Discussion
Before diving into the details of the different situations, let me start by describing the
main conclusions. First, the simulations reveal that, while most fiscal policy and union
instruments have a similar impact on aggregate output, capital, and labour, these instru-
ments may have a very different impact on unemployment, labour force participation,
hours worked, and worker’s welfare. This result definitely highlights the added value of
modelling these different components. As a result, the fiscal government has to choose
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its desired policy instrument carefully and dependent on the variable it wants to target.
Second, fiscal governments and unions have a mutual interest in joining forces to im-
prove the labour market performance of the low-skilled. For example, the most preferable
policy is a decrease in labour taxes levied on low-skilled employees combined with wage
moderation accepted by the unions. The third and final conclusion one can draw from the
simulations is that, unlike in perfectly competitive labour markets, in this set-up labour
taxes levied on respectively employers and employees are not equivalent. Even more, the
behavioural effects of a decrease in the labour tax rate paid by employers are very small.
Let us explore the impact of the different policies on the different categories separ-
ately now. Looking at the impact on output (Y ), capital (K) and labour (H) in Table
3.5, the different policies seem more or less similar at first glance. A decrease in labour
taxes levied on all low-skilled employees ( ), a decrease in the net unemployment bene-
fit replacement rate (b), and a decrease in the wage preference of the unions ( ), these
policies lead to a strong increase in the different aggregate variables. These effects are
even stronger when two of these instruments are adjusted simultaneously. For example, a
joint decrease in   and b leads to a 5% increase in Y . Adding a decrease in   even leads
to a 10% increase in steady state output. On the other hand, the effect on Y , K, and H
are much smaller (or even negative) following a decrease in ⌧ p and a decrease in  54 65.
Zooming in on the different components of aggregate labour, however, the model
really proves its usefulness. Indeed, the simulations reveal that the impact of  , b, and  
on respectively unemployment, labour force participation, and hours worked differs sub-
stantially relative to each other. Decreasing only labour taxes ( ), for example, have no
use when the fiscal government aims to decrease low-skilled unemployment. They are,
however, very useful to increase the amount of hours worked by employed low-skilled
individuals. Decreasing the net unemployment benefit replacement rate and less aggress-
ive wage policies by the union, on the other hand, have a strong impact on low-skilled
unemployment. But they have no use if the target variable is the amount of hours worked
per employed individual. A decrease in  54 65 has a strong impact on the participation
decision of the low-skilled aged 54-65, but a small impact on the other components of
aggregate labour.
Both a decrease in   for all low-skilled individuals and a decrease in b have a negative
impact on the labour force participation of the individuals aged 54-65. When faced with
lower labour taxes, employed low-skilled individuals work, earn and save more. As such,
they are able to accumulate more non-human wealth before the age of 54 and by the time
they reach the age of 54, they are less dependent on labour income. More specifically, the
higher level of non-human wealth allows them to retire earlier.
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Table 3.5: Simulations - Results
% change %-point change Welfare
Policy change Y K H n u p CEVs CEVs¯
(1)4  (all ages)< 0,4⌧c = +1.7% 2.3 3.5 1.6 2.5 -0.3 -1.8 2.462 -0.209
(2)4⌧p (all ages)< 0,4⌧c = +1.7% 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.637 -1.070
(3)4b (all ages)< 0,4⌧c =  3% 3.1 2.8 3.3 1.4 -5.5 -12.9 -4.099 5.722
(4)4  (all ages)< 0,4b (all ages)< 0,4⌧c =  1.4% 4.8 5.3 4.5 3.7 -5.2 -13.8 -1.882 4.986
(5)4⌧p (all ages)< 0,4b (all ages)< 0,4⌧c =  1.4% 3.3 3.0 3.4 1.5 -5.2 -12.8 -2.620 4.386
(6)4  (54-65)< 0,4⌧c = +2.8% 0.2 -1.1 0.9 0.4 1.4 20.1 -1.252 -0.981
(7)4  (54-65)< 0,4b (all ages)< 0,4⌧c =  0.6% 3.3 1.4 4.5 1.1 -6.2 -4.2 -4.993 5.118
(8)4 < 0,4⌧c =  1.6% 2.9 3.0 2.9 0.5 -4.0 -5.1 -0.443 3.901
(9)4  (all ages)< 0,4 < 0,4⌧c =  0.2% 5.2 6.4 4.6 2.9 -4.4 -7.4 1.915 3.891
(10)4⌧p (all ages)< 0,4 < 0,4⌧c = 0.0 3.3 3.6 3.1 0.6 -3.9 -5.6 1.159 2.676
(11)4  (54-65)< 0,4 < 0,4⌧c = +0.6 3.5 2.1 4.3 0.6 -3.4 13.1 -1.639 3.749
(12)4  (all ages)< 0,4b < 0,4 < 0,4⌧c =  2.8 9.0 9.9 8.6 3.6 -10.5 -16.1 0.044 9.777
(13)4⌧p (all ages)< 0,4b < 0,4 < 0,4⌧c =  2.6 7.4 7.8 7.2 1.5 -10.1 -15.1 -0.601 8.756
Notes: both the percentage change in aggregate output (Y ), aggregate capital (K), aggregate labour (H), and average amount of hours worked per employed
low-skilled (n) as well as the percentage point change in the aggregate unemployment rate (u) and the participation rate (p) are relative to the steady state
values displayed in Table 3.3.
92
3.5. Simulations: outline and results
Following a decrease in b, it is not due to higher savings per employed individual, but due
to the fact that more individuals are employed. More individuals are employed, which
means that they earn a labour income and are able to accumulate more non-human wealth.
Finally, Table 3.5 also contains a welfare comparison between the two steady states
for each policy. As mentioned, the welfare is looked upon from an ex-ante perspective17.
Note that fiscal policy variables have both a direct and an indirect impact on ex-ante wel-
fare, while union instruments only have an indirect effect. That explains why the impact
on welfare is on average stronger if a fiscal policy instrument is changed. Unemployed
low-skilled individuals facing a decrease in b are worse off in the new steady state. This
result is driving the negative effect on ex-ante welfare for the low-skilled. The welfare
effects of the other policies are less negative or even positive. For example, a decrease in
  leads to a positive effect on ex-ante welfare. The results for high-skilled individuals are
primarily determined by the change in the consumption tax rate.
3.5.3 Application: Germany 2010-2016
Figure 3.1 depicts Germany as the country with the biggest unemployment rate among the
low-skilled. Since 2001-2007, the benchmark period considered in the previous sections,
Germany has imposed drastic fiscal policy reforms, though. As a result, Germany thus
forms a highly interesting case to explore the explanatory power of the model.
In this section, I simulate the model for Germany respectively for the periods 2001-
2007 and 2010-2016 and compare its predictions with the data. More specifically, I
impose the values for the fiscal policy variables as observed in these two time periods
together with the calibrated values as outlined in Section 3.4. Table 3.6 displays these
values. Note that all these variables are determined using the data sources in Section
3.4.9. The fiscal reform imposed by the German government includes a decrease in la-
bour taxes (both on employers and employees), a decrease in the net replacement rate for
the PAYG pension, and a decrease in the net unemployment benefit replacement rate.
The simulations are displayed in Table 3.7. Indeed, the performance of the German la-
bour market has increased significantly following the reform. Both high- and low-skilled
54- to 65-year-old individuals participate far more compared to 2001-2007. The aggregate
unemployment rate has decreased as well: from 11.2% to 9.7%. Looking at the model’s
predictions, one conclusion is that the model has difficulties in capturing the level of the
participation rates. The predictions of the model for both the high- and the low-skilled
are lower than the levels observed in the data. The aggregate unemployment rate, on the
17Note that this is only a preliminary welfare analysis and that these results are only informative. A
thorough welfare analysis requires the computation of the full transition path. The transitional path is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper.
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Table 3.6: Calibration for Germany (2001-2007 and 2010-2016): fiscal policy and union variables
Fiscal Policy and Union variables 2001-2007 2010-2016
Weight of union on wages relative to employment  R 0.787 0.787
Weight in union reference wage for competitive wage %R1 0.8 0.8
Weight in union reference wage for high-skilled wage %R2 0.05 0.05
Weight in union reference wage for unemployment benefit %R3 0.15 0.15
Degree of progressivity of tax code ⇠ 0.25 0.22
Labour tax rate for the average wage   30.2 28.6
Labour tax rate levied on employers ⌧p 19.9 18.9
Consumption tax rate ⌧c 11.1 12.0
Net replacement rate for unemployment benefit b 59.6 50.7
Net replacement rate PAYG pension for (early) retired bp 58.0 55.0
Probability to move from unemployment to employment ⇢ul 0.065 0.065
other hand, is somewhat higher. Notwithstanding these observations, an upside is that
the predicted impact of the fiscal policy reform goes in the right direction. It does not
fully capture the evolution, though. Let me start with the 18- to 53-year-old low-skilled
individuals. Following the fiscal policy reform, they face a higher probability of being em-
ployed. A lot more low-skilled individuals will be employed at each age. Furthermore,
the activity rate among the elderly also increases, albeit not so strong for the low-skilled.
As discussed in the previous section, this is due to the lower unemployment rate. More
low-skilled individuals are employed and accumulate more non-human wealth. As such,
they are less dependent on labour income at the age of 54-65.
There is a caveat, however. So far, the model is only able to compare steady states.
Given that only few years have passed since the fiscal policy reform, the German economy
might not have reached its steady state yet. The predictions of the model, on the other
hand, are the values for the steady state of the model. This might, of course, influence the
results to some extent.
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Table 3.7: Labour market performance in Germany in 2001-2007 and 2010-2016: data versus
model’s predictions
2001-2007
Data Model’s predictions
Participation rate 54-65 high-skilled 71.1% 57.5%
Participation rate 54-65 low-skilled 51.5% 45.1%
Aggregate unemployment rate 11.2% 13.0%
2010-2016
Data Model’s predictions
Participation rate 54-65 high-skilled 87.0% 65.0%
Participation rate 54-65 low-skilled 66.5% 49.1%
Aggregate unemployment rate 9.7% 10.0%
3.6 Conclusion
This paper explores the potential of fiscal and union policies to improve the labour mar-
ket performance of low-skilled individuals. While there is considerable evidence on the
impact of fiscal policy and labour market institutions on aggregate employment , there is
much less evidence on their impact on employment among low-skilled individuals.
My aim in this paper is twofold. The first objective is to develop a large-scale com-
putable OLG model with idiosyncratic productivity risk in which households choose the
tax and wage profile they will face during their active period of life by attending college
or not. The key innovation here is that equilibrium unemployment among unskilled in-
dividuals is endogenous and leads to idiosyncratic employment risk. More specifically,
I introduce a unionised labour market for low-skilled individuals. Due to this set-up,
the probabilities in the age-specific Markov matrix governing the stochastic employment
process are endogenously determined. Therefore, by attending college or not, households
also choose the employment risk they will face.
The second objective is to use the model to quantitatively investigate the impact of
fiscal and union policies on the labour market position of low-skilled individuals. The
simulations reveal that modelling the different components of aggregate employment is
important to explore the effectiveness of fiscal and union policies in great detail. While
most fiscal policy and union instruments have a highly similar impact on aggregate output,
capital, and labour, these instruments all have a different impact on unemployment, labour
force participation, and hours worked. The simulations thus highlight that the choice for a
given policy instrument is dependent on the target variable. Only decreasing labour taxes,
for example, has no use when the fiscal government aims to decrease low-skilled unem-
ployment. Decreasing the net unemployment benefit replacement rate and less aggressive
95
3. IMPROVING THE LABOUR MARKET POSITION OF THE LOW-SKILLED
wage policies by the union, on the other hand, have a strong impact on low-skilled unem-
ployment. But they have no use if the target variable is the amount of hours worked per
employed individual.
Several policies lead to desirable results in terms of unemployment. Overall, however,
the simulations show that fiscal governments and unions have a mutual interest in joining
forces to improve the labour market performance of the low-skilled. For example, the
most preferred policy is a decrease in labour taxes levied on low-skilled employees com-
bined with wage moderation accepted by the unions. Not only does it lead to a decrease
in the unemployment rate of the low-skilled, it also has a positive impact on the num-
ber of hours worked per employed individual and it is very likely to increase welfare of
employed low-skilled individuals. Furthermore, it does not harm unemployed individuals
directly.
The last conclusion one can draw from the simulations is that, unlike in perfectly
competitive labour markets, labour taxes levied on respectively employers and employees
are not equivalent within the model. Even more, the behavioural effects of a decrease in
the labour tax rate paid by employers are very small. Within the current set-up, the fiscal
government can thus achieve more by lowering the tax rates paid by employees.
Finally, given the remarkable evolution of the German labour market since 2007, the
above analysis is complemented with a simulation of the German fiscal policy reform in
the period 2010-2016. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the model to grasp the level
of the high- and low-skilled participation rates, it does a fairly good job at capturing the
evolutions that are characterising the German labour market since 2007: both the lower
aggregate unemployment rate and the increase in participation.
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Appendix 3.A Details on the computational approach
This Appendix describes the computational approach used to solve the model in the pa-
per. The model is solved using three algorithms: one algorithm to solve for the different
policy and value functions, one algorithm to solve for the equilibrium quantities and one
algorithm to solve the union problem. First, I solve the competitive model in which
the unions are excluded, meaning that there is no involuntary unemployment. Using the
output from this model (e.g. the competitive wage for unskilled workers), I use a min-
imisation routine to compute the solution for the union problem. Once a solution for the
union problem is obtained, I solve for the equilibrium of the model with unemployment.
Due to the stochastic unemployment process, there are some minor differences between
the household problem in the competitive model and the imperfect competitive model. In
this Appendix, I will describe the algorithm for the imperfect competitive model, as this
is the most complex one.
3.A.1 Computation of the policy and value functions
The algorithm that is used to solve for the policy and value functions is standard in the
literature. In this subsection, the implementation of this algorithm is outlined in detail.
First, as the asset dimension of the state space is continuous, I have to discretise this
dimension in order to calculate the value and policy functions on a computer. Therefore,
I construct a set of discrete points {a1, a2, a3, ..., an}. As the computing time required
to solve the model increases with the amount of discrete grid points for the state space
for asset holdings and the results do not change if I choose higher values, I set n = 25.
The discretised asset dimension of the state space is then used to solve the maximisation
problem of the household. The algorithm iterates on the following steps:
• Compute the decisions of the individuals at the maximum age J for any (ai, ⇡, s).
As the surviving agents die with certainty in the next period and since they leave no
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bequests, they consume all remaining resources. Therefore, the policy functions for
consumption cJ(ai, ⇡, s) are computed for every (ai, ⇡, s) with the associated value
functions.
• As the policy and value functions in the last period of life are calculated in the pre-
vious step, these are used to iterate backwards to solve for the household decisions
for all ages. Focusing on employed individuals of working age, a0j(ai, e, ⇡, ⌘, s),
cj(ai, e, ⇡, ⌘, s) and nj(ai, e, ⇡, ⌘, s) are computed. I use the minimisation routine
of Chris Sims18 to solve for the optimal a0j , where the optimal level of consumption
and labour supply follow from this value for a’. Note that as this is a minimisation
routine, I minimise  Vj , i.e. the negative of the value function. As the routine
requires a continuous function, I have to interpolate the value function Vj+1. The
unskilled individuals that are not employed in the current period only choose next
period asset holdings a0j(ai, u, ⇡, ⌘, n) and consumption cj(ai, u, ⇡, ⌘, n).
3.A.2 Solving for the macroeconomic equilibrium
I use the Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton algorithm proposed by Ludwig (2007) to solve for
the macroeconomic prices. Starting from an initial guess for the interest rate and the
wages for high-skilled individuals (remember that the wage for the unskilled individu-
als is already determined by the union problem), I compute household decisions and the
distribution of households on the state space and macroeconomic quantities. Using these
quantities, I compute new values for the interest rate and the wage for high-skilled indi-
viduals. Using these, the initial values are updated. These steps are executed until the
distance between the initial guesses and the resulting prices is sufficiently small.
3.A.3 Solving the union maximisation problem
Using the output of the competitive model and the minimisation routine of Chris Sims,
the union maximisation problem is solved. Similar to the household decision with re-
spect to next period asset holdings, I minimise the negative of the utility function of the
union. While the minimisation routine executes, for every new update of the wage for
unskilled individuals, I solve for the policy functions of the unskilled individuals and the
unemployment rates determined by the firm while taking the decisions of the high-skilled
individuals, the wage for high-skilled individuals and the interest rate resulting from the
competitive model and the fiscal policy variables as given.
18This routine can be found on http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/optimise/.
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Appendix 3.B Details on the construction of the data for
labour force participation rates and the
aggregate unemployment rate
This Appendix gives a detailed description of the construction of the data for the labour
force participation rates, employment rates, and the aggregate unemployment rate. The
details for Belgium are given in Table 3.8 below. The data for Denmark and the UK are
constructed in a similar way.
In a first step, the employment rate for the high-skilled 18- to 53-year-olds is con-
structed. This value serves as the benchmark to construct the other data. Looking at Table
3.8, the benchmark is 85.9%. More specifically, all other variables that follow are nor-
malised with respect to this benchmark of 85.9%. The choice of this employment rate
as benchmark follows from the assumption in the model that all high-skilled individuals
aged 18-53 participate on the labour market and have a job. For this group, there is full
employment.
Let me start with the employment rates among the age groups 54-57, 58-61, and 62-65
of the high-skilled. The data are 67.4% for the age group 54-57, 43.5% for the age group
58-61, and 25.7% for the age group 62-65. On average, this gives an employment rate
of 45.5%. The next step is normalising the aforementioned values by the average parti-
cipation and employment rate for the high-skilled individuals aged 18-53. On average,
this implies an employment rate of 53% (see also Table 3.3). Given our assumption of
zero unemployment among the high-skilled, this number is also the average participation
rate among the older high-skilled. The latter values are the data used in the paper for the
calibration of ⇥s¯,⇥s, and ⇢.
I then perform the same analysis for the low-skilled individuals. The average em-
ployment rate of low-skilled individuals aged 18-53 in the data is 65.7%. The %-point
difference between the employment rate of the high- and low-skilled individuals aged
18-53 equals 20.2. This value is used to construct the aggregate unemployment rate (ut)
assuming that for each generation of low-skilled 20.2% of the participating individuals
is unemployed and given that all participating high-skilled work. Next, I use the actual
values for the participation rates of the low-skilled individuals aged 54-57, 58-61, and
62-65. These are respectively 47.7%, 27.6%, and 13.7%. Just like for the high-skilled, I
normalise these values using the value for the employment rate of high-skilled individuals
aged 18-53. These can be found in the column to the right.
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Table 3.8: Construction of the data for labour force participation in Belgium
Labour market indicator Data
Normalised on
employment rate
high-skilled aged 18-53
(a) Employment rate high-skilled individuals aged 18-53 85.9% 100%
(b) Employment rate low-skilled individuals aged 18-53 65.7%
Employment rate difference in %-points between high- and low-skilled individuals aged 18-53 20.2%
Employment rate high-skilled 54-65 45.5% 53.0%
Participation rate low-skilled 54-57 47.7% 55.5%
Participation rate low-skilled 58-61 27.6% 32.1%
Participation rate low-skilled 62-65 13.7% 15.9%
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Chapter 4
Real-time Parameterised Expectations
and the Effects of Government
Spending1
Abstract
In this paper, we explore the effects of government spending in the real business
cycle model where agents use a learning mechanism to form expectations. In con-
trast to most of the learning literature, we study learning behaviour in the original
non-linear model. Following the learning interpretation of the parameterised expect-
ations method, agents’ forecast rules are approximations of the conditional expecta-
tions appearing in the Euler equation. We show that variation in agents’ beliefs about
the coefficients of these rules, generates time variation in the transmission of govern-
ment spending shocks to the economy. Hence, our modelling approach provides
an endogenous mechanism for time-varying government spending multipliers in the
standard real business cycle model.
Keywords: Non-linear learning, Parameterized expectations, Fiscal Policy, Time-
varying multipliers
JEL classification codes: E62, D83, D84, E32
1This Chapter is co-authored with Ewoud Quaghebeur. We thank Freddy Heylen, Gert Peersman, the
members of the Macro Research Group of Ghent University, and the participants of the INFER Workshop
on ’News and Fiscal Policy’ for valuable suggestions.
101
4. REAL-TIME PARAMETERISED EXPECTATIONS
4.1 Introduction
The macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy depends crucially on the behavioural response
of households to these policies. An important determinant of this behavioural response is
the approach households apply to form expectations regarding the evolution of different
endogenous, macroeconomic variables. The dominant paradigm used to model expect-
ations in macroeconomics is the rational expectations (RE) hypothesis. According to
this hypothesis, households have perfect knowledge about the structure of the model and
understand the full complexities of the macro-economy. An alternative to the rational
expectations hypothesis is provided by the learning literature (see e.g. Evans and Honka-
pohja, 2001).2 In this literature, agents form expectations using a perceived law of motion.
Over time, as new information becomes available, agents update the coefficients of their
perceived law of motion.
This observation raises the question of whether the effects of government spending
and the transmission thereof in the macro-economy are different in the basic Real Busi-
ness Cycle (RBC) model using respectively rational expectations and a learning set-up.
Indeed, it is well known that government spending multipliers generated by standard RBC
and Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models using rational expectations
are typically constant. This theoretical finding is, however, not in accordance with the
findings of several empirical studies. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and Owyang
et al. (2013), among others, show that the government spending multiplier is time-varying.
In this paper, we start from these empirical findings and show that the introduction of a
learning set-up in the standard RBC model can generate substantial time variation in the
government spending multiplier.
Several papers have already explored the effects of fiscal policy using a learning
framework within an RBC or DSGE model. Evans et al. (2009), for example, study
the effects of anticipated fiscal policy changes both within an endowment economy and
the Ramsey model. Their assumption is that agents fully understand and anticipate the
evolution of taxes but have to forecast future factor prices using a linear learning mech-
anism. Building on this framework, Mitra et al. (2013) generalise the analysis of Evans
et al. (2009) to a stochastic environment with elastic labour supply. Gasteiger and Zhang
(2014) extend the model even further by introducing distortionary taxes. Following a sim-
ilar learning approach, Benhabib et al. (2014) investigate the effects of fiscal stimulus in
a new Keynesian model with a zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
2In this paper we consider Euler equation learning as put forward by Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
In this approach, agents make one-step ahead forecasts. By contrast, the infinite horizon approach of Pre-
ston (2005) assumes that at each date agents make forecasts about variables into the infinite future. For a
discussion of these two approaches see Honkapohja et al. (2013).
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All the aforementioned papers have enriched our knowledge on the macroeconomic
effects of fiscal policy. They show that these effects can be substantially different when
using the learning approach instead of the rational expectations approach. However, none
of these studies explicitly focuses on the evolution and level of the government spending
multiplier. Furthermore, they all study learning in the linearised counterpart of the non-
linear model they are using. Indeed, it is common in the learning literature that non-linear
models are first linearised around the rational expectations solution before studying their
dynamics under learning. Exploring learning and the link with fiscal policy in the original
non-linear model has several advantages, though. First, there is no longer the need to
linearise the REmodel around its steady state. Furthermore, contrary to linearised models,
which necessarily lead to a local stability analysis, the context of the original non-linear
system allows one to provide a more global stability analysis. Last, due to the non-
linearity of the system, it is more natural to use non-linear forecasting rules compared
to linearised models. This way, the usefulness of non-linear forecasting rules can be
studied as well. As such, one can allow for the possibility of non-linear responses from
households.
In this paper, we explore the transitional effects of government spending and the beha-
viour of the government spending multiplier by introducing learning in the in the original
non-linear RBC model. More specifically, we adopt the learning interpretation of the
parameterised expectations algorithm (PEA). This algorithm was initially developed as a
solution method for non-linear, stochastic models with rational expectations (see for ex-
ample den Haan and Marcet, 1990; Marcet and Lorenzoni, 1999; Marcet and Marshall,
1994). The idea behind the PEA is to replace the conditional expectations in the equi-
librium conditions of the model with flexible functional forms with a finite number of
arguments, e.g. polynomials. However, in Marcet and Marshall (1994), the authors also
give an alternative, learning interpretation to the solution of the PEA.
We find that learning in the non-linear model leads to substantial time variation in
the transmission of structural shocks in the model economy. As such, this result stands
in sharp contrast with the RE and PEA solutions of the model. Our set-up thus leads
to time-varying government spending multipliers. Furthermore, the time variation in our
set-up itself is endogenously determined. As the economic agents update their beliefs,
their response to a change in government spending changes as well, leading to a different
impact on the economy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the model.
In Section 4.3, the learning mechanism is outlined in detail and compared with the rational
expectations solution and the PEA solution of the model. Section 4.4 shows how learning
behaviour in our model leads to time variation in the government spending multipliers.
103
4. REAL-TIME PARAMETERISED EXPECTATIONS
Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model
To study the transitional dynamics of fiscal policy changes, we use the standard RBC
model with elastic labour supply. In this section, we briefly introduce the different com-
ponents of the model.
4.2.1 Households
The maximisation problem of the representative household consists in maximising
E0
1X
t=0
 t

c1  t
1    + b
(1  nt)1 ✓
1  ✓
 
(4.1)
subject to its budget constraint:
ct + kt+1 = wtnt + (1 + rt)kt   Tt. (4.2)
In these equations, ct represents the household’s consumption, kt+1 denotes the capital
stock, nt is its labour supply, and wt and rt are the real wage and the real interest rate. The
latter is equal to the rental charge on capital after depreciation (rt = rkt   ). Furthermore,
b is the taste for leisure,   the discount factor,   the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
and ✓ the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in leisure. Tt is the lump
sum tax in period t.
The optimality conditions of the household with respect to labour and consumption
are respectively given by
c  t =
b (1  nt) ✓
wt
(4.3)
and
 Et
 
c  t+1
⇥
rkt+1 + 1   
⇤ 
= c  t . (4.4)
4.2.2 Firms
The representative firm produces the final good according to
yt = ztk
↵
t n
1 ↵
t (4.5)
where zt evolves according to
zt = z
⇢z
t 1 exp("
Z
t ). (4.6)
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with ⇢z 2 (0, 1). In these equations, "Zt ⇠ N (0,  2Z) is an innovation in technology.
Profits are given by
L = ztk↵t n1 ↵t   wtnt   rkt kt (4.7)
and the corresponding first-order conditions with respect to labour and capital respectively
are:
wt = (1  ↵)ztk↵t n ↵t , (4.8)
rkt = ↵ztk
↵ 1
t n
1 ↵
t . (4.9)
4.2.3 Government
The fiscal government finances its expenditures on goods by levying lump sum taxes.
Formally, we have
gt = Tt. (4.10)
Government spending gt evolves according to
gt = g
⇢g
t 1 exp("
G
t ), (4.11)
with ⇢g 2 (0, 1) and where "Gt ⇠ N (0,  2G) is a government spending shock.
4.3 Real-time non-linear learning
4.3.1 Set-up
We assume that agents, instead of having rational expectations, form forecasts by means
of a non-linear learning mechanism. In particular, agents in our model approximate the
conditional expectational function in the consumption Euler equation
Et  (st+1) = Et
⇥
c  t+1
 
1    + ↵zt+1k↵ 1t+1 n1 ↵t+1
 ⇤
, (4.12)
where st = [ct, kt, zt], by a parametric function  
 
xt,  t 1
 
of the state variables xt =
[1, kt, zt, gt], and update the parameters  t 1 using a constant-gain variant of recursive
least squares. We follow the parameterised expectations literature and use an exponenti-
ated polynomial to approximate the expectational function. More precisely, we consider
the following first-order polynomial in the state variables of the model
Et  (st+1) '  
 
xt, t 1
 
= exp [ 0 +  1 log kt +  2 log zt +  3 log gt] . (4.13)
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Agents update the vector of belief parameters  t in real time according to this learning
rule:
 t =  t 1 + S
 1
t xt 1
⇥
log (  (st))  log
 
 
 
xt 1, t 2
  ⇤
, (4.14)
St = St 1 + 
h
xt 1x
0
t 1   St 1
i
, (4.15)
where St is the moment matrix for xt and  2 (0, 1) is the gain parameter. If the gain
parameter  would be equal to t 1, equations (4.14)–(4.15) are the recursive formulas of
the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator for the coefficients   in the log-linear specific-
ation of equation (4.13), i.e. log (  (st)) ' log ( (xt 1, )). The update for   in equation
(4.14) uses the most recent forecast errorlog (  (st))  log
 
 
 
xt 1, t 2
  
.
Instead of adopting the (decreasing-gain) OLS algorithm, where  = t 1, we set the
gain  to a small constant. The constant-gain case is the most relevant one for our ana-
lysis and is widely used in the adaptive learning literature (see Eusepi and Preston, 2011;
Milani, 2007; Slobodyan and Wouters, 2012, for example). As argued by, for example,
Sargent (1999), Cho et al. (2002), Branch and Evans (2007), Milani (2007), and Orphan-
ides and Williams (2007), it is a natural way of accomplishing “perpetual learning” as it
places a greater weight on more recent observations. Hence, the constant gain makes sure
that the variation in the agents’ beliefs does not die out over time.
We are now able to formulate the dynamics of our model under non-linear learning.
For some initial beliefs  0 and an initial state vector x0 = [1, k0, z0, g0], substituting the
approximating function  
 
xt, t 1
 
for the expectation function in equation (4.4) gives
consumption ct =  
⇥
 
 
xt, t 1
 ⇤ 1/ , equation (4.3) determines labour supply nt, and
kt+1 follows from the resource constraint (4.2). The procedure is detailed in Appendix
4.B.
4.3.2 Discussion
Originally, the parameterised expectations approach was used as a method to approximate
the rational expectations equilibrium of non-linear stochastic dynamic models. The ori-
ginal parameterised expectations algorithm (PEA) starts from a large sequence of shocks
{zt, gt}Tt=0, computes the corresponding endogenous variables consistent with the para-
meterised expectations, and iterates on the vector of parameters   until the approxima-
tion becomes sufficiently accurate. A detailed step-by-step description of the algorithm is
given in Appendix 4.A.
In this paper, we follow the suggestion of Marcet and Marshall (1994) and interpret
the parameterised expectations approach as a real-time learning mechanism. Instead of
holding the parameters   constant over the stochastic simulation of the model, we let
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agents update them according to the learning rule above each time new information be-
comes available. In doing so we build on Berardi and Duffy (2015), who applied a similar
learning mechanism to an optimal growth model.
4.3.3 Non-linear learning simulation
Before turning to the effects of government spending shocks, we compare the non-linear
learning solution of the model with two conventional alternatives: the rational expect-
ations solution and the solution provided by the original parameterised expectations al-
gorithm (PEA).3 Recall that in the latter case, the parameters of the approximating func-
tion are held fixed whereas in the non-linear learning model the parameters are updated
over time. Given a sequence of 10,000 structural shocks, we generate a series of endo-
genous variables for these three different solutions.
Our assumptions on the parameter values are listed in Table 2 and are in line with the
literature. The baseline value for the gain parameter, , is set to 0.02.4 Given that this
is a crucial parameter for the learning dynamics, we discuss the implications of different
choices for  in Section 4.4. The other parameters are set to values commonly used in
the literature. The output elasticity of capital ↵ is set to 1/3. According to Rogerson
(2007), a reasonable range for ✓ in models with a macro focus is [1, 3]. We set ✓ equal
to 1. The coefficient of risk aversion   equals 1 and the discount factor   is set to 0.98.
The depreciation rate   equals 0.025. The AR(1) coefficients of technology, ⇢Z , and
government spending, ⇢G, are set to 0.9. The share of government spending in GDP,
g¯/y¯, is set to 0.2. For the standard deviations of the technology and fiscal disturbances,
 Z and  G, the value 0.01 is chosen. The parameter capturing the taste for leisure, b, is
determined such that individuals work on average 1/3 of their time endowment.
It is clear from Figure 4.1 that the simulated series of both the learning model and the
parameterised expectations algorithm are close to the rational expectations series. The
figure shows the evolution of consumption, output, labour, and investment for 500 peri-
ods of the full sample.5 The relatively small differences between the rational expectations
and parameterised expectations solution, indicate that the latter is a reasonably good ap-
proximation of the former. This comforts us in the choice of the functional form of the
3We use the deterministic extended path method to find the rational expectations solution of the model.
4This is a value well within the range of estimates reported in the literature. According to Orphanides
and Williams (2005, 2007) a gain parameter in the range 0.01–0.04 provides the best fit between the agents’
forecasts in the model and the expectations data from the Survey of Forecasters. Using a similar strategy,
Branch and Evans (2006) obtain a value of 0.0345. The estimate of Milani (2007) equals 0.0183 and hence
lies within the same range. The estimated gain in Eusepi and Preston (2011) is 0.0029. The Bayesian
estimation results from Slobodyan and Wouters (2012) provide values for  going from 0.001 to 0.06
depending on the particular learning scheme.
5Investment is defined as it = yt   ct   gt.
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Parameter Description Value
↵ Output elasticity of capital 1/3
  Discount factor 0.98
  Coefficient of risk aversion 1
  Depreciation rate 0.025
b Taste for leisure 1.44
✓ Preference parameter 1
g¯/y¯ Steady state government expenditure to output ratio 0.2
⇢Z Technology shock AR(1) coefficient 0.9
⇢G Government spending AR(1) coefficient 0.9
 Z Standard deviation of the technology disturbance "Z 0.01
 G Standard deviation of the fiscal disturbance "G 0.01
 Gain parameter in the learning mechanism 0.02
Table 4.1: Calibration.
approximating function. The simulation results also illustrate the local stability of the
non-linear learning mechanism.6 Over our long simulation horizon, the recursive estim-
ation of the belief parameters does not drive the economy towards diverging paths. This
stability is also reflected in the evolution of the belief parameters over time, depicted in
Figure 4.2. Although the parameters can deviate from their PEA values for a sustained
period of time, they remain in the neighbourhood of those values.7
4.4 The effects of government spending under
non-linear learning
In sharp contrast with the rational expectations and PEA solutions of the model, the non-
linear learning solution generates time-variation in the transmission of structural shocks
in the model economy. In this section we illustrate how this feature provides an attractive
mechanism for generating variation in the government spending multipliers over time.
In standard rational expectations models, variation in the transmission mechanism of
shocks is typically obtained by allowing structural parameters to vary over time. One
common strategy is to estimate a fixed-parameter model on different samples and test for
breaks. A downside of this strategy is that the time variation is by assumption infrequent,
6Since our analysis is numerical, establishing analytical convergence results is beyond the scope of
this paper. Stability results for constant-gain algorithms can be found in (inter alia) Evans and Honkapohja
(2001). Loosely speaking, constant-gain learning mechanisms are locally stable only if the gain parameter
is sufficiently small. We discuss the sensitivity of our results with respect to this parameter in Section 4.4.
7Constant gain learning implies that the parameters do not converge to a point estimate but only to a
distribution around the rational expectations beliefs.
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Figure 4.1: Simulated series of model variables under different assumptions regarding the forma-
tion of expectations. The series are measured in percentage deviations from the steady state. The
horizontal axis measures time in quarters.
whereas our approach allows for time variation at a much higher frequency. Another pop-
ular strategy is to use stochastic time-varying coefficient models. In this approach, (some)
model parameters are assumed to follow a stochastic process.8 Both strategies have the
disadvantage that the time variation is not endogenously determined by the model.
By contrast, our approach allows for endogenous time variation of the government
spending multipliers at a relatively high frequency. Figure 4.3 shows the impact multipli-
ers that correspond to the series in Figure 4.1. The transmission mechanism that underlies
the multipliers changes as agents recursively update their beliefs over time. It is well
understood that expectations play a crucial role in the impact of fiscal policies, and our
modelling approach highlights this expectations channel for the transmission government
spending shocks.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the time variation of the government spending multipliers gener-
ated by learning behaviour in our model. It reports the distribution of the impact multipli-
8Examples of the first strategy are Benati (2008) and Canova (2009); examples of the second strategy
include Cogley and Sbordone (2008) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). A more extensive overview of
the existing literature goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of the belief coefficients in the non-linear learning model. The series of
solid lines correspond to the coefficients of the approximating function given by equation (4.13).
The dashed lines represent the coefficients provided by the parameterised expectations algorithm.
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the impact multipliers in the non-linear learning model. The series
represent the impact multipliers in non-linear learning simulation for the same 500 periods as in
Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of impact multipliers based on 10 simulations of the non-linear learning
model over 10,000 periods. The histograms represent the government spending multipliers for
output, consumption, and investment in the non-linear learning model for different values of the
gain parameter (). The purple lines represent the rational expectations multipliers. The vertical
axis measures relative frequencies.
ers for output, consumption, and investment.9 In the rational expectations equilibrium, the
multipliers are time-invariant. The multipliers for output, consumption, and investment
are, respectively, 0.33,  0.27 and  0.30. The relatively small output multiplier, mainly
driven by a significant crowding out of private consumption, is a standard result of the
real business cycle model. Under non-linear learning behaviour, however, the multipliers
vary significantly around their rational expectations values. The degree of time variation
is governed by the gain parameter  in the recursive learning rule (4.14) since that para-
meter determines the volatility of the belief parameters. Overall, learning behaviour in our
model generates substantial time variation in the multipliers and a higher gain increases
this variation considerably. Figure 4.5, on the other hand, describes the evolution of the
government spending multiplier in a sample of 160 periods. This figure illustrates once
more that a higher value for  leads to more time variation. If  is equal to 0.01, the time
variation is very small. This changes drastically when  is equal to 0.03. Even within
the simple RBC model, the government spending multiplier increases from 0.15 to nearly
0.35 over a period of 40 years.
9The results are based on 10 simulations of the non-linear learning model over 10,000 periods. For each
simulation, the initial parameter vector is the vector provided by the parameterised expectations algorithm.
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Figure 4.5: Evolution of the impact multipliers in a sample of 160 periods for different values of
.
4.4.1 Discussion
The previous paragraph showed that our set-up leads to time-variation in the government
spending multiplier. This result implies that the effectiveness of an increase in government
spending varies over time. For this reason, this paragraph provides some insights into
the drivers of the government spending multiplier. These determinants are of particular
interest for fiscal policymakers. It allows them to assess the effectiveness of fiscal policy
in the economy.
The evolution of the government spending multipliers is mainly driven by the evol-
ution of  3, the coefficient for government spending in the approximating function 4.13.
If  3 is high (low), the government spending multiplier for output is high (low) as well.
Intuitively, this result makes sense. If individuals attach a higher weight to government
spending in their approximating function, the impact of an increase in government spend-
ing on the decision variables will also be stronger. Figure 4.6 illustrates this relationship
for the output, consumption, and investment multipliers. If  3 is high, the crowding out
of private consumption after the government spending shock will be more severe. Hence,
the consumption multiplier will be larger. Note, however, that in the context of an RBC
model, a small multiplier for private consumption leads to a large multiplier for output.
The output multiplier is driven by labour supply and a higher level of consumption leads,
ceteris paribus, to a lower level of labour supply.
As the evolution of  3 is the most important driver of the multiplier, the next step is
to explore the drivers of  3. Looking at Equation (4.14), two important channels can be
identified. The first one is the forecasting error
⇥
log (  (st))  log
 
 
 
xt 1, t 2
  ⇤
. A
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of impact multipliers for high and low values of belief parameter  3 .
The histograms are based on a simulation of 10,000 periods of the non-linear learning model and
represent the government spending multipliers for output, consumption, and investment. The high
(low)  3 sub-sample contains the multipliers when  3 is above (below) its median value. The
vertical axis measures relative frequencies.
positive (negative) forecasting error leads to an increase (decrease) in  3, everything else
equal. The forecasting error itself is determined by the evolution of the technology shocks.
More specifically, if zt > zt 1, the forecasting error is negative, whereas if zt < zt 1 it is
positive. So, everything else equal, after a period of technological growth, the government
spending multiplier is low and after a period of decreasing technology, the government
spending multiplier is high. This result is, however, dependent on the level of government
spending, which is the second channel. If government spending is above its steady state
level,  3 will increase for a given level of technology, if it is below its steady state level,
 3 will decrease for a given level of technology. Furthermore, the further government
spending is from its steady state level, the stronger its influence on the evolution of  3 and
thus the government spending multiplier.
Combined, these results lead to the following insights. The government spending
multiplier is likely to be high if technology and government spending relative to its steady
state level evolve in opposite direction. More specifically, the multiplier is high (increases)
after (i) a considerable period of increasing technology and low government spending on
the one hand, and (ii) after a considerable period of decreasing technology and high gov-
ernment spending on the other hand. The multiplier is low (i) after a considerable period
of increasing technology and high government spending on the one hand and (ii) after a
considerable period of decreasing technology and a low level of government spending on
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the other hand10.
We illustrate the aforementioned results using Figure 4.7. In this Figure, we high-
light three different episodes during which the government spending multiplier strongly
changes. The corresponding levels of technology and government spending are displayed
in respectively the middle and bottom panel. Furthermore, the red line in the bottom
panel denotes the steady state level of government spending. Here, we discuss the evol-
ution of the government spending multiplier between periods 176 and 204. The other
ones follow the same reasoning. At first, technology strongly increases while the level
of government spending is below its steady state level. We know that this combination
leads to an increase in  3. This increase almost directly leads to an increase in the gov-
ernment spending multiplier. After some time, however, technology starts to decrease. At
that point, government spending is higher than the steady state level. This combination
pushes the government spending multiplier upwards.
4.4.2 Choice of the approximating function: linear versus
non-linear learning
In the baseline simulation, we assume that agents approximate the expectation in the
consumption Euler equation (cf. equation (4.12)) by the following non-linear function
 
 
xt, t 1
 
= exp [ 0 +  1 log kt +  2 log zt +  3 log gt] .
In this section, we compare this “non-linear” learning approach with “linear learning”
where agents use the following linear approximating function
 
 
xt, t 1
 
=  0 +  1kt +  2zt +  3gt.
As for the “non-linear” learning case, the parameters  t 1 are updated using the constant-
gain recursive least squares formulas (4.14)–(4.15) but the updating term between square
brackets in equation (4.14) now becomes
⇥
  (st)   
 
xt 1, t 2
 ⇤
.
When comparing the linear with the non-linear learning approach, two interesting ob-
servations can be made. First, non-linear learning outperforms linear learning in terms of
forecasting performance, especially when (large) shocks drive the economy far away from
its steady state. To illustrate this, Table 4.2 reports the root-mean square error (RMSE)
of the forecasts under linear and non-linear learning. In a “high volatility” simulation,
10Recent contributions to the literature investigate the relationship between the size of the multiplier
and the state of the business cycle – see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013) and Owyang et al.
(2013). We have investigated this relationship using different measures for the business cycle and found that
this stylised RBC model is not adequate to uncover a structural relation. Investigating this issue in a more
elaborate (more demand-driven) non-linear learning model is a promising direction for future research.
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Figure 4.7: Endogenous drivers of the government spending multiplier
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Learning scheme Root-mean-square error
Baseline High volatility
( Z =  G = 0.01) ( Z =  G = 0.025)
Non-linear learning 0.010 0.026
Linear learning 0.010 0.034
Table 4.2: Forecasting performance of linear and non-linear learning. Root-mean-squared errors
are calculated over 10,000 simulation periods.
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Figure 4.8: Linear and non-linear approximating function for different values of the capital stock.
Government spending and technology are fixed at their steady state values and   equals the coef-
ficient vector of the parameterised expectations algorithm.
when structural shocks to the economy are larger than in the baseline simulation, non-
linear learning improves the forecasting performance relative to linear learning. In the
baseline simulation, however – when the structural shocks are relatively small – the fore-
casting performance of non-linear learning is (approximately) equal to linear learning.
Hence, when shocks are relatively large, non-linear learning leads to better forecasting.
To provide some intuition for this result, Figure 4.8 plots the linear and non-linear ap-
proximating function for different values of the capital stock. For values close to the
steady state (k = k¯), the approximation by the linear and non-linear function is very
similar. For capital (and government spending) far away from the steady state, the linear
and non-linear approximation differ quite substantially. In both cases, agents can update
the coefficients of the approximating function to improve their forecasting, but the results
presented in Table 4.2 show that non-linear learning outperforms linear learning in terms
of RMSE.
Second, the linear learning approach also generates time variation in the government
spending multipliers. Figure 4.9 shows how the impact multipliers for output, consump-
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Figure 4.9: Distribution of impact multipliers based on 10 simulations over 10,000 periods of the
model with a linear approximating function. The histograms represent the government spending
multipliers for output, consumption, and investment for different values of the gain parameter ().
The purple lines represent the rational expectations multipliers. The vertical axis measures relative
frequencies.
tion, and investment again fluctuate around the rational expectations multipliers, but their
values are less dispersed. Under non-linear learning, the updating of the belief coeffi-
cients generate more variation in the consumption response after the government spending
shock. Consequently, the effects on output and investment will also vary more.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the transitional dynamics following fiscal policy changes in a
stochastic macroeconomic framework where agents use adaptive learning to update non-
linear forecast rules to form expectations. Several papers have already studied the effect of
fiscal policy using a learning framework (see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 2009; Gasteiger
and Zhang, 2014; Benhabib et al., 2014). All of these papers, however, use linear fore-
cast rules. In this paper, we apply a different approach. Following, inter alia, Marcet and
Marshall (1994) and Berardi and Duffy (2015), we interpret the parameterised expecta-
tions algorithm (PEA) as a real-time learning mechanism used by agents to update their
expectations over time in the original non-linear model.
Our main contribution is to study the dynamics of government spending in the stand-
ard RBC model where agents use this non-linear learning mechanism to form expecta-
tions. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to compare the transitional
dynamics resulting from this framework with the dynamics under rational expectations.
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In our non-linear learning set-up, the effects of government spending shocks vary sub-
stantially over time. We have shown that this variation is endogenously driven by agents’
expectations about the future. The resulting fluctuations in the government spending mul-
tipliers are in marked contrast to the time-invariant multipliers of the rational expectations
solution of the model. We also show that the forecasting performance of the learning
mechanism is better if agents use a non-linear approximating function instead of a linear
one. In particular in the context of relatively high structural shocks which drive the eco-
nomy far away from its steady state, using a non-linear approximating function to form
expectations is advantageous.
Our findings provide several avenues for future research. First, it may be very fruitful
to go beyond the standard RBC model. Understanding how learning affects the variability
of fiscal multipliers in more elaborate models is an important topic. It may, for example,
shed further light on the dependency of multipliers on the state of the business cycle
and the stance of monetary policy. Second, the non-linear learning model provides a
natural framework for studying the consequences of a structural change in fiscal policy.
Comparing the dynamics of this learning model with the rational expectations dynamics
is, in our view, a promising direction for further research.
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Appendix 4.A Parameterised expectations algorithm
Under the parameterised expectations algorithm (PEA) the vector of coefficients   of the
approximating function  (·, ) is calculated with the following iterative procedure.
Step 1 Draw a large sequence of shocks
 
✏Gt , ✏
Z
t
 T
t=0
and compute {gt, zt}Tt=0 as
defined in (4.6) and (4.11).
Step 2 Choose an initial guess  0 and an initial value k0 for the capital stock.
Step 3 At iteration i 2 {0, . . . , imax}, use  i to generate the endogenous variables
{ct ( i) , nt ( i) , kt+1 ( i)}Tt=0. In particular, (i) substituting the approxim-
ating function  (xt, i) for the expectation function in equation (4.4) gives
consumption ct =   [ (xt, i)]
 1/ , (ii) the first-order condition (4.3) de-
termines labour supply nt, and (iii) kt+1 follows from the resource constraint
(4.2).
Step 4 Use the data for t = 0, . . . , T 1 to run the non-linear least squares regression
of c  t+1
 
1    + ↵zt+1k↵ 1t+1 n1 ↵t+1
 
on the approximating function  (xt, ·) to
obtain an estimate  ˆ.
Step 5 Use this estimate to update the guess for   according to
 i+1 = (1  µ) i + µ ˆ, (4.16)
where (0, 1] is a damping parameter.
Step 6 Apply steps 3-5 iteratively until the convergence criterion
P
k
   ki+1    ˆk   <
⌧ is met, where k is the number of parameters in  .
In our experiments, we set T = 10, 000, imax = 200, µ = 0.8, and ⌧ = 1 ⇥ 10 5. The
initial value for the capital stock is the steady state: k0 = k¯.
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Appendix 4.B Learning algorithm
To simulate the learning model, we follow the following steps.
Initialisation
1. Draw a sequence of shocks
 
✏Gt , ✏
Z
t
 S
t=0
and compute {gt, zt}St=0 as defined in (4.6)
and (4.11).
2. Choose an initial guess  0 and an initial value k0 for the capital stock.
Simulation Simulate the model S periods forward using the following scheme.
1. Approximate the conditional expectational function in the consumption Euler equa-
tion
Et  (st+1) = Et
⇥
c  t+1
 
1    + ↵zt+1k↵ 1t+1 n1 ↵t+1
 ⇤
, (4.17)
by the parametric function  
 
xt,  t 1
 
of the state variables xt = [1, kt, zt, gt].
2. Calculate the corresponding endogenous variables determined by the following sys-
tem
ct =  
⇥
 
 
xt, t 1
 ⇤ 1/ 
, (4.18)
c  t =
b (1  nt) ✓
wt
, (4.19)
wt = (1  ↵)ztk↵t n ↵t (4.20)
yt = ztk
↵
t n
1 ↵
t , (4.21)
it = yt   ct   gt, (4.22)
kt+1 = (1   ) kt + it. (4.23)
3. Update the vector of parameters  t 1 according to
 t =  t 1 + R
 1
t xt 1
⇥
log (  (st))  log
 
 
 
xt 1, t 2
  ⇤
, (4.24)
Rt = Rt 1 + 
h
xt 1x
0
t 1  Rt 1
i
. (4.25)
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Chapter 5
Beyond Rational Expectations: The
Effects of Heuristic Switching in an
Overlapping Generations Model1
Abstract
I explore the transitional dynamics in an Overlapping Generations framework
with and without heuristic switching. Agents use these simple heuristics to forecast
the interest rate and the real wage. The fraction of agents using a specific heuristic
depends on its relative forecasting performance. In the absence of heuristic switch-
ing, the results indicate that there is a lot of variation in the transitional dynamics
over different parameter values and heuristics. They might even oscillate or diverge.
Including heuristic switching has two advantages. First, it decreases the variation in
the transitional dynamics significantly. Second, it has a stabilising effect on oscillat-
ing or diverging transitional dynamics.
Keywords: Heuristic Switching, Heterogeneous Agents, Fiscal Policy, Trans-
itional Dynamics, Overlapping Generations
JEL classification codes: D83, D84, E03
1I am grateful to Freddy Heylen, Ewoud Quaghebeur and Tim Buyse for valuable suggestions and com-
ments. The computational resources (Stevin Supercomputer Infrastructure) and services used in this work
were provided by the Flemish Supercomputer Center, funded by Ghent University, the Hercules Foundation,
and the Economy, Science, and Innovation Department of the Flemish Government.
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5.1 Introduction
This paper explores the stability and transitional dynamics of an Overlapping Generations
model with heuristic switching. Accordingly, this paper contributes to a growing literature
that goes beyond the rational expectations paradigm. After all, the transitional and equi-
librium impact of public policy, for instance, on the macroeconomy depends crucially on
the behavioural response of households to these policies. An important determinant of
this behavioural response is the procedure households apply to form expectations regard-
ing the future course of different variables. Moreover, these expectations themselves are
typically a key determinant of the current realisation of these variables. Several authors
have argued that assuming that economic agents have rational expectations (RE) is unreal-
istic. An alternative is provided by the learning literature (see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja,
2001). In this literature, boundedly rational agents form expectations using a perceived
law of motion. In the lion’s share of this literature, agents act as econometricians who up-
date the coefficients of their perceived law of motion as new realisations of the variables
of interest become available over time.
A number of papers studied the effects of least-squares adaptive learning within an
Overlapping Generations framework (henceforth OLG) - see e.g. Schönhofer (1998),
Adam (2003), Tuinstra (2003) and Tuinstra and Wagener (2007). In Schönhofer (1998),
for example, it is shown that if one explicitly considers learning in a monetary OLG
model, the dynamic system exhibits chaotic behaviour. Tuinstra (2003), on the other
hand, introduces the notion of beliefs equilibria. These are equilibria where the belief
of the agents best fits the time series data, which itself is generated by the model where
agents have this belief. Although the learning dynamics might converge, the author shows
that the corresponding inflation dynamics might be erratic. Different from these studies,
Chen et al. (2008) study the dynamic behaviour of an OLG model with capital accu-
mulation under three different types of expectations: rational, myopic and adaptive ex-
pectations. They conclude that the dynamics can be complex when using the latter two
types. Moreover, the dynamic properties of the model crucially depend on the value of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and, in the case of adaptive ex-
pectations, on the weight agents attach to past observations when forming expectations.
All these papers have enriched our knowledge of the properties that characterise OLG
models when moving beyond the scope of rational expectations. The majority of the pa-
pers using an OLG framework, however, focus on the (mostly local) stability properties
of the equilibrium, not on the transitional dynamics following policy shocks. A second
shortcoming is that often only one forecasting rule is studied. If the agents act as econo-
metricians, they constantly update the coefficients of the same equation, but they cannot
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distinguish or switch between different rules. Furthermore, even if multiple rules are
studied simultaneously, it is virtually always assumed that all agents use the same rule at
a given point in time. In these papers, the focus often lies exclusively with one-period-
ahead forecasts as well, ruling out the possibility of multi-period-ahead forecasts.
It is, however, plausible that a fraction of the economic agents does not have the
cognitive capacities to act as an econometrician. Just as it can not be ruled out a priori that
different forecasting rules are being used by the economic agents at one point in time. So
then, what is the macroeconomic impact if one would assume that economic agents use
simple rules to forecast wages and interest rates? Additionally, how do the transitional
dynamics behave when individuals have multiple rules to choose from? And are the
transitional dynamics sensitive to the rule being used? Finally, how do they compare to
the transitional dynamics in the rational expectations case?
In this paper, I assume that agents use such simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the
future course of the interest rate and the real wage. Agents use these heuristics because,
in general, they do not possess the cognitive abilities as assumed by the RE literature nor
to act as econometricians. Instead, the agents have a certain number of different heuristics
at their disposal. On a regular basis, they assess the predictive power of the heuristic they
are currently applying. If it performs well, the probability that agents will use the same
heuristic in the next period will be higher. If it does not perform well, there is a higher
probability that they switch to another rule.
The framework used to answer these questions is in line with the evidence provided
by several laboratory experiments - see e.g. Adam (2007), Hommes (2011) , Heemeijer
et al. (2012) and Hommes (2014). In Heemeijer et al. (2012), for example, the authors
use a standard OLG framework to conduct an individual experiment in order to assess
the ability of individuals to form expectations and the degree to which these individuals
learn about the accuracy of their forecasts. In the experiment, participants are asked to
submit fifty one-step-ahead forecasts for the inflation rate. Over time, the participants also
observe the actual realisations of the inflation rate. These can be used by the participants
to forecast the remaining future inflation rates. The authors argue that their experimental
results cannot be explained using the rational expectations approach. Rather, they are
consistent with the use of constant gain algorithms or average expectations. Their results
also indicate that individuals switch between different heuristics according to the relative
forecasting performance of these rules.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature that goes beyond the rational
expectations paradigm by exploiting the heuristic switching approach within an Overlap-
ping Generations model. Triggered by a fiscal policy shock, the objective is to study the
transitional dynamics of the model for a large number of settings including one or mul-
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tiple heuristics and compare the behaviour of the dynamics with their rational expectations
counterpart.
The simulations lead to three main findings. First, in a context without heuristic
switching (i.e. a context where individuals only have one heuristic at their disposal to
form expectations), the evolution of transitional dynamics can be substantially different
from the rational expectations case, especially in the first periods of the transition. Ra-
tional expectations is thus not always a good approximation. Furthermore, there is a lot
of variation in the dynamics over different parameter values and heuristics. This finding
implies that if only heuristic is used, the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy is highly
sensitive to the heuristic being used. What is more, as the discount rate and the degree
of risk aversion decrease, the model becomes unstable and the corresponding transitional
dynamics oscillate or even diverge.
Second, after activating the heuristic switching regime, the variation in the transitional
dynamics decreases significantly. Consequently, the sensitivity of the transitional effects
of fiscal policy is much lower now and its exact impact is thus less uncertain for policy
makers.
Third and last, the heuristic switching has a stabilising effect on the transitional dy-
namics. For certain configurations of the parameter values for which the dynamics were
very unstable in the absence of heuristic switching, the dynamics now converge to the
steady state in most cases.
These findings are important. They imply that allowing individuals to choose from a
wide range of forecasting rules is actually a better option than constraining them to use
only forecasting rule. It allows them to select the rules that perform relatively better, a
feature that not only enhances the stability of the model, but reduces the uncertainty in
the transitional dynamics as well. It implies that going beyond rational expectations does
not lead to a wide range of possible trajectories. Furthermore, it turns out that rational
expectations is a better approximation when the switching mechanism is activated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the different
model blocks. Section 5.3 focuses on the heuristic switching. In Section 5.4, I provide
some details on the timing in the model. The calibration and parameterisation of the
model is described in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 consists of the description and a detailed
look into the results of the different simulations. Section 5.7 concludes.
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5.2 Model
I consider a closed economy in which time is discrete and runs from 0 to1. Each period
lasts for 4 years. At each moment in time, the economy is populated by J overlapping
generations. The model consists of three actors: heterogeneous agents, firms, and a fiscal
government. Markets are incomplete meaning that individuals cannot explicitly insure
themselves against productivity shocks.
5.2.1 Demographics
At the beginning of each period, a continuum of new agents with measure one enters
the model. Individuals have an uncertain lifespan. They face an age-specific survival
probability 'j between the age of j and j + 1. The demographics of the model are
exogenous and given by:
Nj+1,t+1 = 'jNj,t (5.1)
where Nj,t represents the number of individuals of age j at time t. Every individual who
survives J periods will die with certainty after the J-th period.
5.2.2 Individuals
Individuals enter the model at the age of 18. Ex-ante, before any decisions are made,
individuals only differ with respect to the heuristic they apply to form expectations. Fur-
thermore, the economic agents face idiosyncratic income risk during their active period of
life. At any given point in time, individuals are characterised by a state vector (j, a, ⌘, h),
where j is the age of the agent, a the accumulated non-human wealth at the beginning of
period t, ⌘ the productivity shock and h the heuristic that the agents is currently applying.
Let  j,t(a, ⌘, h) denote the share of agents aged j of type (a, ⌘, h) at date t. For each t
and j we have
R
 t,j(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) = 1.
Individuals choose sequences of (n, c, a0), i.e. labor supply, consumption and accu-
mulated non-human wealth, to maximise their expected lifetime utility. The latter is given
by
U = E
(
JX
j=1
 j 1
 
cj(1 µ)(1  nj)µ
 1 ✓
1  ✓
)
. (5.2)
The share of consumption is given by 1   µ. The degree of relative risk aversion is
governed by ✓. The time discount factor is denoted by  . Individuals reaching the age of
JR retire.
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The dynamic budget constraint of an individual aged j < JR with state (a, ⌘, h) at
time t is given by
(1 + ⌧c)cj + a
0
j = wt⌘"jnj(1  ⌧) + (1 + rt(1  ⌧k))(aj + Trt) (5.3)
He or she earns an after-tax wage of wt"j⌘nj(1   ⌧), where wt is the real wage per unit
of effective labour at time t, "j is an age-specific productivity parameter, ⌘ is the labour
productivity shock and ⌧ is the average tax rate on labour income. The consumption tax
rate is ⌧c. The real interest rate is given by rt. Individuals pay taxes on capital income
where the capital tax rate is denoted by ⌧k. Individuals enter the model without wealth and
leave no intentional bequests. Due to accidental bequests, individuals receive a transfer
Trt from the government. The accumulated non-human wealth at the end of the period is
denoted by a0. I impose that individuals are not able to borrow: a0   0. This individual
maximises the following recursive problem:
V (j, a, ⌘, h) = max
cj ,nj ,a0j
U(cj, nj) +  'j
X
⌘0
⇡(⌘0|⌘)V (j + 1, a0, ⌘0, h) (5.4)
The stochastic process regarding the labor productivity shock is denoted by ⇡(⌘0|⌘). The
heuristic used is given by h. From the age of JR onwards, individuals receive a public
pay-as-you-go pension. Their budget constraint for the ages j   JR is given by
(1 + ⌧c)cj + a
0
j = (1 + rt(1  ⌧k))(aj + Trt) + ppt (5.5)
The maximisation problem is now given by
V (j, a, h) = max
c,a0
U(cj) +  'jV (j + 1, a
0, h) (5.6)
A final note on the basic PAYG-pension ppt received by the retired households in the
model. For simplicity, it is assumed that all individuals receive the same pension, i.e. a
fraction bp of the average after-tax wage in the economy.
5.2.3 Firms
The production function of the representative firm is given by
Yt = AK
↵
t L
1 ↵
t (5.7)
where A is the level of technology that assumed to be constant over time,Kt is the capital
used by the firm, and Lt is given by
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Lt =
JR 1X
j=1
Nj,t
Z
nj(a, ⌘, h)⌘"j t,j(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) (5.8)
5.2.4 Government
Government expenditures on goods and public pensions are financed by taxes on labour,
capital and consumption. The fraction of output that is devoted to government consump-
tion gc is adjusted such that the government budget is balanced every period. Formally,
the government budget constraint is given by
Gc,t + Pt = Tn,t + Tc,t + Tk,t (5.9)
with:
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
Gct = gcYt
Pt =
PJ
j=jR
Nj,t
R
ppt j,t(da⇥ dh)
Tkt = ⌧krtKt
Tnt = ⌧
PJR 1
j=1 Nj,t
R
wtnj(a, ⌘, h)⌘"j j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh)
Tct = ⌧c
PJ
j=1Nj,t
R
cj(a, ⌘, h) j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh)
5.3 Heuristic switching
In this paper, I take the view that economic agents have limited cognitive capabilities.
In such a world, individuals use simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the evolution of ag-
gregate macroeconomic variables and to form expectations. Notwithstanding their lim-
ited cognitive capabilities, economic agents are willing to learn from their mistakes. To
this end, I combine the use of heuristics with a trial-and-error learning approach2. More
specifically, economic agents have different heuristics at their disposal and they endogen-
ously select the heuristic or forecasting rule that performed the best in previous periods.
On a regular basis, individuals assess the predictive power of the heuristic they are cur-
rently using vis-à-vis the predictive power of the other rules. If the current rule performs
well, the probability that an individual will keep on using the same rule is higher. If not,
there is a higher probability that he or she will switch.
2For an in-depth analysis of the use of heuristics and heuristic switching, I refer the reader to De Grauwe
(2012), Heemeijer et al. (2012) and Hommes (2014).
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The different heuristics at the disposal of an individual to form expectations are the
following3:
r1,et+s,t = r
1,e
t,t 1 +  1(rt   r1,et,t 1) (Adaptive (1)) (5.10)
r2,et+s,t = rt +  2(rt   rt 1) (Trend (1)) (5.11)
r3,et+s,t =
1
 3
 3 1X
j=0
rt j (Average (1)) (5.12)
r4,et+s,t =
 4 1X
j=0
 jrt j (Average (2)) (5.13)
r5,et+s,t = rt (Myopic) (5.14)
with s 2 {1, ..., J}. In these equations, both actual realisations (rt) and expected values
(rh,et+s,t) of the interest rate are given. The subscript t in rt denotes the historical period t
in which the realisation occurred. On the other hand, rh,et+s,t is the expectation at time t of
the interest rate in period t+ s using heuristic h. For example, r1,et,t 1 is the expectation at
time t  1 using the first heuristic of the interest rate at time t.
The first heuristic boils down to an adaptive expectations approach to form forecasts.
It states that the expectation of an individual regarding the evolution of the interest rate
equals r1,et,t 1, the expectation of the interest rate in the current period t made at time t  1,
and a fraction  1 of the forecast error, i.e. the difference between the actual realisation
of the interest rate rt and r1,et,t 1. The second one is a trend rule. Here, r
2,e
t+1,t equals the
actual realisation of the interest rate rt plus a fraction  2 of the difference between the
current and previous realisation of the interest rate. Agents expect higher interest rates
in the future when the current interest rate rt is higher than the previous interest rate
rt 1 and vice versa. When  1 and  2 are low, individuals are less inclined to adjust
their expectations. When  1 and  2 are high, individuals will be more inclined when
adjusting their expectations. The third heuristic implies that the expected interest rate for
the next period equals an unweighted average of the last  3 realisations of the interest
rate, while in the fourth heuristic r4,et+1,t is determined using a weighted average of the last
 4 realisations of the interest rate. Finally, the fifth heuristic is equivalent to the use of
3In this section, I only provide the different heuristics for the evolution of the interest rate. Note that
agents form expectations about wages as well using the same heuristic, and the heuristics that they use to do
so are equivalent to the ones stated in this section. Furthermore, these heuristics are based on the heuristics
provided in Hommes (2014).
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myopic expectations. Individuals simply assume that the interest in the next period will
equal the current realisation of the interest rate.
Agents using heuristic h at t use this heuristic to form rh,et+s,t (s 2 {1, .., J   j}, J
denoting the maximum age an individual can reach and j denoting the actual age), i.e.
the expected values at time t of the interest rate and the real wage in the remaining peri-
ods of their life. In period t + 1, they will update their expectations of these values as
new information becomes available. For the last three heuristics (Equations (5.12-5.14)),
I assume that the agents using these heuristics expect that the new value applies for the
remainder of their life. Thus, for example, if the individual has at most three more peri-
ods to live after the current period, expectations for these periods held at time t are the
following: rh,et+1,t = r
h,e
t+2,t = r
h,e
t+3,t. In the next period, however, the updated expected
values for the last two periods of life (rh,et+2,t+1 = r
h,e
t+3,t+1) might differ from the expected
values for these periods at time t (rh,et+2,t = r
h,e
t+3,t). In other words, agents assume that the
expected value at time t applies for the remainder of their life. In time t+1, the expected
value itself might change, but they still assume that this new expected value applies for
the remainder of their life.
For the first two heuristics, I use two different versions. In one version, I use the
same assumption as for the last three heuristics, namely that the forecast for the next
period rh,et+1,t equals the forecast for the subsequent periods as well. In the second version,
though, to form expectations for the periods t+2, t+3, t+4, ... the heuristics are adjusted
as follows:
r6,et+s,t = r
6,e
t+s 1,t +
 1
 5s
(rt   r6,et,t 1), s 2 {1, ..., J   j} , (Adaptive (2)) (5.15)
r7,et+s,t = r
7,e
t+s 1,t +
 2
 6s
(rt   rt 1), s2 {1, ..., J   j} , (Trend (2)) (5.16)
where s is the number of remaining periods of life. Heuristic 6 implies that the individual
observes the forecast error rt   r6,et,t 1 and acknowledges that he or she might make fore-
casting errors in the future. Using the forecast error, he or she iterates forward to form
expectations for the interest rate in period t + j. The term  5s then captures to what ex-
tent he or she thinks that they will make the same forecasting error in the future. For the
last heuristic, the basic idea is the same, but now it captures to what extent an individual
thinks that the trend will continue in the future.
In total agents have seven different heuristics at their disposal. Consistent with the lit-
erature on Heuristic SwitchingModels, the performance of heuristic h 2 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
is measured by the squared prediction error of that specific rule ⇥t,h in a specific period t:
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⇥t,h =  (rt   rh,et,t 1)2 +  ⇥t 1,h (5.17)
All that is left to be specified is the fraction of agents using a specific heuristic h. Using a
discrete choice model, this is given by
 h,t = ⇠ h,t 1 + (1  ⇠) exp(k⇥t 1,h)P7
h=1exp(k⇥t 1,h)
(5.18)
Here,  h,t measures the fraction of individuals using heuristic h at period t. This
means that
P7
h=1  h,t = 1. Furthermore,   2[0,1] is a parameter measuring the memory
of the economic agents. The lower  , the less economic agents take past periods into
account when comparing heuristics. Furthermore, k   0 is the intensity of choice. The
larger k, the faster agents switch between heuristics. The last parameter is ⇠ 2 [0, 1],
measuring inertia. If this parameter is low, economic agents switch less to other heuristics
even if they clearly perform better. In other words, the habit of using a certain heuristic is
stronger.
5.4 Timing
Each period, a number of decisions have to be made by the individuals populating the
economy. These sequential steps are:
1. Given their expectations, individuals decide on the amount of labour they want to
supply to the labour market.
2. Based on Kt and Lt, rt and wt are determined. These values of wt and rt do not
change the value of n. Labour has already been supplied to the labour market.
3. Individuals receive their labour (based on n as determined in step 2) and capital
income. Afterwards, they decide on c and a0.
4. They evaluate the heuristic they are applying using Equation (5.17). Afterwards,
the heuristic switching takes place.
5. Having observed the actual realisation of the interest rate and the wage, individuals
update their expectations about the future values of the interest rate and the real
wage rate using the heuristic they are using.
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5.5 Definition of Equilibrium
Let  j,t(a, ⌘, h) denote the share of agents aged j at time t with state (a, ⌘, h). For each j
and t we have
R
 j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) = 1.
Definition 1 Given an initial capital stock K0, a given vector of exogenous fiscal
policy variables {⌧c,t, ⌧k,t, ⌧t, bp,t}1t=1 and initial measures { j,0}Jj=1, an intertemporal
equilibrium consists of sequences of value and policy functions {Vt, a0j,t, cj,t, nj,t}1t=0,
sequences of transfers {Trt}1t=0, sequences of prices {wt, rt}1t=0, sequences of expecta-
tions
n
rh,et+k,t, w
h,e
r+k,t
o1
t=1
, sequences of taxes, social security policies, tax aggregates and
government spending {Gc, Tn,t, Tk,t, Tc,t, ppt}1t=1, aggregate variables {Yt, Kt, Lt}1t=0 and
sequences of measures { j,t}1t=0 such that:
1. Given expectations rh,et+k,t and w
h,e
t+k,t and government policies, n(j, a, ⌘, h) is the
optimal labour supply of an individual with state n(j, a, ⌘, h).
2. Given prices rt and wt, government policies, expectations rh,et+k,t and w
h,e
t+k,t, and
the labour supply n(j, a, ⌘, h) as decided in the beginning of period t, Vt satisfies
the Bellman equations as given in subsection 5.2.2 for all states (j, a, ⌘, h), where
{a0j,t, cj,t} are the related policy functions.
3. Interest rates and wages are given by:
rt = ↵A
✓
Lt
Kt
◆(1 ↵)
    (5.19)
and
wt = (1  ↵)A
✓
Kt
Lt
◆↵
(5.20)
4. The pension ppt is determined by:
ppt = bp,t
0BBBBB@
JR 1X
j=1
Lj,t
R
wtn(j, a, ⌘, h)⌘"j(1  ⌧) j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh)
JR 1X
j=1
Lj,t
1CCCCCA (5.21)
where bp,t is the net replacement rate for the individuals.
5. The transfer Trt+1 is determined by:
Trt+1 =
0BBBBB@
JX
j=1
(1  'j)Nj,t
R
a0(j, a, ⌘, h) j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh)
JX
j=1
Nj,t+1
1CCCCCA (5.22)
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6. Expectations rh,et+k,t and w
h,e
t+k,t are updated using Equations (5.10-5.16).
7. The performance of the heuristic and the fraction of individuals using a certain
heuristic is determined via Equations (5.17-5.18).
8. The capital market, the labour market and the goods market clear every period t:
Kt+1 =
JX
j=1
Nj,t
Z
a0(j, a, ⌘, h) j,t(da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) (5.23)
Lt =
JR 1X
j=1
Nj,t
Z
n(j, a, e, ⇡, ⌘, H)"j⌘ (da⇥ d⌘ ⇥ dh) (5.24)
Yt =
JX
j=1
Nj,t
Z
c(j, a, ⌘, h) j,t(da⇥d⌘⇥dh)+Gc,t+(Kt+1 (1  )Kt) (5.25)
9. Government policies {Gc, Tn,t, Tk,t, Tc,t} are determined using Equation (5.9) and
the fraction of Yt used for government spending (gc) is endogenously determined
such that the government budget is balanced each period:
gc =
Tn,t + Tc,t + Tk,t   PPt
Yt
(5.26)
10. Yt is determined by equation (5.7).
11.  j+1,t+1 = Zj,t( j,t) where Zj,t is the law of motion induced by the exogenous
mortality rates, the exogenous Markov process for labour productivity, the endo-
genous asset accumulation and the heuristic switching regime.
5.6 Data and calibration
In this section, the parameterisation and calibration of the model is outlined in detail. The
lion’s share of the calibration is in line with the literature on quantitative OLG models
with idiosyncratic risk. The model is calibrated to Belgium for the period 2000-2007.
5.6.1 Demographics
Agents enter the economy at the age of 18 (model age = 1), retire at the age of 66 (model
age = 13) and live at most until the age of 94 years. Each period in the model lasts for four
years. The conditional survival probabilities {'j} are taken from the Human Mortality
Database and are for 2000.
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5.6.2 Technology and employment
The parameters regarding technology are {↵, A,  }. The capital share in production ↵
equals 0.36. The level of technology A is constant and normalised such that the equilib-
rium real wage rate in the benchmark model w is equal to 1. The depreciation rate   is
calibrated using a target for the equilibrium annual real interest rate of r = 4.5%.
5.6.3 Labour productivity shocks and parameters
In the model, an individual of age j and idiosyncratic shock ⌘ who works n hours will
earn a pre-tax wage of
wnj⌘"j (5.27)
I use the specification reported by Cournède and Gonand (2006) to calibrate the age-
specific productivity profile "j . The resulting profile is hump-shaped.
The productivity shock ⌘ can take three values: ⌘ 2 {⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3}. The Markov trans-
ition matrix is a (3x3)-matrix:
⌦ =
264⇢11 ⇢12 ⇢13⇢21 ⇢22 ⇢23
⇢31 ⇢32 ⇢33
375 (5.28)
where ⇢ij is the probability Pr(j|i) to end up in state j in the next period given state i
in the current period. Taking all this information together, the states of the Markov chain
{⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3} and the Markov transition matrix ⌦ still have to be determined. For the labor
productivity states {⌘1, ⌘2, ⌘3} in the labor earnings process, I use a discretised Markov
chain for a continuous AR(1)-process with persistence ⇣s and variance  2⌘ . The persistence
is chosen to be 0.969 and the variance 0.01 (Krueger and Ludwig, 2013).
The markov transition matrix for the idiosyncratic productivity risk is then given by
⌦ =
2640.8851 0.1113 0.00350.0557 0.8887 0.0557
0.0035 0.1113 0.8851
375
while the values for ⌘1, ⌘2 and ⌘3 are respectively 0.6029, 1 and 1.6587.
5.6.4 Preferences
The instantaneous utility function of the individuals is given by Equation (5.2)4. The
parameters to be calibrated are { , µ, ✓}. As in Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Krueger
4This functional form is often used in the quantitative OLG literature with idiosyncratic risk: see e.g.
Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Krueger and Ludwig (2013)
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Table 5.1: Calibration summary
Parameter values
Weight on leisure in utility function µ 0.6164 Average fraction of time spent working = 1/3
Discount factor in utility function   0.96
Coefficient of risk aversion ✓ 4 Conesa and Krueger (2006); Krueger and Ludwig (2013)
Level of technology A 4.478 w = 1
Capital share in production ↵ 0.36
Depreciation rate   0.36 r = 4.5%
Age-specific component of wages "j Cournède and Gonand (2006)
Tax rate on labour ⌧ 52.2% Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013)
Tax rate on consumption ⌧c 13.4% Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013)
Tax rate on capital ⌧k 26.8% McDaniel (2007)
Net replacement rate pension bp 0.631 OECD, Pensions at a Glance (2005)
and Ludwig (2013), ✓ is chosen to be 4. The relative weight on leisure µ, on the other
hand, is determined such that Belgian employed individuals work on average 1/3 of their
time. Using the values of µ and ✓, a coefficient of relative risk aversion of approximately
2 is obtained. Finally,   is set to 0.96.
5.6.5 Fiscal policy variables
The government in the model finances spending on goods and PAYG pensions with taxes
on consumption, capital and labour. For the tax rates ⌧c and ⌧ , I use the same data as
Heylen and Van de Kerckhove (2013). For details on the construction of these fiscal
policy variables, I refer to Heylen & Van de Kerckhove (2013, their Appendix 1). The
value for the capital tax rate ⌧k is determined using the tax series constructed by Cara
McDaniel. I use the average between 2000-20075. Regarding the basic PAYG-pension
received by the retired households in the model, I use data on the average net replacement
rate after retirement obtained from the OECD (Pensions at a Glance, 2005).
5.7 Simulations
5.7.1 Set-up
The goal of this paper is go beyond the rational expectations paradigm and use heurist-
ics to study the transitional dynamics following fiscal policy shocks. In this section, I
explore the effects of an unanticipated permanent labour tax decrease financed by gov-
5The updated tax series can be downloaded from www.caramcdaniel.com/researchpapers. The meth-
odology is discussed in McDaniel (2007).
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ernment spending. I proceed in two steps. In the first step, I assume that economic agents
have only one of the available heuristics to form expectations at their disposal. Thus, at
this point there is no heuristic switching. In a second step, I perform the same analysis,
however, now I do use the heuristic switching framework: i.e. I assume that agents eval-
uate the performance of the heuristic they are currently using. According to its relative
performance to other heuristics, individuals might switch to a different heuristic. All the
results discussed in the following subsections are for the scenario in which ⌧ is reduced
from 52.2% to 42.2%.
5.7.1.1 No heuristic switching
I perform the analysis in step 1 for different parameter values for the discount factor  ,
the coefficient of relative risk aversion ✓ and the parameters  1,  2,  5 and  6 governing
the adaptive and trend heuristics. For  , I use two different and rather extreme values:
0.98 and 0.86, whereas ✓ takes the values 2 and 46. The lower (higher) the value of ✓, the
higher (lower) the Frish elasticity of labour supply and the more (less) individuals respond
to different real wage rates. For  1 and  2, the two values are 0.1 and 0.9. In the latter
case, individuals are much faster in adjusting their expectations to current evolutions. To
conclude, the values used for  5 and  6 are 1 and 2. Higher values for the latter two
variables indicate that current evolutions matter less in the future. The values for  3,
 4 and  j remain constant over all scenarios. For the first two, I attach the value of 5.
That means that individuals take a total period of 20 years to average. The weights  j
are determined using the formula 9 2j25 , meaning that the weights are 9/25 for the current
period, 7/25 for the previous period, and 5/25, 3/25 and 1/25 for the other periods.
Thus, I end up with 4 parameter combinations of   and ✓. For each of these com-
binations, I have 4 different combinations for each of the adaptive expectations heuristics
(Equations (5.10) and (5.15)), 4 different combinations for each of the trend rule heurist-
ics (Equations (5.11) and (5.16)) and 1 single specification for the other three heuristics
(Equations (5.12-5.14)), leading to a total number of 76 scenarios.
5.7.1.2 Heuristic switching
Of course, not all individuals use the same heuristic to form expectations about the future
realisations of the interest rate and the real wage rate. It is more realistic to assume that
individuals have more than one heuristic at their disposal to form expectations. Therefore,
a next step is activating the heuristic switching framework. For these simulations, I use
the same range of parameter values for  , ✓,  1,  2,  5 and  6. The values for  3,  4
6I performed the analysis as well for ✓ = 10 but the results are highly similar to ✓ = 4.
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Table 5.2: Different initial distributions for the weights (fractions of individuals using the specific
heuristics).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
 1,0 (Adaptive (1)) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/7 1/4 0
 2,0 (Adaptive (2)) 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1/7 1/4 0
 3,0 (Trend (1)) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1/7 1/4 0
 4,0 (Trend (2)) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1/7 1/4 0
 5,0 (Average (1)) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1/7 0 1/3
 6,0 (Average (2)) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1/7 0 1/3
 7,0 (Myopic) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1/7 0 1/3
and  j are the same as well. Furthermore, I have to choose values for the parameters  ,
⇠ and k. For the first parameter  , measuring the degree to which individuals take the
past performance of heuristics into account, the values 0.2 and 0.9 are used. In the first
(last) case, individuals attach low (high) weight to errors in the past. For the second para-
meter ⇠, measuring the degree of inertia in the switching of individuals between different
heuristics, the values 0.1 and 0.9 are used. The latter value indicates that the fraction of in-
dividuals using a specific weight will change slowly, even if its performance is especially
good or bad. The last parameter k indicates the intensity of choice. I use two values:
0.1 and 100. The higher, the more people are inclined to switch to the best performing
heuristic.
I use all the combinations of these parameters for 10 different initial distributions
of weights, i.e. initial fractions of individuals using the different heuristics. These are
given in Table 5.2. For example, in (1), all agents start by using Adaptive (1) to form
expectations. When one heuristic is used extensively in the first periods of the transition
period, this could lead to different dynamics compared to when a second heuristic is used
heavily in the beginning.
5.7.2 Results
5.7.2.1 With vs without heuristic switching for   = 0.98 and ✓ = 4
The results for   = 0.98 and ✓ = 4 with and without heuristic switching are given in
Figure 5.17. The three panels on the left concern the scenarios without heuristic switching.
They display the median transitional dynamics for output, the real wage rate and the
7The permanent decrease in the labour tax occurs in period 1. The value for output in the old steady
state is 16.6. The initial steady state level for the pre-tax wage is 1. The results for   = 0.86/✓ = 4,
  = 0.98/✓ = 10,   = 0.86/✓ = 10 and   = 0.98/✓ = 2 are similar and are therefore not displayed
in this text. The conclusions mentioned in the text apply to these configurations as well. The results for
  = 0.86/  = 2 are discussed in the next subsection.
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forecast errors for all the different heuristics over all the different parameter values for  1,
 2,  5 and  6 as discussed in subsection 5.7.1.1. The three panels on the right concern
the results with heuristic switching for   = 0.98 and ✓ = 4. For each combination of
respectively ⇠,   and k, they show the median transitional path over all the combinations
for  1,  2,  5 and  6 and over all initial distributions as given in Table 5.2. Furthermore,
for the panels with heuristic switching, I also give an indication of the variation in the
transitional dynamics over all different scenarios. Note that the RE case is displayed
using the dashed line.
I start with the discussion for the results without heuristic switching. In the first period,
the difference between output in the rational expectations case (dashed line) and the heur-
istic scenarios is most pronounced. In the RE case, the value for wt is lower than the
value in the old steady state due to the higher labor supply. For the different heuristics,
however, the expectation for the wage equals the value for the real pre-tax wage rate in
the old steady state. As the individuals base their labour supply on their expectation for
w, they supply more labour relative to the RE case leading to a higher level of output. Af-
terwards, output decreases as employment decreases, but the increase in Kt counteracts
this decrease to some extent. These panels indicate that substantial output gains can be
achieved compared to the rational expectations case. In all heuristic cases, output over-
shoots its RE counterpart. This effect is most pronounced in the adaptive expectations
case, since expectations are lagging behind the most. When individuals use the trend
heuristic, there is some oscillation in the beginning. Overshooting is the largest when
average expectations are used.
Unsurprisingly, the dynamics of the actual real wage rate are closely related to the
heuristic used to form expectations. At first, the real wage rate is lower than its RE
counterpart, but it quickly catches up. The panels in the last row show the forecast errors.
The forecast error is negative when the expected value is bigger than the actual value
and positive otherwise. The oscillation following the trend heuristic is also clear from
the panels in the last row of Figure 5.1. The forecast error changes in sign compared to
the period before and gradually it converges to zero. In the adaptive expectations case,
forecast errors are always negative. Average expectations lead to a negative forecast error
in the beginning. Around the fifteenth period, they become positive for some periods.
Most importantly, these panels indicate that even for very common parameter values
for   and ✓, the resulting dynamics, both for output and wages but also for all the other
variables, are substantially different from the dynamics in the rational expectations case.
Second, they show that the resulting dynamics depend on the heuristic that is used and
the parameterisation of that heuristic. Thus, there is a certain degree of variation in the
dynamics.
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As for the results with heuristic switching, one can see that the distance between the
values of respectively + 1 standard deviation and -1 standard deviation from the mean
value in each period is small and quickly becomes smaller as time goes by. Thus, in
a framework without rational expectations and with heuristic switching, the effects of a
labour tax decrease become much more predictable and monotonic even though a lot of
individuals have different ways of forming expectations and even considering different
initial distributions. The heuristic switching framework enables policy makers to better
anticipate the effects of tax changes.
Figure 5.2 displays the boxplot of the value of Equation (5.17) for each period for each
heuristic over the transition. This figure gives a lot of information on how the different
heuristics are performing over the transition period. The two adaptive heuristics and the
two average heuristics perform the best in the beginning, as they are overall the slowest
ones to adjust their expectations. The trend rules are the worst performers in the begin-
ning. Over time, the myopic expectations heuristic gradually becomes the best performing
heuristic based on the median value of Equation (5.17). Another aspect worth mentioning
is the fact that for the adaptive and trend heuristics, the range of the values for Equation
(5.17) is much bigger compared to the others. This means that in some cases, especially
when the adjustment factors  1 and  2 are high, these heuristics perform extremely bad.
For the adaptive heuristics, this is typically after the tenth period.
The main message here is that after the heuristic switching regime has been activ-
ated, the variation in the transitional dynamics decreases significantly, meaning that the
transitional effects of a decrease in labour taxes become more predictable and monotonic
over all different parameter values in the specifications of the heuristics (both extreme
and moderate) and of the parameters in Equations (5.17) and (5.18) and over all possible
initial distributions. Thus, allowing for alternative expectations and a lot of heterogeneity
in terms of initial fractions does not lead to a wide range of possible transitional paths,
but decreases in fact the range in which the transitional dynamics are located.
5.7.2.2 With vs without heuristic switching for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2
In the previous subsection, I discussed the results for   =0.98 and ✓ = 4. As mentioned
previously, I also performed the same analysis for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2. I will, however,
discuss the results in a different way as I want to highlight a different feature of the
heuristic switching approach compared to the previous subsection.
Figure 5.1 showed that in all of the scenarios, the transitional dynamics converge to the
steady state. This is not always the case, however. In Figure 5.3, I include the transitional
dynamics for output for all the different heuristics but without heuristic switching when
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  = 0.86/✓=2 and over all the different parameter values as discussed in subsection
5.7.1.1. For a lot of the scenarios, the transitional dynamics oscillate around the steady
state or even diverge. The oscillations are very large in some cases. Not surprisingly, in all
the adaptive and trend scenarios in which individuals adjust their expectations faster ( 1
and  2 equal to 0.9), the dynamics diverge or experience large oscillations. For smaller
weights, the dynamics oscillate to a smaller extent. The variation in the dynamics is thus
very big.
With heuristic switching, the conclusion is different. Figure 5.4 reveals that the heur-
istic switching approach has a stabilising effect on the dynamics. Only when the agents
using the adaptive heuristic and the ones using the trend heuristic are simultaneously ag-
gressive in adjusting their expectations ( 1 =  2 = 0.9), the dynamics oscillate in some
cases. In all other cases, the heuristic switching approach stabilises the dynamics.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 further examine the sensitivity of the results to the memory para-
meter ( ), the noise parameter (k) and the inertia parameter (⇠) for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2.
First, the results for   = 0.2. Only when k = 100 and ⇠ = 0.9 do all the different
simulations over the parameter values for the specification of the heuristics and the initial
distributions converge. So even when  1 =  2 = 0.9, the scenario which appeared to be
problematic in the previous figure. When the noise is low, the economic agents will be
more able to detect the better performing heuristics. Combined with high inertia, meaning
that economic agents don’t quickly switch from heuristic, this leads to a stabilising effect
for all cases. The value of k is more important than ⇠. Even for low inertia, if there is not
a lot of noise, the lion’s share of the simulations converge.
When the memory parameter is higher, the conclusions from the previous figure are
even stronger. In this case, whenever k = 100, the dynamics will converge to the steady
state, even for low inertia. The oscillations in the cases where k = 0.1 are also smaller
than their counterparts in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.1: Transitional dynamics after a labour tax decrease for different heuristics and under rational expectations scenario
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Figure 5.2: Boxplot of the Squared Prediction Error for w for the different heuristics over the transition period
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Note: these boxplots are constructed using the Squared Prediction Error for a given heuristic in a given period over all parameter values discussed in Section 5.7.1.2.141
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Figure 5.3: Transitional dynamics after labour tax decrease for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2 without heuristic switching
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Figure 5.4: Transitional dynamics after labour tax decrease for   = 0.86 and ✓ = 2 with heuristic
switching split up for different combinations of  1 and  2
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5.8 Conclusion
This paper explores the stability and transitional dynamics of an overlapping generations
model with heuristic switching. Accordingly, this paper contributes to a growing literature
that goes beyond the rational expectations paradigm. I assume that agents use simple
rules, heuristics, to forecast the future course of the interest rate and the real wage. Agents
use these heuristics because, in general, they do not possess the cognitive abilities as
assumed by the RE literature nor to act as econometricians. Instead, the agents have a
certain number of different heuristics at their disposal. On a regular basis, they assess
the predictive power of the heuristic they are currently applying. If it performs well, the
probability that agents will use the same heuristic in the next period will be higher. If it
does not perform well, there is a higher probability that they switch to another rule.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature that goes beyond the rational
expectations paradigm by exploiting the heuristic switching approach within an Overlap-
ping Generations model. Triggered by a fiscal policy shock, the objective is to study the
transitional dynamics of the model for a large number of settings including one or mul-
tiple heuristics and compare the behaviour of the dynamics with their rational expectations
counterpart.
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Figure 5.5: Transitional dynamics after labour tax decrease for   = 0.86, ✓ = 2 and   = 0.2:
sensitivity of results to different values of the inertia and the noise
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Figure 5.6: Transitional dynamics after labour tax decrease for   = 0.86, ✓ = 2 and   = 0.9:
sensitivity of results to different values of the inertia and the noise
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
H
ig
h 
in
er
tia
 (ξ
 
=
 0
.9
)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
15.5
16
16.5
17
17.5
18
18.5
19
19.5
20
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
16
16.5
17
17.5
18
18.5
Lo
w
 in
er
tia
 (ξ
 
=
 0
.1
)
High noise (k = 0.1)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
16.6
16.8
17
17.2
17.4
17.6
17.8
18
18.2
18.4
Low noise (k = 100)
144
5.8. Conclusion
The simulations lead to three main findings. First, in a context without heuristic
switching (i.e. a context where individuals only have one heuristic at their disposal to
form expectations), the evolution of transitional dynamics can be substantially different
from the rational expectations case, especially in the first periods of the transition. Fur-
thermore, there is a lot of variation in the dynamics over different parameter values and
heuristics. This finding implies that if only heuristic is used, the macroeconomic impact
of fiscal policy is highly sensitive to the heuristic being used. What is more, as the dis-
count rate and the degree of risk aversion decrease, the model becomes unstable and the
corresponding transitional dynamics oscillate or even diverge. Second, after activating
the heuristic switching regime, the variation in the transitional dynamics decreases signi-
ficantly. Consequently, the sensitivity of the transitional effects of fiscal policy is much
lower now and its exact impact is thus less uncertain for policy makers. Third and last,
the heuristic switching has a stabilising effect on the transitional dynamics. For certain
configurations of the parameter values for which the dynamics were very unstable in the
absence of heuristic switching, the dynamics now converge to the steady state in most
cases.
These findings are important. They imply that allowing individuals to choose from a
wide range of forecasting rules is actually a better option than constraining them to use
only forecasting rule. It allows them to select the better performing rules, a feature that
not only enhances the stability of the model, but reduces the uncertainty in the transitional
dynamics as well.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions, Policy Recommendations,
and Avenues for Future Research
The final chapter of this dissertation aims to provide the reader with the overall conclu-
sions that can be drawn from this dissertation and the derived policy recommendations.
Its second objective is to highlight the avenues for future research that are potentially
interesting in my opinion.
Fiscal policy, labour market institutions, and the labour market
performance of low-skilled individuals
When it comes to the main conclusion of the first two papers, the title of this section says
it all. In other words, the results of these papers clearly indicate that both fiscal policy
and labour market institutions are crucial components (i) to explain the cross-country
variation in low-skilled unemployment and (ii) to design public policies that improve the
labour market position of the low-skilled significantly without compromising the welfare
of the unemployed.
Going into more detail with respect to (i), the Shapley decomposition performed in
the first paper reports an almost equal role for differences in fiscal policy variables and in
union preferences. Nor differences in fiscal policy nor differences in union preferences are
thus sufficient to explain why OECD countries differ in terms of labour market perform-
ance of the low-skilled. The interaction between the two does the trick. More specifically,
the source of unemployment is the above market-clearing wage chosen by the unions,
while fiscal policy variables explain a significant part of the magnitude of unemployment.
Despite the overall importance of fiscal policy, the different fiscal policy variables differ
significantly in terms of explanatory power, though. The key variable within the fiscal
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policy component is the net unemployment benefit replacement rate. Somewhat more
surprising, on the other hand, is the lack of explanatory power of labour taxes.
Not only do we need both components to explain low-skilled unemployment, the
design of public policy that aims at improving the labour market performance of the
low-skilled benefits from the interaction of the two as well, the implication being that
fiscal governments and unions have a mutual interest in joining forces for the design and
execution of such policies. Preferable policies feature a reduction in labour taxes for the
low-skilled combined with an obligation for the unions to accept lower wages. Policies
imposing a decrease in the unemployment benefit yield a similar improvement in the em-
ployment prospects of the low-skilled, but they are less preferable as they are very likely
to go hand in hand with welfare losses for those low-skilled individuals who remain un-
employed after all. Chapter 3 also demonstrates that the different fiscal policy instruments
may have a very different impact on unemployment, hours worked, and participation. In
other words, policymakers thus have to choose the instrument depending on the variable
they want to target. Only decreasing labour taxes, for example, has no use when the fiscal
government aims to decrease low-skilled unemployment. Decreasing the net unemploy-
ment benefit replacement rate and less aggressive wage policies by the union, on the other
hand, have a strong impact on low-skilled unemployment. But they have no use if the
target variable is the amount of hours worked per employed individual. Even more, if
policymakers choose labour taxes as the desired instrument, a decrease in the tax rate
faced by the employees is preferred over a decrease in the tax rate faced by employers as
the behavioural effects are much stronger in the former case.
Nevertheless, there are many roads ahead for future research. First, the richness of
the theoretical model used in the Chapter 3 is not yet used to the fullest. For example,
it would be interesting to study the importance of labour market frictions in the context
of pension reform. Using a search and matching set-up, de la Croix et al. (2013) find
that the macroeconomic effects of a shift from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension
scheme do indeed differ if labour market imperfections are considered. Furthermore, the
models can also be applied to determine the extent to which the decision to retire early
is influenced by the generosity of the early retirement benefits on the one hand and the
probability that a low-skilled individual is employed when he or she participates on the
other hand. A next avenue for future research is equally interesting and challenging. So
far, the theoretical model constructed in Chapter 3 is only used for an in-depth compar-
ison of steady states. The reason being that the computational complexity to solve the
model is very high. Moving beyond a steady state comparison and applying the model
to construct a transition path for each of the different policies would benefit hugely from
a reduction in this computational burden. A full transition path would be especially re-
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warding as it would allow for a detailed welfare analysis of consecutive generations, both
from an ex ante and an ex post perspective. As a result, the political feasibility of the
policy changes could be studied. These directions for future research would, if executed,
definitely sharpen the recommendations for policy makers.
Fiscal policy and alternative expectations
Compared to the previous subsection, the structure is now somewhat different. For the
sake of clarity, I will first elaborate on the conclusions that can be drawn from Chapters
4 and 5 with respect to the effectiveness and impact of fiscal policy under alternative ex-
pectations and the related policy recommendations. Thereafter, I provide some insights
on the use of rational versus alternative expectations. These recommendations and con-
clusions are mainly targeted at researchers. Finally, and similar to the previous section, I
will identify some avenues for future research.
The central result emerging from Chapter 4 is that a switch from rational expectations
to a learning set-up within the standard Real Business Cycle model is able to generate
a time-varying government spending multiplier, a feature which has been reported by
numerous empirical studies. What this ultimately implies, is that the effectiveness of
fiscal policy evolves over time.
Sensible policy recommendations, however, require insights into the drivers of the
government spending multiplier. One variable that is of particular interest to explain fluc-
tuations in the government spending multiplier is the importance households attach to
government spending when making decisions. A result that makes sense intuitively. If
households value information on government spending more when making decisions, the
impact of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy is bigger. So when do households attach
a large weight to government spending? Our analysis shows that the government spend-
ing multiplier is high after (i) a considerable period of increasing technology and low
government spending on the one hand, and (ii) after a considerable period of decreasing
technology and high government spending. In the basic RBC model, these conditions are
not often fulfilled. They are rather rare events in the current set-up. For shorter samples,
we see that the fluctuations in the government spending multiplier are smaller and that
these fluctuations occur around a rather steady level for the multiplier, where the level is
determined following the aforementioned conditions.
Do the results of Chapters 4 and 5 tell us something about whether rational expecta-
tions or alternative expectations have to be used? If the aim is to compare different steady
states, rational expectations is the better choice as learning is especially relevant for the
transitional dynamics. So what about the transitional dynamics then? At first sight, our
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results indicate that, in general, the transitional dynamics for both the learning framework
in Chapter 4 and the heuristic framework in Chapter 5 are fairly close to their rational
expectations counterpart. As such, one might conclude that rational expectations seems
a reliable set-up. However, Chapter 4 reveals that using rational expectations ignores the
time-varying government spending multiplier. The level of the multiplier could, however,
be of particular interest for the fiscal government. Chapter 5, on the other hand, indicates
that the transitional dynamics can be substantially different from their rational expecta-
tions counterpart, especially in the first periods of the transition. In this case, rational
expectations is thus not always a good approximation. If the researcher decides to use
heuristics, he or she has to use the heuristic switching approach. This approach yields
better results compared to the set-ups in which only one heuristic is used. Indeed, allow-
ing individuals to switch to better performing heuristics actually reduces the number of
possible trajectories. The transition of the macro-economy following a fiscal policy shock
is thus far less sensitive to how individuals form expectations if there are multiple heur-
istics at their disposal. As a result, rational expectations is a better approximation when
the switching mechanism is activated.
There are numerous avenues for further research. For example, the model that is being
used in Chapter 4 is a standard RBC model. Adding additional building blocks, in par-
ticular price rigidity and occasionally binding constraints such as the zero lower bound,
could sharpen our recommendations. Regarding Chapter 5, it would be highly interesting
to study other types of shocks, both transitional and permanent. In addition, adding other
heuristics and study their performance would also benefit the analysis in Chapter 5. A
next step could be to introduce aggregate risk in the model. So far, only a few lifecycle
models featuring idiosyncratic risk have introduced aggregate risk. The reason being that
the computational complexity of the model increases strongly. However, the heuristics
provide a elegant and useful approach to simplify the analysis. Furthermore, while labor-
atory research found that individuals do use the heuristic switching mechanism, it would
still be highly interesting to empirically test whether rational expectations or the heuristic
switching approach fits the data best.
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